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Abstract 
A Generic Architecture for Insider Misuse Monitoring in I T Systems 
Aung Htike Phyo 
BSc (Hons) 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been widely deployed within many 
organisations' IT nenvorks to delect network penetration attacks by outsiders and 
privilege escalation attacks by insiders. However, traditional IDS are ineffective for 
detecting o f abuse o f legitimate privileges by authorised users within the organisation i.e. 
the detection o f misfeasance. In essence insider IT abuse does not violate system level 
controls, yet violates acceptable usage policy, business controls, or code o f conduct 
defined by the organisation. However, the acceptable usage policy can vary from one 
organisation to another, and the acceptability o f user activities can also change depending 
upon the user(s), application, machine, data, and other contextual conditions associated 
with the entities involved. The fact that the perpetrators are authorised users and that the 
insider misuse activities do not violate system level controls makes detection o f insider 
abuse more complicated than detection o f attacks by outsiders. 
The overall aim o f the research is to determine novel methods by which monitoring and 
detection may be improved to enable successful detection o f insider IT abuse. The 
discussion begins with a comprehensive investigation o f insider IT misuse, encompassing 
the breadth and scale o f the problem. Consideration is then given to the sufficiency o f 
existing safeguards, with the conclusion that they provide an inadequate basis for 
detecting many o f the problems. This finding is used as the justification for considering 
research into alternative approaches. 
The realisation o f the research objective includes the development o f a taxonomy for 
identification o f various levels within the system from which the relevant data associated 
with each type o f misuse can be collected, and formulation o f a checklist for 
identification o f applications that requires misfeasor monitoring. Based upon this 
foundation a novel architecture for monitoring o f insider IT misuse, has been designed. 
The design offers new analysis procedures to be added, while providing methods to 
include relevant contextual parameters from dispersed systems for analysis and reference. 
The proposed system differs from existing IDS in the way that it focuses on detecting 
contextual misuse o f authorised privileges and legitimate operations, rather than detecting 
exploitation o f network protocols and system level \ailnerabilities. 
The main concepts o f the new architecture were validated through a proof-of-concept 
prototype system. A number o f case scenarios were used to demonstrate the validity o f 
analysis procedures developed and how the contextual data from dispersed databases can 
be used for analysis o f various types o f insider activities. This helped prove that the 
existing detection technologies can be adopted for detection o f insider IT misuse, and that 
the research has thus provided valuable contribution to the domain. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the context o f the research by presenting an 
overview of the main issues concerned with the monitoring o f insider misuse. It then 
outlines the aims and objectives o f the research, followed by a brief summary o f each o f 
the later chapters. 
1.2 Monitoring insider misuse 
Since the invention o f the first computer, organisations o f various disciplines have relied 
upon computing machines for solving complex problems such as calculations, code 
cracking, data storage, data manipulation, and statistical analysis. Today, components o f 
an IT system include: network infrastructure, computer hardware, operating systems, and 
business applications. With the invention o f the World Wide Web and the development 
o f critical applications, such as database systems, web browsers, and email, 
organisations' dependence upon FT infrastructure has increased, and they are now used to 
support many aspects o f business. 
Along with the commercial success o f the World Wide Web, the Internet has become one 
o f the mediums where large numbers o f business transactions are carried out daily. Many 
organisations conduct their business through the web, and provide web-based services to 
their customers. This attracted both the attention o f the customers, and also malicious 
hackers, resulting in increased level of attacks upon the public feeing ser\'ers (Power 
2002). External hackers may perform protocol exploitation attacks against the public 
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facing server, or exploitation o f server applications to gain higher privileges within the 
server system to gain a foothold. However, abuse o f granted access by organisation's 
employees (i.e. misfeasance) has also become a significant issue (Gordon et. a l . 2006). 
The increased dependence upon IT systems, and the threat posed by external attackers 
and insider misuse highlighted the need to protect the systems and data. This has resulted 
in the development and employment o f security tools and mechanisms, such as virus 
scanners, firewalls, and encryption tools, in order to protect the systems and data. Despite 
the employment o f preventive security mechanisms and tools, the attackers st i l l managed 
to penetrate the IT networks and continue to compromise the systems and avoid detection 
for long periods until the system administrator notices log entries that indicate the system 
security may have been compromised. However, it is impractical, i f not impossible to 
manually check log entries in an organisation with a large network o f computers. To 
solve this problem. Denning (Denning 1987), introduced the idea o f automated log 
analysers, which became widely known as Intmsion Detection Systems (IDS). Denning's 
idea was that when the preventive mechanisms fa i l , the IDS would analyse the log data 
related to network and systems to detect indications o f possible security breach. The 
concept o f IDS has been widely accepted since then and many IDS tools have been 
commercially developed in order to improve the monitoring o f network and host security. 
In 2006 the CSI/FBI survey indicated that 69% percent o f 616 respondents employed IDS 
products in their organisations (Gordon et. al. 2006) 
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However, traditional IDS were designed in order to detect type o f attacks usually carried 
out by outsiders. Thus, any inherent ability to detect misuse by authorised users would be 
a coincidence, rather by design. Nonetheless, it is conjectured that theoretically existing 
detection technologies and monitoring strategies can be adopted for monitoring o f insider 
IT misuse. 
The hypothesis behind this research is that although existing IDS technologies can be 
applied to insider misuse monitoring, IDS needs to be provided with the relevant 
knowledge and information for analysis before it can detect misfeasor activities. 
1.3 Aims and objectives of research 
The goal o f the research is to determine whether existing detection technologies 
employed in traditional intrusion detection systems can be utilised for detecting insider 
misuse activities, and i f so how they may be applied for successful detection o f insider IT 
misuse. The main objectives o f the research can be summarised as follows. 
1. Identify the motives o f misuse and the type o f activities that may result in misuse. 
2. Identify existing detection technologies and strategies that can be applied to 
insider misuse monitoring. 
3. Investigate and analyse the ways in which insider misuse incidents can be most 
effectively identified and monitored at a technology level 
4. Identify applications/operations and relevant contexmal information required for 
identifying each type o f misfeasor activity 
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5. Design and evaluate a generic conceptual misfeasor monitoring system 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 presents a general overview o f the insider misuse problem in order to create 
awareness, explaining the meaning o f insider in the context o f the research; defining 
the scope o f research and describing the kind o f activities that w i l l be considered for 
the research. This is followed by identification o f motivations behind misuse, and 
analysing the source o f the problem i.e. what created the opportunity for misuse? The 
chapter concludes by listing the factors that created the opportunity for misuse. 
Chapter 3 considers the factors that presents the opportunity for misuse, and outlines 
the list o f technical and non-technical controls, which i f implemented can 
dramatically reduce the likelihood o f some o f the misuses occurring. It then presents 
the preventive mechanisms currently available to protect the data and systems, 
highlighting the factors cmcial to maintaining system and data security. The chapter 
concludes by reasoning why preventive mechanisms alone cannot assure system 
security, and emphasises on the need for monitoring mechanisms. 
Chapter 4 compares and analyses current IDS in terms o f the architecture, 
technologies utilised, and the strategies employed for detection o f misuse. This is 
then followed by a discussion o f their relevance and limitations with regard to 
monitoring insider misuse. The chapter also evaluates the information analysed by 
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current IDS and their relevance in detecting misfeasor activity. The chapter ends with 
highlighting the need to analyse relevant data for each type o f misuse. 
Chapter 5 starts with a review o f current intrusion taxonomies, and presents a 
detection-oriented classification o f insider misuse. This outlines where the relevant 
data for analysis may be collected within the various levels (i.e. network, system, 
application, and data) o f the IT infrastructure. It concludes by emphasising the need to 
provide the monitoring system with the log data o f user interaction within the 
application environment. 
Chapter 6 starts by highlighting the need to identify information, applications and 
functions that require misfeasor monitoring. It then presents a checklist for 
identifying applications and functions that require misfeasor monitoring. It concludes 
by explaining why acceptable usage policy (regarding data, and operation) and 
contextual reference data is required in order to detect abuse o f legitimate access. 
Chapter 7 presents the conceptual architecture o f a novel Misfeasor Monitoring 
System, describing how existing technologies and strategies f i t within the 
architecture. It then explains how the logs, policies, and contextual information w i l l 
be analysed for decision-making during the monitoring process. 
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Chapter 8 describes the components o f Misfeasor Monitoring System demonstrator, 
detailing how the contextual information provided is utilised. It then demonstrates the 
applicability o f existing detection technologies, and strategies to misfeasor 
monitoring by evaluating the demonstrator system against a number o f misfeasor 
activities. 
Chapter 9 presents the main conclusions o f the research carried out, outlining the 
principle achievements and limitations o f the work, as well as suggestions for further 
improvements. 
Chapter 2 Nature of Insider IT Misuse 
Chapter 2 Nature of Insider IT Misuse 
2.1 Introduction 
Insider IT misuse is a broad subject, and it is not possible to cover all aspects o f misuse 
activities that may be performed by employees o f the organisation. This chapter w i l l 
present the focused scope o f the research, and define the meaning o f insider, and misuse 
within the context o f the thesis. 
2.2 Definition of Insider 
From the organisation's point o f view, insiders can be employees, part-time employees, 
consultants, contractors, and employees o f partner firms. From the system's perspective, 
insiders are users with a valid login account to access the resources it manages and 
services it provides. Users may be physically located insider or outside the organisation, 
but have the same logical presence within the IT system. For example, a telecommuting 
user who works from home by connecting to the organisation's network via VPN has 
logical presence on the system, but not physically inside the organisation where servers 
are located. By contrast, some individuals may be physically inside the organisation, but 
lack a valid user account to access the systems. For example, a cleaner who has physical 
access to the building and the offices within it, but do not have a valid user account in 
order to access the computers located in the building. In this context, they are regarded as 
logical outsiders, and for the purpose o f this research the term Mnsider' refers to users 
with valid login accounts (i.e. the logical insiders), and do not consider physical insiders. 
Although, one thing to note is that once and individual has gained access to a system, 
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whether the individual is legitimately authorised or not, it is very d i f f icu l t to differentiate 
between legitimate user and illegitimate user from the system's point o f view. 
2.2.1 The scope of insider within the thesis 
Logical insiders i.e. authorised users o f the system with legal login accounts to access the 
organisation's IT systems. Physical insiders who have no logical presence are not 
considered for monitoring, i.e. theft o f hardware or wiretapping is not within the scope o f 
the research. It is also assumed that the BIOS is protected to prevent the system from 
loading an altemative operating system, and physical security is present to prevent 
addition o f unauthorised hardware (such as a wireless network card). 
2.3 Different categories of I T misusers 
Although the great majority o f the people are familiar with the generic meaning o f the 
word 'misuse', when attempting to map it to an IT context, there is a need to clarify 
certain issues. Insider IT misuses can be a very subjective term, and one o f the most 
challenging tasks is to draw a clear line that separates an f f misuser from a person who is 
using a system in an acceptable way and for an approved purpose. The word 'misuse' 
implies the presence o f rules that specify the conditions o f allowable usage for the 
resources concemed. These rules are often embodied within an IT usage policy. 
Although this is not diff icul t to grasp, vagueness is introduced by the term misuse and 
what it means to different people or organisations. What is considered illegitimate use in 
one particular organisation can be perfectly acceptable for another. For example, 
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browsing the web for personal use is outlawed entirely in some companies, whereas 
odiers are somewhat more relaxed about it and impose varying limits upon what is 
acceptable (e.g. some may permit up to 20 minutes per day, whereas others may allow 
twice this). However, such a policy, and hence the definition o f misuse, can differ from 
one organisation to the other. Thus no single definition o f misuse is appropriate for all 
organisations. 
The term "misuse" is interchangeably used for both outsider attacks and insider abuse. In 
addition, the nature/methods o f insider misuses can also differ. Therefore, the usage o f 
the term within the context o f this research needs to be made clear. 
Anderson (1980) provided classification o f internal security breaches within an IT 
context. Anderson divided intemal misuses into three distinct categories: 
• Masqueraders: These are intemal users, who have exploited the flaws within the 
operating system to impersonate the identity o f another user, and thus evading 
accountability. When this occurs, the malicious activities the masquerader has 
carried out wi l l be audited under the identity o f the user the perpetrator has 
impersonated. Some of the privilege escalation attacks fall within this category. 
This type o f misuse is not considered within the scope o f this research. 
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• Clandestine users: These are internal users, who evade auditing by operating at a 
lower level than where the actual auditing occurs. For example, i f the auditing 
occurs at the application level, and the user accesses the data through an arbitrary 
application that does not provide auditing facility, detection can be avoided. It is 
very di f f icul t to detect what actually happed to the system and data stored on it , 
when the user has evaded auditing. Therefore, avoiding detection for a longer 
period o f time, and by the time someone notices that something is wrong with the 
system/data; the perpetrator might have left the organisation. This emphasise the 
need to monitor the application utilised for the access o f file (resources) or 
performing an activity. IMMS requires applications to provide audit data in order 
to analyse user activity within the application environment. Thus, i f the user 
accessed the file (resource) through an arbitrary application, auditing may be 
avoided. This turns a misfeasance (legitimate operation at the operating system 
level) to a clandestine activity. 
• Misfeasors: These are the internal users, who abuse their existing system and 
application level privileges by utilising the system and resources in an 
inappropriate manner or for unapproved purpose. This can happen when the user 
has been assigned more privileges than actually necessary to carryout his/her daily 
tasks. The users may be assigned higher privileges by mistake, or because the 
access controls are not granular enough and hence forcing the system 
administrator to assign the user slightly higher privileges than necessary. 
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However, even when the principle o f lease privilege is applied, such privileges 
may still be abused, such as transferring a confidential document to someone not 
authorised to access, or configuring the system in such a way that the security is 
weakened. 
Various other classifications o f security breaches exist, and they w i l l be detailed in 
Chapters. 
23.1 Scope of misuse within the thesis 
Within the scope o f this research, only misfeasor activities are considered for monitoring 
and clandestine users, or masqueraders are not included. Prior to proceeding further, the 
definition o f misfeasance need to be made clear. Anderson's (1980) definition o f 
misfeasance is fairiy technical and not easily understood. A less technical and more 
general definition o f "misfeasance" is defined in Microsoft Encarta World English 
Dictionary as; 
Misfeasance: "illegally performing something legal: acting improperly or 
illegally in performing an action that in itself is lawful" 
Microsoft Encarta Worid English Dictionary (Encarta 2005) 
Therefore, interpretation o f misfeasance in the scope o f this research is that the operation 
itself is lawful when viewed fi-om the perspective o f the operating system and access 
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controls, yet unlawful when view from the perspective o f the application^usiness context 
and organisation's code o f conduct. However, the acceptable usage policy may also differ 
from one organisation to another. For example, some organisation may permit/encourage 
information sharing among colleagues, while others may deem such a practice 
unacceptable. The acceptability o f sharing information may also depend upon the content, 
the users involved, the responsibilities o f the users involved, and the tools (machine, and 
application) utilised for access. 
2.4 Types of misuses 
Various legitimate activities carried out by authorised users may result in misuse within 
the context o f the acceptable usage policy defined by the organisation. This section 
presents the nature o f activities that may violate the acceptable usage policy o f some 
organisations. The categorisation o f misuse activities in this section have been derived 
from the triennial Audit Commission Computer Fraud and Abuse surveys. The 
categorisation here is based on the potential consequences o f the activities, while the 
classification in Chapter 5 is based upon the level o f the system at which the detectable 
evidence may manifest itself The nature o f acfivities presented in this section is 
considered on the basis of their potential impact upon the organisation's finance, 
reputation, productivity, and legal liability. 
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2.4J Internet access abuse 
The organisation can be held Hable for the external content accessed/downloaded by its 
employee. Not only can result in loss o f employee productivity (Haines 2007), but the 
downloaded images, video, and audio can bring disrepute to the organisation. I f the 
accessed multimedia content breached copy rights, the organisation may be held liable. 
The websites accessed and the content downloaded may also introduce malware to the 
organisation's IT systems. The file types requiring investigation are vocal, instrumental 
and visual content. In terms o f downloading, no organisation to date has been held liable 
for accessing inappropriate textual content by its employees. However, uploading 
inappropriate content o f all types (textual, vocal, instrumental, visual) by its employees 
can implicate the organisation. 
In 2004, die Department o f Work and Pensions was shamed by the discovery o f 
pomographic pictures on organisation's computers. The investigation revealed that over 
two million pomographic pages were accessed within a period o f eight months, and more 
than 18,000 of the images and sites accessed involve child abuse (Lea 2004). This 
undoubtedly damaged the reputation o f the organisation, and led to the sacking o f sixteen 
employees, and two hundred disciplinary cases. 
2.4,2 Information theft 
Espionage o f political and corporate nature has existed long before the utilisation o f IT 
systems by organisations for the management o f its information. However, within non IT 
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environment, the amount o f information stolen can be limited, physical activity can be 
noticed by colleagues, and physical security may deter documents being stolen. I f an 
employee wanted steal information he/she must memorise the information little by little 
each time to take home, steal the original copy or photocopy the documents and attempt 
to pass through security checks to take it out o f the premises. I f the perpetrator chose to 
memorise the information, it may be less accurate, and it wi l l take time. I f the perpetrator 
chose to steal the original copy of the information, someone else needing access to the 
information may notice it missing. I f the perpetrator chose to photocopy the documents 
using one o f organisation's photocopiers, colleagues may notice and arouse suspicion and 
leading to a closer investigations. However, within IT environments large volumes o f 
information may be stolen within a short period. User activity within the system cannot 
be easily noticed by colleagues. Information can be easily duplicated without anyone 
noticing, the original copy won't be missing from its original location for a second and 
still accommodating access by other users. Information can be transferred through the 
network, bypassing physical security checks. When connection to the extemal network is 
not available, the information may be hidden within removable storage media prior to 
sneaking it out o f the premises. 
Recently, a fonner employee (Nigel Stepney, head o f performance engineering) o f the 
Formula One team Ferrari has been accused o f providing proprietary information to the 
chief designer o f the rival McLaren team. The 500 page technical documents containing 
Ferrari proprietary information were found at the McLaren chief designer's home, and the 
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computers are being examined by experts for forensic evidence (BBC 2007a). Such a feat 
would have been very d i f f icuh without the utilisation o f IT systems. The employee would 
have had to memorise the information in small pieces, and the accuracy o f the 
information could be in doubt. Assuming physical security is present, it would be very 
dif f icul t to steal a 500 page document in one go without the use o f IT. 
2.4,4 Breach of privacy/confidentiality 
Inappropriate access o f organisation's databases can result in breach o f confidentiality 
and privacy. Targets o f abuse include: 
- Organisation's business database 
- Organisation's employee database 
- Organisation's customer database 
In March 2000, a police officer in North Queensland, Australia, admitted utilising the 
police database for personal reasons (Taylor 2000). The 20 year old police officer 
performed 6,900 searches on the police database within a period o f two months, and at 
least 300 o f the searches were not related to off ic ia l work. The perpetrator used the police 
database to check for potential girlfriends, domestic violence within his neighbourhood, 
old school friends, neighbours, and govemment cars he wanted to buy. 
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The above example is a classic case o f misfeasance, where the perpetrator has authorised 
access, the operation itself is legitimate, and part o f the perpetrator's work. Although, 
none o f the system level access controls were violated, and the operation itself is 
legitimate, the context in which the operation was performed violated moral and ethical 
conduct. The fact that system level controls were not violated, the operation itself is 
legitimate and part o f the perpetrator's responsibilities makes detection o f misfeasance 
more diff icul t in comparison to detection o f outsider attacks. 
2,4,5 Sabotage 
Sabotage can result from various activities, such as deletion o f important files, writing 
bad data to corrupt information, or deliberate misconfiguration o f the system to 
compromise security. The consequence of sabotage can result in: 
- Destruction o f critical data (business, and customer databases) 
- Disturbance o f ser\Mce (web, ecommerce, production, or intemal data 
services) 
- Weakening o f system security (disabling virus scanners, addition o f 
vulnerable networked services) 
- Deliberately causing the application to malfunction (inappropriate 
configuration o f application settings). 
Therefore, activity verification and establishing o f accountability is required. 
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In May 2000, a former employee o f Omega Engineer Corp. who held the position o f 
system administrator was convicted for deletion o f proprietary software belonging to the 
organisation (Gil l 2002), which resulted in USSIO million damages to the organisation. 
The fact that the perpetrator was a system administrator makes automated detection 
useless due to lack o f segregation o f duties. Therefore, system administrative operations 
should be verified by a second party, and segregation o f duties needs to be employed 
between the person performing the operation and the person verifying the operation. 
2.4.6 Fraud 
Within IT systems fraudulent activities usually involve database access and entry o f 
inappropriate data. Fraud can affect data integrity, financial loss, and damage to 
reputation. 
In 1996 two credit union employees colluded for several months to alter credit reports in 
return for payment (Randazzo et. al. 2004). The employees were responsible for updating 
credit reports based on the information provided. However, the perpetrators abused their 
authorised access by removing negative credit indicators in exchange for money. 
2.5 Factors leading to misuse 
According to Schultz (2002), a combination o f three main factors can lead to insider 
misuse o f IT systems. The outlined factors are: 
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• Capability 
The perpetrator must have the technical know-how, and/or a good 
understanding o f the targeted system. The system here does not l imit to the 
network or the operating system, it can include user application, security 
policy, or business rules, i.e. in order to bend the rules one must first know 
what the mies are and the loopholes that may be exploited. 
• Motivation 
Merely having the capability does not necessarily mean that the individual 
w i l l misuse. The perpetrator must also have the motivation to misuse, 
although sometimes accidental misuses can occur. However, one thing to note 
is that an innocent error gone unnoticed can also lead to misuse as the 
individual may believe that the activity w i l l not be noticed. 
• Opportunity 
Having the motivation and capability are essential ingredients for a potential 
misfeasor. However, the perpetrator also needs the opportunity to misuse. The 
opportunity may present itself in the form o f technical \ailnerabilities 
(protocol, system, and policy), lack o f segregation o f duties by management, 
or loopholes within business rules. The opportunity may sometimes appear in 
the form o f an error gone unnoticed (Coderre 1999). Possibly due to lack o f 
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security and acceptable usage awareness training, many o f the misfeasors did 
not consider the negative consequence that may result from their activities 
(Randazzo et. al. 2004). 
When the three fectors combine, the potential for occurrence o f misuse becomes higher. 
I f the exploitation o f loopholes is involved detection may be avoided for long periods, 
and only detected by accident or when management changes. 
2.5J Capability 
Depending upon the role o f the employee, and the associated responsibilities, the 
capability and the nature o f misuse may differ (Magklaras and Fumell 2002). System 
administrators have the capability for sabotage and data theft, accountants have the 
capability for financial fraud, sales representatives have the capability to steal customer 
information, data analyst have the ability to access sensitive business data, and common 
users have the ability to abuse internet access. Therefore, almost every system users have 
the capability to misuse in one form or another, although the severity o f the actions can 
differ. 
2.5.2 Motivations behind misfeasance 
First o f all, it is important to understand the motivations for insider misuse in order to 
identify the type o f applications that are most likely to be misused, and the nature o f 
information that is subject to misuse. It has been identified that the main motivations 
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behind insider misuse can be categorised in to that o f financial gain, ego, vengeance, and 
recreation. The motivations identified are based on the study carried out by Shaw et. al. 
(1998b). Some o f the scenarios described here are manifestation o f each motive within IT 
systems in order to gain insight for identifying the type o f activities and the nature o f data 
targeted for each motive. 
Intentional misfeasor cases are performed for a variety o f reasons including greed, 
revenge, ego gratification, express anger, impress others, to protect or advance career, or 
a combination o f the motives mentioned (Shaw et. al. 1998a). A suitable way to sub-
divide them is to consider the motives in a way that could detect the ultimate goal of the 
abuser. It might be inferred, for example, that a legitimate user is trying to access 
sensitive data (data theft), take revenge against a particular person or an entire 
organisation (personal differences), cover indications o f unprofessional behaviour, or 
deliberately ignore a particular regulation o f the information security policy. 
2.5.2.1 Financial Gain 
In this category, the activity carried out results in direct financial gain to the individual. 
The users may commit fi-aud within financial systems, or steal proprietar>'/confidential 
information contained within files or database systems. The nature o f content may differ 
f rom one organisation to another. Examples o f important files include, source code, 
research documents, product designs, contracts, and internal memos. Examples o f 
financial systems include payroll, inventory control, stock management, order 
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management, invoice systems, claimant systems, accounting systems, and banking 
systems. Examples o f information databases include customer databases, product 
databases, financial records, salary information, personal records, criminal databases, 
supplier records, and technical data. 
Under certain circumstances, the misfeasor may only have to create opportunity so that 
someone else can steal valuable information. An example o f this is, knowingly installing 
a Trojan program on a machine, which has access to important information, so that the 
creator o f the Trojan program can access the information. Another example o f this kind 
is, intentionally weakening the security o f the machine or disabling a monitoring system, 
which has access to confidential information, so that someone else may compromise the 
machine in order to access the desired information. 
2.5.2.2 Ego and Pressure 
In the cases o f Nick Leeson (1997), and Iguchi (Dowell 1997), their initial intentions 
were to hide small errors in order to save face and live up to expectations. However, in 
order to recover the losses they took higher risks, which led to more loss. 
In the case o f Jett (Dhillon and Moores 2001), it may have been the pressure to perform, 
although motivation may also involve financial gain through performance bonuses. 
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Therefore, databases referenced for performance monitoring and bonus calculation are 
subject to fraudulent modifications. 
2.5.2.3 Vengeance 
In this category, any activity carried out by the individual may not result in direct 
financial gain, but nonetheless give a sense o f power and satisfaction to the culprit. 
However, the result o f the activities wi l l be damaging to the organisation. The affect may 
be on products, organisation's image/reputation, or productivity. Targets o f abuse are all 
valuable files, documents, records, and services. These are subject to disturbance, 
destmction, and undesired exposure. The culprit may delete files containing valuable 
content, such as source codes, and product designs. Important records such as customer 
data and financial records may be doctored to compromise the integrity o f valuable data. 
Systems, Applications, and other mechanisms within the organisation may be attacked in 
various ways to halt/delay productivity. Web services provided by the organisation may 
become subject to DoS attacks, rendering the organisation's ser\'ices unavailable to 
customers. Therefore, any application or ser\'ice that is essential to the day-to-day 
functioning o f the organisation is subject to abuse, and any information that is valuable or 
potential embarrassment to the organisation is subject to exposure. In certain cases, the 
user may not actually carry out the attacks, but rather create an opportunity for someone 
else to create havoc within organisation's IT systems. 
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2.5.2.4 Recreation, Breach of Privacy, Curiosity, Social Engineering, Naivety, Accidental 
Misuse, Un-Wittedly Running a Trojan Application 
In this category, the activities may not result in significant financial gain to the 
individual. However, it may still result in damage to organisation's assets, reputation, and 
productivity as side effect. While surfing the web, users may access websites that contain 
inappropriate content that may contain viruses, and Trojans that may affect organisation's 
IT systems. Some of the content accessed by users such as pornography may also damage 
organisation's reputation, and sometimes the organisation may be held legally liable. In 
addition, while the users are surfing the web, writing personal emails, perusing personal 
emails, downloading entertainment media, and playing online games, the user are unable 
to carry out productive work, resulting in reduced overall productivity (Carr 2005). A 
study based on 3,500 U K companies revealed that the users who visit social network sites 
during work hours may be costing firms over £130 millions a day (BBC 2007b). Web 
browsers, emails, and other communication programs are becoming essential to many 
organisations, and monitoring user activity within these environments are important. 
However, the users can be prevented from installing undesired programs, such as 
computer games, and entertainment applications. 
2.5.3 Opportunity 
Insider misuse occurs when a ready mind meets an opportunity (Tuglular 2000, Audit 
Commission 1994). Therefore, circumstances that present opportunity for misuse needs 
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to be idemified. The opportunity may arise due to weakness or lack o f managerial and 
technical controls (Cappelli et al. 2006) and the situations in which this can arise are: 
• Lack of awareness by users 
Sometimes misuse may result from users being unaware o f the security culuire or 
the acceptable usage policy o f the organisation. Employees may share passwords, 
or critical files, when they are not provided with security awareness training. 
• Lack of properly defined security (or acceptable usage) policy 
For example, employees may abuse Internet access inadvertently when they are 
not provided with the acceptable IT usage policy guidelines. 
• Failure to define proper segregation of duties 
The opportunity to misuse granted privileges arise when the person performing an 
operation is also responsible for verification o f the activities. This principle is 
applicable across all systems, environments, and organisations. This part o f the 
problem is al the managerial level o f the organisation (assuming the system 
environment facilitates segregation o f duties), and formal segregation o f duties 
needs to be defined. 
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• Faihire to enforce segregation of duties 
When an IT system administrator is responsible for all aspects o f system 
maintenance (including development o f security policy, and detection o f security 
breaches), and a second party cannot be involved for verifying the activities o f the 
system administrator, opportunity to abuse trust arises. Technical limitations o f 
the system environment may prevent enforcing segregation o f duties, which w i l l 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
• Faihtre to enforce principle of least privilege 
Sometimes, the opportunity for misuse arises when the users are assigned more 
privileges than required to perform their daily duties (Brackney and Anderson 
2004). In such cases, the users may have authorised access to confidential files 
that is not required to perform their assigned tasks, or have the privilege to 
perform operations that is not part o f their responsibilities. This kind o f situations 
can arise when security policy is poorly defined, or implemented, which may be 
due to lack o f understanding by the person responsible for assigning privileges. 
Therefore, it is essential that the assigned privileges and access rights are verified 
to ensure conformance to need to know/perform basis. 
2.6 The scale of misuse 
I f one takes a look back to computer crime literature and surveys dating up to the mid-
90s, the evidence presented would certainly suggest that the main threat was to be found 
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from one's own staff, with as much of 80% o f computer crime believed to be the result o f 
insider activity (Power 1995). In more recent years, however, many sources have 
indicated a significant rise in extemally sourced incidents (principally in terms o f 
Intemet-based attacks such as website defacement and denial o f service), with the 
consequence that although insider misuse is still significant, it now accounts for a far 
lesser proportion o f raw incidents. For example, in the UK, results from the Department 
o f Trade & Industry's Information Security Breaches Survey 2006 revealed that overall 
only 32% o f businesses considered their worst security incident to have been caused by 
an insider (DTI 2006). However, when considering the large businesses (wi th over 250 
employees) only, 52% considered their worst security incident to have been caused by an 
insider. 
Another source that has monitored the changing trend regarding internal and extemal 
attack is the annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Looking back to 
1995, a key observation fi-om the CSI was that "the greatest threat comes fi-om inside 
your own organisation" (Power 1995). In more recent years, however, the survey results 
have painted a rather different picture, and by 2005 it was reported that, incidents 
originating from both inside and outsider are almost equal (Gordon et. al. 2005). This 
indicates that insider incidents require as much attention as those coming f rom outside. In 
addition CEOs o f most organisations w i l l be more interested in the effect that the 
incidents had on their bottom line. In 2006 CSI/FBI survey 7% o f the respondents 
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considered that more than 80% o f the loss is accountable to insider incidents (Gordon et. 
al 2006). 
Many o f the categories used in the CSI/FBI results encompass incidents that could 
potentially have been both intemally and externally sourced (e.g. theft o f proprietary 
information, sabotage o f data networks, and vims). However, three o f the categories very 
clearly indicate the source, and it is interesting to see the level o f the annual losses that 
were associated in each case. The relevant information is presented in Table 2 .1 . 
Supporting results from the ICT Fraud and Abuse 2004 survey (Audit Commission, 
2005) also reveal that the majority o f the perpetrators (over 80%) originated from inside 
the organisation, with operational staff 37%), administrative/clerical staff 31%o, and 
managers 15%. 
It is quite evident from the results that, although the proportion o f externally sourced 
incidents had exceeded intemal ones, the quantifiable losses in the latter case are 
significantly higher than those attributable to outside hackers. It is therefore clear that, in 
real terms, the level o f the insider threat is still much greater than that exhibited by 
external hackers. 
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Year System penetration 
by outsider 




1998 SI,637,000 33,720,000 350,565,000 
1999 S2,885,000 37,576,000 53,567,000 
2000 37,104,000 327,984,740 322,554,500 
2001 519,066,600 335,001,650 $6,064,000 
2002 813,055,000 350,099,000 54,503,000 
2003 32,754,400 311,767,200 3406,300 
2004 3901,500 310,601,055 54,278,205 
2005 3841,400 36,856,450 331,322,100 
2006 3758,000 31,849,810 310,617,000 
Total 349,002,900 $155,455,905 3133,877,105 
Table 2.1 Annual losses for selected incidents from C S I / F B I surveys 
The CSI figures relating to insider abuse o f network access cleariy suggest that, as well as 
bringing considerable advantages in terms o f web and email communication, hitemet 
access has also ushered in a whole range o f new problems. This can be further evidenced 
by a surv'ey o f 544 human resources managers, conducted in 2002 and targeting large U K 
companies (with Marge' in this case being defined as those employing an average o f 
2,500 people). The results revealed thai almost a quarter o f them (23%) had felt obliged 
to dismiss employees in relation to Internet misconduct (with the vast majority o f these 
cases - 69% - being linked to the downloading o f pornographic materials) (Leyden, 
2002). Many other cases resulted in less severe courses o f action, such as verbal 
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warnings or a discreet word in the ear o f the person concerned, and in total the results 
indicated that 72% of respondents had encountered Internet misuse in some form. 
In 2002 Information Security magazine survey, 23% o f respondents rated authorized 
users as their most important problem, while 11% reported unauthorized users as their 
most important problem (Briney and Prince 2002). Similarly, results from the 
Department o f Trade & Industry's Information Security Breaches Survey 2002 revealed 
that 34% o f businesses considered their worst security incident to have been caused by an 
insider (DTI 2002). Indeed, the fact that insiders are already within the organisation 
often puts them in an ideal position to misuse a system i f they are inclined to do so. The 
insider abuse can be more damaging than many outsider attacks, since the perpetrators 
have a good idea o f what is sensitive and valuable within the company. ICnowing where 
these resources are stored, and what security mechanisms are used to protect them, also 
helps insiders in circumventing controls and evading detection (Einwechter2O02). 
2.7 Famous Cases 
Although mainstream media have focused mainly on viruses, worms, and hacker attacks, 
there have been a few insider cases that gained fame or notoriety in recent years. The 
cases that follow demonstrate that although insider incidents may be rare, the cost o f a 
single incident can have a significant impact. 
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2.7. / Joseph Jett vs. Kidder Peabody (Dhillon and Moores 2001) 
Joseph Jett was an employee o f securities bank Kidder Peabody. His 
responsibilities included arbitrage o f bonds. Kidder Peabody relied heavily on 
expert systems for the valuation o f transactions in the bond market, and for 
automated calculation o f loss and profits. Jett had good understanding o f how the 
bond market, and how the expert system at Kidder evaluates loss and profits. Jett 
realised that by performing forward transactions, the time for registering losses in 
lost and profit statements wi l l be postponed indefinitely, generating profits only. 
As a result o f phoney profits from his trades, Jett earned more than $14million in 
salary and bonuses, and his activities remain undetected for two years. He was 
only charged with record keeping violations, and avoided charges o f fraud. 
Jett's case is a great example o f misfeasor behaviour within IT environment. He 
was authorised for all the activities he carried out. He was performing legitimate 
operations, yet in an unexpected and inappropriate manner. He did not violate 
network, operating system, or application level controls. He merely exploited the 
loopholes regarding the evaluation o f transactions with the understanding o f the 
bond trading market. 
2,7,2 Nick Leeson vs. Barings Bank (Asiaweek 1995) 
Nick Leeson was an employee o f Barings bank, and his responsibilities included 
managing operations on futures markets in Singapore Monetary Exchange. He 
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was responsible for both trading and recording his trades, lacking proper 
segregation o f duties; an unusual practice in the banking industry. Leeson 
gambled on highly speculative markets without authorisation, and at first he was 
making large profits. However, his luck ran out, and Leeson hid his losses 
totalling more than SI.4 billion in an account numbered 88888. Although there is 
not much technical involvement in this case as in Jett's. this example 
demonstrates the importance o f formal segregation o f duties and that insider 
misuse is a management problem as much as technical. 
2,7.3 Tim Lloyd vs. Omega (Gaudin 2000) 
Tim Lloyd was a trusted employee o f Omega for over ten years. He was 
responsible for planning and building o f Omega's first computer network for its 
Bridgeport manufacturing plant. He was in sole charge o f all the network 
administration duties including backing up data and management o f backup tapes. 
A week before he was fired, Lloyd asked all the users for all the programs stored 
on local systems and moved to the server. After he was fired, Lloyd planted a 
time bomb that deleted nearly every program stored on the server. The programs 
deleted were used for the manufacturing o f 25, 0000 different products. Lloyd had 
also stolen the backup tapes and formatted them. This led to delayed production, 
and resulted in losses o f around S10 mil l ion. 
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This case demonstrates the perils o f lack o f segregation o f duties at both 
organisation level and within the IT environment. Lloyd did not violate any 
system level policies, because he made the policies, and he was responsible for 
making system level policies. His activities could not have been detected, because 
he was responsible for verifying his own operations. He was only charged for 
theft o f backup tapes. 
2JJ Robert Hanssen vs, FBI 
Robert Phillip Hanssen was an employee o f the FBI, and was assigned to the New 
York Field Office 's intelligence division in order to aid establish an automated 
counter intelligence database in 1979. He was charged with spying for Russia 
since 1985, and alleged to have given highly classified information including 
identity o f U.S spies, electronic surveillance technology, and nuclear war plans to 
the Russians in retum for SI.4 million and diamonds (Arena 2001). He was 
authorised to access the FBI's electronic case file system, and it is reported that 
Hanssen copied classified information on to floppy disks and his Palm handheld 
computer (Verton 2001). Henssen also accessed the case file system to check 
whether FBI is investigating him. However, because he was an authorised user his 
queries were not seen as suspicious. 
The case o f Robert Hanssen demonstrates the risk o f allowing authorised users to 
carry PDA, and removable media in and out o f sensitive office areas. It also 
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demonstrates the diff icul ty o f determining possible misuse when the operation 
performed is part o f the perpetrator's responsibilities. In the wake o f Hanssen's 
case, a former CIA scientist Allen Thomson suggested the application o f two 
person authorisation rule for all sensitive database searches and system operations 
in order to limit data compromise. 
2.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter the meaning o f insider, and the notion o f misuse within the scope of the 
research, has been defined. Examples o f various insider misuse cases are also presented, 
and the factors leading to misuse is highlighted. In the next chapter, the existing measures 
that can be taken to prevent or reduce the risk o f misuse occurring w i l l be discussed and 
evaluated, in order to determine whether they can provide an adequate safeguard against 
the problems observed. 
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3 . 1 Introduction 
Having analysed the nature o f insider misuse and classification o f cases on the level o f 
the system they may have impact upon, this chapter reviews the current security controls 
that can be applied against insider misuse. The aim o f this chapter is to investigate the 
weaknesses existing controls have at preventing insider misuse. Those weaknesses w i l l 
inform the design o f the proposed architecture, and enhance the detection o f insider IT 
misuse. 
The chapter begins with the discussion o f the classic security model for operating systems 
and evaluation o f access control at the operating system level. The analysis o f access 
control mechanisms w i l l aid in identifying activities that can be regulated through access 
controls and the ones that cannot be regulated by access control and thus require auditing 
and detection. It then proceeds to consider auditing and intrusion detection techniques. 
From the examples given in the previous chapter, it can be noted that some o f the misuses 
could have been prevented through managerial and technical means. Therefore, possible 
preventive measures need to be evaluated in order to reduce the amount o f monitoring 
needed, and to increase effectiveness and efficiency o f monitoring. Preventing when 
possible reduces monitoring overhead, and increases monitoring efficiency, and most 
importantly reduces risk. I f utilised correctly, many o f the preventive mechanisms can 
reduce the likelihood o f misuse occurring. 
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3.2 Non-technical measures 
When considering how to protect systems, it is worth noting that preventative measures 
need not be technical. Insider misuse is a management problem as much as it is a 
technical issue. For example, the insider threat study carried out by Carnegie Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute in conjunction with United States Secret Service revealed 
that, one third o f the insiders responsible for sabotage o f employer's IT systems had a 
previous arrest history (Keeney et. al. 2005), and 65% o f the perpetrators did not consider 
the consequences that may result fi-om their activities (Randazzo et. al. 2004). This 
emphasise the importance o f background checking prior to employment, and security 
awareness training. As such, formal internal controls are as important as technical 
controls. Security guidelines, such as the recommendations provided by the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard, typically suggest a number o f personnel-related measures that, i f 
employed correctly, can reduce some instances o f insider misuse: 
- Check references o f prospective new employees before hiring them; 
- Ensure that employment contracts include a clause relating to the acceptable use 
o f IT resources; 
- Ensure that adequate reminders about the 'acceptable use' policy are encountered 
by staff during their day to day use o f systems; 
- Ensure adequate supervision o f staff by line management; 
- Provide a means by which staff can confidentially report misuse o f IT systems, 
without fear o f recrimination from colleagues. 
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- Ensure proper division o f duties at management level i.e. such that collusion 
between staff members would be necessary before significant opportunities for 
frauds could be identified. 
- Enforce segregation o f duties within system level, i.e. the individual 
authorising/verifying an operation should not be the same as the person who 
performed the action, such as the person responsible for administration o f the 
system should not be the same as the person responsible for verification o f system 
security. 
- Conceming the access o f data, make sure that access control policies resemble 
organisation's management hierarchy or rules (Ward and Smith 2002). 
- Security and access control policies need to be maintained to keep up with the 
change in organisation's management hierarchy. 
In the absence o f an automated super\'ision approach, it would still fall to line managers 
and the like to enforce and monitor these aspects. 
3,2.1 Physical security 
Intrusion detection systems are not capable o f dealing with issues related to physical 
security o f the systems. However, some o f the insiders have physical access to the 
systems, and physical access can provide means o f getting around controls implemented 
at the system level. Therefore, physical security needs to complement system level 
security to minimise certain types o f insider misuses, such as theft o f storage media 
containing sensitive information. Security checks should be in place to prevent removable 
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media from being taken in and out o f offices containing highly sensitive data, such as 
serx'er rooms, and backup vaults. Physical locks should be applied to system box, so that 
hardware may not be easily added without authorisation. Removal o f hard disk can result 
in compromise o f data confidentiality. Addition o f a network card can result in covert 
channels for conveying proprietary information, bypassing the channels monitored by the 
system. 
3.3 Technical measures 
Once the system is loaded with an arbitrary operating system, the controls enforced by 
the normal operating system can be bypassed. It is even truer now wi th the wide 
availability operating systems that can be loaded from Live CDs and USB keys. (This 
would fall into the category o f clandestine activity). In such cases, the perpetrator would 
be able to bypass access controls and replicate the information contained on the system 
hard disk. BIOS level passwords need to be applied to prevent the system f rom loading 
unauthorised operating system from unauthorised media. In addition, encr>Tption should 
be applied to confidential files, in case the files are successfiilly replicated through such 
approach, or through physical theft o f hard disk. 
The security mechanisms and monitoring w i l l not be effective i f the operating system and 
critical applications are compromised prior to installation. Operating systems and 
application programs need to be verified before being allowed to install on organisation's 
systems. This requires segregation o f duties and multi-person verification to ensure that 
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the operating system or the application being installed is not compromised. Software 
installation capability also needs to be limited to a few persons, and verification 
procedure needs to be enforced. However, some o f the standalone applications do not 
require installation, and the execution o f the program file can compromise system 
security. Executable paths also need to be defined, in order to prevent execution o f 
foreign programs. For example, files within C:\Windows directory and C:\Programs 
directory can be executed, and prevents execution o f files from anywhere within the 
system. 
3.4 Computer Security Model 
First o f all, basic components o f computer security model needs to be examined in order 
to understand how security is maintained at a system level. The computer security model 
consists o f the identification and authentication module, access control mechanism, and 
auditing mechanism. The components o f the computer security model w i l l be analysed to 
identify their relevance towards prevention and detection o f misfeasance. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the computer security model o f many operating s>'stems. Most 
operating systems include an Identification and Authentication subsystem to identify and 
authenticate users, an Access Control mechanism to regulate user access o f resources, 
and an Auditing Subsystem to log system events and user access o f resources (Escamilla 
1998). 
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Figure 3.1 Computer Security Model 
In the computer security model, subjects access objects and the reference monitor makes 
the access control decisions. The reference monitor refers to the permissions database to 
determine permissions associated with each object to detemiine which subjects are 
allowed access to the object and the mode of access each subject is allowed. Depending 
upon the level in which the mechanism is implemented, the parameters considered for 
decision making and a\ailable modes of operation may vary. The subjects and objects 
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can very depending upon the level o f the system in which the access is regulated. For 
example, at the operating system level files and system sen'ices can be objects, while 
records and queries become objects within database systems. 
3.4.1 Identification attd Authentication 
It is not possible to regulate access unless the identity o f the user (owner o f the process 
requesting access) is known, and authentication procedure is also required to ensure the 
user is who he/she claims to be. I f access is regulated on individual basis, the user's 
identity needs to be determined, in addition i f access is regulated on group/role basis the 
group/role the user belongs to needs to be detemiined before identifying permissions 
associated with the user/role. The ability to establish the identity o f the user(s) involved 
in an activity is also relevant towards detection o f misfeasance, because the acceptable 
usage depends upon the user's responsibility within the organisation and the relationship 
between the user(s) and the system/data affected/involved. 
3.4.2 Security and Usage Policy 
Anything that is o f value needs to be inventoried (Machines, Operating systems. 
Applications, Files, Databases etc.) before desired security, and acceptable usage policy 
regarding each entity can be defined. This requirement is also relevant towards misfeasor 
monitoring, because acceptable usage policy needs to be referenced for successful 
detection o f misfeasance. 
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An ideal security policy should to be defined before attempting to implement at the 
system level in order to understand limitations o f the access control technology at each 
level o f the system, and to identify acfivities that cannot be regulated through access 
control and thus requires monitoring. 
3.4.2.1 IVfiite listing and black listing 
For any kind o f regulation, a reference o f what is allowed and disallowed is needed, 
depending upon the operation and data/system affected/involved. The parameters used or 
regulation also need to be directly related to the parameters referenced for determining 
permissions. For example, parameters used for regulation are based on IP address the 
reference policy must be based on IP address, and i f the parameters used for regulation 
are based on user name the reference policy must be based on user name. 
3,4,3 Access control 
This section analyses whether confidentiality, integrity, and availability o f the system and 
data can be protected from misfeasor activities through the use o f access control. It is 
clear f rom previous discussions that proper segregation o f duties is a critical issue 
regarding insider misuse, and thus access control mechanism and relevant access control 
policies need to be evaluated for their ability to enforce segregation o f duties within the 
system environment. In addition dissemination o f data and inappropriate deletion o f files 
are also a concern, and the capabilities and limitations o f access controls with regards to 
these issue need to be evaluated. 
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Access control mechanism provides means for regulating access o f services and data and 
ensures that only the authorised users are allowed access to the files and only in the mode 
o f access defined by the access policy. 
Operating systems utilise file system's file allocation table for regulating file access, and 
security attributes associated with each file determine how granular the access policy can 
be. At the operating system level, the available modes o f access are read, write, and 
execute. The mode o f access affects the entire file. Depending upon how access 
permissions are set, Uvo classical access control policies are available. 
3.4.3.1 DAC (Discretionary Access Control) 
Lampson (1971) introduced the basic ideas that lead to the development o f discretionary 
access control. DAC as the name suggests the discretionary o f the contents rest with the 
owner/creator o f the file, and the owner o f the file defines which subjects are allowed 
access to the file, and the mode o f access allowed for each subject. However, the system 
administrator can access every file located within the system and is also able to override 
the permissions set by the owner, and this presents opportunity for privilege abuse. In 
addition, managing the ownership o f informafion within an organisation is a challenge, 
and the issue w i l l be discussed in 3.4.4. 
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The flow o f information within DAG is not regulated i.e. a user having gained access to 
the file may transfer the contents to someone who is not authorised to access the file. It is 
not possible to prevent dissemination o f data within discretionary controlled system. 
There is no representafion o f hierarchy within the DAC model, and thus no control 
regarding the direction o f information flow. 
One o f the weaknesses o f D A C is that the information can be replicated, and the creator 
o f the replica can grant permissions to subjects who would not have access to the 
original. DAC is sufficient for cooperative environments such as academic research, but 
does not satisfy the requirements o f many commercial enterprises (Ferraiolo et. al. 1993). 
3.4.3.2 MA C (Mandatory Access Policy) 
Mandatory access control was introduced by (Bell , LaPadula 1975), to enforce lattice-
based security policies to thwart Trojan-Horse attacks, and to regulate direction o f 
information flow within the system. 
Within M A C model, the system enforces the access permissions overriding the policy set 
by the creator o f the file. Access is regulated using the security label associated with the 
file, and the clearance level o f the subjects. The clearance level o f the subjects represents 
a hierarchical order within the M A C model. For example, the clearance levels may 
consist o f Top Secret, Secret, Classified, Unclassified, and the hierarchy may be in order 
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o f TS > S > C > U. Within this hierarchical order each clearance level dommates itself 
and those below it. 
In addition to the hierarchical clearance levels, categories can also be associated with 
subjects and objects to create compartmentalisation within the same clearance level. 
Categories are analogous to departments within an organisation. For example, a user 
cleared to access classified information from one department (marketing) cannot access 
the classified information o f anther department (payroll) within the same organisation. 
Although M A C can regulate f low o f information within a mainframe environment where 
all processing and communication is centralised, it would not fare well in a distributed 
environment, where the client machines are powerful enough to store, manage, and 
communicate data through arbitrary channels. However, the idea o f hierarchy, 
categorisation (or compartmentalisation), and information f low control is relevant to 
insider misuse problems and may be adapted for monitoring o f information transfer. The 
analysis o f M A C model has identified the need to consider the access rights o f user(s), in 
relation to data involved, receiving data as a result o f data transfer. 
3.4.3.3 Privilege and Access Rights Management 
Within IT environments with large number o f users, it becomes very d i f f i cu l t to manage 
the access rights and permissions o f each user individually. This is especially true within 
database environments, where a database file can contain a large number o f records and 
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fields each requiring various security requirements. Thus scalability issues can arise when 
assigning permissions on individual basis. Due to this problem, permissions are 
associated with role(s), and then the users are assigned to roles to manage scalability. In 
addition it is desirable to be able to manage access permissions based on the hierarchical 
structure o f the organisation. For the purpose o f managing access permissions base upon 
the organisation structure, Ferraiolo and KJiun (1992) proposed role based access control 
framework RBAC, 
3.4.3.4 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC framework manages access control policies based upon the functions a user is 
required to perform within the organization (Ferraiolo et.al. 1995). In order to control 
transactions based on the role o f the user within the organisation, R B A C is mainly 
employed in database environments (Ramaswamy and Sandhu 1998) although Sun 
Solaris 8.0 and above supports RBAC. RBAC is policy neutral, it is a framework for 
managing access rights and permissions, and thus can accommodate both D A C and M A C 
policies. 
RBAC regulates access permissions based on the user's role/responsibilities within the 
system, rather than the ownership o f the objects. A role is defined as a set o f j ob functions 
that the user is required to perform in order to satisfy his duties. For example, users may 
take on roles such as clerk, supervisor, manager, and director. Therefore the definition o f 
roles closely resembles organisation hierarchy. 
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In the RBAC model, roles can have overlapping privileges or responsibihties, meaning 
users o f different roles may need to perform common operations, and some o f the 
operations may need to be performed by all users. It would be time consuming to 
repeatedly assign common privileges to all the roles. To solve this problem, RBAC 
allows the hierarchical structure in which a role can be inherited by another role (Moon 
et. al. 2004). Therefore, common privileges can be assigned to a common role, which can 
then be inherited by ail the roles that exist in the system. I f implemented properly, the 
structure o f roles for RBAC can resemble organisational structure, and the hierarchy o f 
roles can reflect the authority, responsibilities or duties o f the users associated with each 
role. Separation o f duties can be applied by specifying mutually exclusive operations and 
mutually exclusive roles, i.e. mutually exclusive operations cannot be assigned to the 
same role, and a user cannot be assigned to the roles that are mutually exclusive (Kuhn 
1997). The concept o f separation o f duties is the use o f processing procedures that require 
more than one person to complete a transaction or an operation, and it is particulaHy 
relevant to insider misuse. The analysis o f R B A C has identified how violation o f 
segregation o f duties may be detected by providing the detection system with information 
regarding mutually exclusive operations that should not be performed by the same user. 
In addition the user's current operating environment is also an important issue related to 
the operation performed and the affects it can have upon the security o f the data accessed 
(Park and Giordano, 2006). For example, regulating the acceptability o f the user's current 
operation environment, when a system administrator performs important server backups 
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from home or performs system updates. Another example is data analyst accessing 
confidential database, from a wireless connection o f an intemet cafe. 
The ability to enforce access controls that resemble organisation hierarchy and the 
capability to apply the principle o f least privilege makes RBAC suitable for commercial 
and civilian organisations. However, access controls only regulate access permissions and 
the main problem with insider misuses is that the perpetrators misuse their existing 
privileges. Therefore, verification o f user activity is still required after access has been 
granted. The idea o f roles, responsibility hierarchy, and managing segregation o f duties is 
relevant to insider misuse problem, and thus should be adopted for monitoring purposes. 
Although application level access control complements operating system level access 
control and provides granularity, auditing is still required to monitor abuse of access 
rights by legitimate users, and verification is needed to ensure integrity o f data after 
legitimate access. 
It may be unethical for legitimate users to browse the database as it can result in breach o f 
confidentiality/privacy. Thus, user access needs to be accounted. In addition, to ensure 
integrity user entries/modifications still need to be verified by a separate entity as fraud 
can result from unverified entries/verifications. 
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3.4 J Ownership of information 
In an organisation context, organisation owns the information stored within the file and 
not the system administrator or the creator o f the fi le. Therefore, no single user should be 
solely responsible for deciding the deletion o f the file, and changing security policy o f a 
f i le . However, no entity that represents the organisation exists within the system 
environment to decide the security requirements o f a file, and deletion o f i t . Therefore, 
deletion o f files and policy changes should be regulated by users sharing the ownership o f 
a file. For example, the system administrator o f the file server and the business manager 
may share the ownership o f a file, and both users must agree before the file can be 
successftilly deleted, or permission changes can be made. I f a third user is added to share 
the ownership o f the file, the first two must agree etc. From then on all the users sharing 
ownership must agree for successfiji deletion o f the file and file permission changes. 
3,4,5 Limitations and challenges of access control 
Despite the noted limitations o f DAC, most commercially successftilly operating systems 
(Windows, Mac, and U N I X ) include D A C as default access control policy. M A C is st i l l 
not widely employed as many commercial organisations do not have a strict reporting 
structure as the military. The fact that access control mechanism automates regulation o f 
access can result in accessibility issues when exceptions need to be made and judgement 
need to be left to the business manager. In addition rigid access control policies like 
M A C and RBAC haven't been tried and tested across various organisations, and 
suitability can differ from one organisation to another. By definition o f misfeasance as 
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previously noted before, the acceptability o f user actions depends upon the organisation's 
culture and accepted code o f conduct. 
At the operating system level, access control only regulate whether a subject can read, 
write, or execute a file. It does not regulate whether the user can copy the content o f the 
fi le from within an editor and paste the contents in another file. It does not regulate 
whether the file accessed may be saved to a removable media, or whether attaching the 
fi le with an email is acceptable. 
Although access control can regulate access, a user having more privileges than necessary 
can abuse the privileges, which can result in sabotage or breach o f 
confidentiality/privacy. Therefore the principle o f least privilege needs to be applied 
when assigning permissions, i.e. on the need to know/edit basis. 
DAC is associated with super-user, and privilege escalation problems. The owner of the 
file may pass on access permissions to any subject, the system administrator can override 
the permissions set by the owner. 
The challenges o f access control have also highlighted the need for segregation o f system 
administration duties, and requirement for multi-person authorisation o f certain activities. 
Monitoring sabotage by system administrators (by way o f deleting critical data files) is 
diff icul t , especially when the system administrator has the ability to turn o f the 
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monitoring. Without necessary preventions, monitoring system may only be able to 
provide prompt alerts and not able to exercise damage limitation. 
Depending upon the attributes considered for decision-making, and the attributes that can 
be involved may be limited by the network, operating system or the application. It is also 
diff icul t to add new attributes to be involved in decision-making, and also d i f f i cu l t to add 
new logic for decision-making. 
Access control does not define the application each user may utilise for accessing each 
file, and this can lead to clandestine operations i f the application utilised does not provide 
sufficient audit data. The application utilised may also provide features for replication o f 
content, and the propagation o f confidential data can lead to weakened security o f the 
data concerned. Therefore, the application each user utilises for accessing each file need 
to be audited, and monitored for activities that may lead to clandestine operations. 
Depending upon the environment in which the user interacts, and the features provided 
by the environment, access control policy can be coarse or too fine-grained. One o f the 
restrictions o f access control is that once the access permissions are defined, human 
judgement is totally bypassed. When access control policy is too rigid, it can affect the 
functionality o f the system and prevent the legitimate users from doing their tasks, 
because access control does not allow human intervention to accommodate exceptions. 
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Due to this restriction, sometimes controls have to be weakened than desired for 
accessibility. 
However, in the case o f misfeasors the users already have legitimate system and 
application level access. The misuse is only apparent when considered in the organisation 
context, code o f conduct, or business rules. Audit ing user activity does not affect 
functionality; yet provide avenues for acceptable usage analysis and detection o f 
misfeasance. 
Although, access control can minimise the risk o f unauthorised users gaining access, and 
thus minimising risk, no single security technology can be a perfect solution to all the 
security problems. (Sandhu 1996) Each security technology, authentication, access 
control, encryption, auditing, and intrusion detection (audit analysis), address only part o f 
the security problem and complements each other. In addition to the limitations o f access 
control, protocol and software vulnerabilities also present opportunity for exploitation. 
When an application/executable/process containing the vulnerability operates with 
special privileges, the attacker can bypass access control mechanisms and operate under 
the identity o f the exploited process. Existence o f such vulnerabilities emphasise the 
inadequacy o f maintaining system security with access control alone, which highlights 
the need for monitoring technologies. Vulnerabilities can result from bad software design, 
or from poor implementation. 
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3,4,6 Misfeasance vs. Access Control 
Considering the list o f potential misuses in the previous section, it is possible that 
appropriate access controls could be used to prevent some o f them, but even these w i l l 
not be sufficient for all contexts (consider, for instance, the case in which the misfeasor 
has legitimately been granted access). The basic problem with insider misuse is that the 
person concerned has legitimate access to IT resources o f the target organisation. This 
means that he/she does not need to bypass the authentication mechanisms o f the FF 
infi-astructure (no stealing or illegal reproduction o f passwords and other forms o f 
authentication tokens). Thus, in an FF context, insider misuse is the act o f abusing granted 
privileges to cause harm. In this context, i t can also be observed that users that know 
more about a system are more likely to abuse their privileges than users who are less 
knowledgeable (Magklaras and Fumell 2002). 
The problem with insider abuse is that, once a user is authenticated to use a system, what 
he does with the system or the objects he has access rights to is not analysed within the 
context in which the activity occurred and the system/data affected. 
3.5 Auditing 
Information security is based on the principles o f Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability, usually known as the CIA triad. However, establishing accountability 
through auditing is also important for detection o f misuse, and as forensic evidence. 
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From the preceding discussions, it can be noted that the problem o f misfeasance cannot 
be prevented through access controls, because legitimate insiders already have authorised 
access, and thus the insiders already have the opportunity factor o f the C M O model 
presented in Chapter 2, section 2.5. The notion o f misfeasance is contextual, and in order 
to identify misfeasance, the user activity and the data or system affected needs to be 
analysed within relevant context defining acceptable use. Therefore, log data related to 
the user activity and the system/data needs to be collected for analysis o f potential 
misuse. The following chapter reviews automated log analysers and intrusion detecfion 
systems in order to evaluate their relevance towards detection o f misfeasance. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed existing controls and countermeasures that are available to 
tackle insider misuse. However, since these systems were not developed with insider 
misuse specifically in mind, the preventive mechanism and the logging present in today's 
commercial systems are not optimized for misuse detection. Access controls cannot 
prevent authorised users from misusing their granted privileges. For example, a user with 
administrator level privileges may not have the moral right to access confidential data on 
the system, but access controls present in today*s systems cannot prevent such actions. In 
addition, i f a rogue system administrator is also responsible for verification o f security 
alerts; necessary response actions wi l l be delayed. Access controls cannot prevent a user 
who has access to a confidential file from transferring the file over a network to someone 
who is not authorised for access. Access controls prevent unauthorised users from 
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modifying the data, however the integrity o f data is not necessarily guaranteed, merely 
because an authorised user has entered/modified it. System level access controls cannot 
regulate the application utilised for accessing the data. The challenges faced by access 
controls have served to inform the design o f the proposed system by highlighting the 
need to focus on a number o f areas, which includes: 
- monitoring access o f data through arbitrary applications 
- monitoring dissemination o f data over networks 
- enforcing multi-person verification o f alerts 
- automated verification o f new/modified database records 
As such, it is considered that some form o f supervision system is required to monitor for 
misuse activity. Audit data can be utilised for determining possible flaws within the 
security system, and it is essential for detecting the misuse o f privileges by authorised 
users (Sandhu and Samarati 1994). Even i f prompt detection is not possible, the fact that 
accountability is ensured and evidence o f activities is collected can discourage potential 
misfeasors. In addition more intelligence can be gained by collecting information 
regarding the user activities rather then preventing access. Prevention may sometimes 
force the perpetrators to find other routes to access, which may not be easily detected by 
monitoring systems. 
Security monitoring tools work in similar manner to access control, except it does not 
deny access, when the parameters associated with the identified event/activity does not 
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satisfy defined policy, the event is alerted to the administrator. Such technologies are 
already available to some extent in the form o f Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
(Amoroso 1999), but as with many other mainstream security technologies, these are 
geared towards detecting attacks on the system rather than misuse o f it by legitimate 
users. Nonetheless, some of the principles are transferable and these are consequently 
examined in the next chapter. 
58 
Chapter 4 IT Security Monitoring and Detection Tools 
59 
Chapter 4 IT Security Monitoring and Detection Tools 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to technical limitations and practical implementation issues related to access 
controls, analysis o f event/activity logs is needed. However, it is not possible to manually 
analyse large volumes o f logs, and thus Anderson (1980) proposed automated log 
analysers, and Denning (1987) introduced the main concepts o f intrusion detection 
model. Automated log analysis sof^are is commonly known as Intrusion Detection 
Systems (Amoroso 1999). 
This chapter presents the architecture, the components, and analysis methods employed in 
intmsion detection systems. The main objective o f the research is to be able to employ 
existing detection technologies for the detection o f misfeasance. Thus, the analysis 
methods employed by current systems in detecting network and system exploits need to 
be studied, so that suitable approaches may be adopted for misfeasor monitoring. This 
chapter wi l l identify the conditions facilitating successful detection o f outsider attacks, so 
that they can be referenced to identify the requirements needed to facilitate successful 
detection o f misfeasance. As part o f the process, methods employed by outsider attacks 
w i l l be discussed, although misfeasors do not need to employ similar methods. 
4.2 Intrusion detection 
Access control mechanism by nature is embedded within the environment in which it 
regulates access, while IDS can analyse audit data gathered from any environment. The 
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general architecture o f an intrusion detection system is similar to access control 
mechanism, except that IDS alert a possible intrusion rather than regulate access. 
Access Request .^1 Access Permissions 
Access Control 
Intrusion Detection 
Decision Making - f 
[Parser] -^ 1 
Misuse Signatures 
Audit Log I Normal Behaviour Profile] 
Figure 4.1 Access Control vs. Intrusion Detection 
While access control mechanism uses explicit decision making procedure, and include 
only permission attributes for decision making, IDS can be configured to consider any 
attribute relevant to an attack during intrusion analysis. Within access control framework, 
the type o f access (read, write, execute) is already associated with permission settings, 
IDS system needs to identify the event/activity (through parsing audit logs) before 
referring to misuse signatures or characteristics o f norm for the given event/activity. 
While access control mechanism has embedded decision-making procedure that cannot 
be change, IDS needs to be provided with or added new rules or decision-making 
procedure for intrusion analysis. While access control mechanism's decision result in 
either access being granted or denied, IDS system can be configured to alert the 
administrator or the output can be directed to a response system so that an appropriate 
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response can be made rather than simply denying access (Papadaki 2004). While the 
access control's decision based upon the defined permissions is final, IDS provides room 
for human judgement and intervention. 
4,2,1 Components of Intrusion Detection System 
An intmsion detection system is composed o f various components each performing a 
distinct function. Components o f an intmsion detection system include (Fumell and 
Dowland 2000): 
• Sensors: Sensors collect the data for intrusion analysis. Depending upon the 
data collected for analysis, sensors may be implemented at the network level, 
operating system level, and/or application level. Collected data should be 
directly related to the activity monitored and the data affected. For example, 
although network packets are directly related to communication activity at the 
network level, operating system logs are not directly related to user activity 
within the application environment. 
• Analysis Engine: Inference engine performs reasoning based upon facts 
provided by the sensors and reference knowledgebase, and concludes the 
likelihood o f misuse. Data provided by the sensors may need to be processed 
at various stages in order to provide the facts that can finally be used for the 
inference o f misfeasance. For example, determining whether a user receiving 
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a file through a file transfer is an insider represents one stage o f inference, and 
whether the receiver considered an insider has appropriate clearance to access 
the file received is another stage o f inference. The facts derived from these 
various stages may be used to determine whether the activity is acceptable by 
the policy defined for the given context. 
• Alert Interface: Alert interface provides the details o f possible misuse 
activities to the IDS administrator. Regarding insider misuse, the interface 
must be able provide information in such a way that the administrator can 
understand the context in which the activity occurred, and why scrutiny is 
required. In addition, the alerts must be sent to the appropriate person who 
understands the contents o f the data, and the acceptable usage policy within 
the context in which the activity was carried out. As previously identified, the 
segregation o f duties is vital in order to detect privilege abuse. Within the IT 
environments the system administrators carryout the operations, and i f the 
responsibility to verify the acceptability o f the operations is also assigned to 
the same person who performed the operation, the opportunity to abuse trust 
arises. This is similar to trading and recording the trades in a business context, 
in which the two activities must be segregated to prevent fraud. In addition the 
system administrator may not have adequate knowledge regarding the 
sensitivity o f the contents o f each and every file managed by the system, 
whereas a business manager would have insight knowledge regarding the 
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sensitivity o f the content o f a set o f files under his/her super\'ision. The 
business manager would also be aware o f the users needing access to it and 
acceptable use o f the information within the context o f the activities each user 
may carryout. Therefore, mechanisms to distribute alerts to appropriate 
authority would be desirable. 
4.3 Data Collection for Intrusion Analysis 
What the detection system can delect depends upon the data analysed for detection. 
Different types o f incidents can manifest themselves at varying levels within the system. 
Depending upon the nature o f data collected for misuse/anomaly analysis, IDS are 
categorised into Network IDS, and Host IDS, although many o f the current IDS are 
hybrid systems that analyse both the network and host data for indications o f misuse. 
• Network-IDS: analyse data collected at the network level and related to 
network communications in order to detect network reconnaissance and 
penetration attacks. 
<• Host-IDS: analyse data collected at the operating level and related to system 
level operations and activities in order to detect unusual application/user 
behaviour. Host based intrusion detection systems that analyse application 
level audit data are sub-categorised as Application-IDS. 
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> Application-IDS: analyse data provided by the application that is 
related to behaviour o f the application/user within the context o f the 
application in order to analyse the activity within the context o f the 
application providing the data. 
In order to understand how the existing technology may be employed for mis feasor 
detection, the application o f the detection technologies for detecting network 
reconnaissance/penetration attacks and privilege escalation attacks need to be studied, so 
that the requirements o f successful detection and suitability o f each analysis technique for 
misfeasor activities may be identified. 
Many o f the currently available FDS are developed to detect attacks originating from 
outsiders. The point o f enny for outsiders in to the organisation's network is through the 
Intemet connection o f the organisation. Accordingly, many intrusion detection systems 
place Sensors at this point o f entry to collect data for analysis o f network reconnaissance 
and penetration attacks (Porras and Valdes 1998). 
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Figure 4.2 Illustration of an Organisation's IT Network 
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43,2 iVehvork-Level Intrusion Detection Systems 
NIDS performs detection at the network level, and the network traffic is monitored to 
look for attacks patterns. Network packets are the main source o f data for monitoring. 
Network packets are captured by placing the network interface cards in promiscuous 
mode, while some network routers/switches include features for logging network packets. 
Usually the system or data collection agent is located at the communication interface o f 
the server, and analyse communication protocol be^veen server and clients. This type o f 
IDS would pickup packets going in and out o f a subnet, but do not monitor traffic in the 
subnet, since they are primarily designed for perimeter security. In order to monitor 
traffic o f each host station, Kerschbaum et al (2000) suggested using embedded sensors, 
where sensors are embedded within the code o f operating system that handles network 
packets. 
Nem'ork data collection modules need to be strategically placed in the network in order 
to capture all the network traffic, usual places include the first node af^er the router in a 
subnet, on a gateway between two subnets, or just after a firewall in an organisation. I f 
intrusion analysis is performed only on the data collected at the point o f entry to an 
organisation, it can create an egg-shell affect because only perimeter security is ensured 
and systems within the network would still be \'ulnerable. 
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It is also important that anomalous access o f isolated sub-nets is monitored. NeUvork 
environments are often divided into multiple subnets for security and performance 
reasons. In order to monitor network traffic for all subnets, each subnet would need a 
separate data collection station, and to monitor the traffic entering and leaving the sub-
net, the monitors would need to pickup all the packets. For example, questions need to be 
asked when a software developer establishes direct network connection to the systems in 
the payroll department, as the user in question may be in process o f modifying the payroll 
database in order to raise his earnings. Uti l izing network services f rom unauthorised 
terminals should also be monitored, since access-terminal security is very important in 
trust-based distributed computing environments. The perpetrator here might be using a 
rogue client program to access the serx'ices. Again controls are sometimes placed within 
the application environment and the use o f arbitrary programs to access the services may 
allow the user to by pass the controls either accidentally or intentionally by the user. 
The information analysed for identifying possible network attacks include, network 
packet headers, network packet content, end points involved in network connections, and 
bandwidth usage. The types o f intmsions that can be detected by Network IDS include 
exploitation o f network protocol vulnerabilities, and exploitation o f server application 
vulnerabilities (Koziol 2003). Network IDS can detect denial-of-service attacks, or 
attempts to exploit ser\'er application vulnerabilities in order to gain further access to 
systems within the organisation's network. 
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Network protocols are a set o f rules designed to accommodate successful communication 
among entities connected to network media (Duck et. al. 1996). Some o f the protocols 
such as ICMP (RFC 792) are designed for network error detection and troubleshooting, 
and attackers may exploit the protocol to gain network information. NeKvork 
reconnaissance involves exploitation o f communication protocols, while network 
penetration involves exploitation o f the network service/application. 
Network packets are considered suspicious i f they match some predefined signatures. 
Three main types o f signatures are header condition signatures, port signatures and string 
(packet content) signatures. By checking header fields in the packets, the IDS would be 
able to monitor attacks on the network protocols. The packet headers can be checked to 
identify indications o f impending attack, and the type o f service the users is utilising. The 
packet content can be compared against signatures o f known exploits in order to detect 
network penetration attacks. 
Network level intmsion analysis can be broken down into: 
• Network packet header analysis 
• Network packet content analysis 
• Usage statistic analysis 
Network packet header analysis method is particularly relevant to misfeasance analysis, 
because some o f the packet headers are legitimate and the analysis is selectively based 
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upon the contextual parameters o f a connection such as source address, destination 
address, TCPAJDP service, and destination port. Therefore, the same method can be 
applied to misfeasor analysis, once the contextual parameters associated with each type o f 
activity that may result in misfeasance is identified, and appropriate inference 
rules/procedures have been developed. 
Due to die rigid structure o f network packets (RFC 791, RFC 793, RFC 768), the 
structure o f the data, and the meaning o f each data field is already known to the analysis 
engine. The same network protocols are used globally. Therefore, NIDS decision making 
procedures can work for all organisations employing the same communication protocols. 
Within the organisation context the structure o f the data may differ from one organisation 
to another, and the meaning o f each data field may vary. 
Inference rules o f the NIDS understand the meaning o f the values within each field o f the 
packer headers at each layer o f the communicafion model, and the acceptable values 
within each field o f the header packets are limited. The knowledge o f the values within 
the context o f the activity, and the limitation o f the variables makes network level 
intmsion detection possible. NIDS inference rules already understand the characteristics 
indicative o f an intrusion. 
Network firewalls also perform the kind o f header analysis discussed above, and block 
specified traffic. The feature that differentiates NIDS from firewall is the ability to 
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monitor packet content to detect crafted code that may cause the server process to 
malfunction upon processing by the applicafion layer and result in undesired 
consequences. Contents o f network packets are compared against signatures o f known 
attacks, to detect remote exploitation o f application and/or system vulnerabilities. 
Although, NIDS can monitor the content o f network packets, detection may be avoided i f 
the server process employs application level encryption. In addition, some NIDS are not 
very good at analysing fragmented packets, and i f the code was sent within fi-agmented 
packets detection may be avoided (Ptacek and Newsham 1999). 
In order to collect unencrypted (and ful ly assembled) data destined to the application, 
Almgren et al (2001) suggested application-integrated data collection for security 
monitoring. This approach uses a data collection module integrated within the application 
to collect information, providing the IDS with the raw data destined for interpretation by 
the application. This is different from analysing audit data provided by the applicafion 
analysis, in the way that it provides the data yet to be processed by the application. 
Despite employment o f NIDS, some variations o f TCP/IP protocol exploits continue to 
work because the NIDS cannot envisage how the destination operating system may 
handle the arriving packet, or how the receiving application may interpret the input 
(Northcutt & Novak 2002). In addition, network-level intrusion detecfion w i l l not detect 
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system level attacks, attacks from directly attached terminals or attacks via dial-in 
modems directly connected to the target computer. 
Misfeasors do not need to penetrate the network; they are employees o f the organisation 
and already have legitimate access to systems within the organisation's network. With 
regards to misfeasor monitoring, Network IDS can help monitor excessive bandwidth 
usage by legitimate users, and also monitor anomalous connections among machines 
within the organisation's network. From a misfeasor monitoring perspective, network-
level auditing can provide data relating to: 
• Web access 
• Email content 
• Excessive usage o f network resources 
• Anomalous access o f isolated sub-nets 
• Utilization o f ne^vork services from unauthorised terminals 
• Statistics regarding network usage 
Insiders already have user accounts to access the systems concerned and in most cases 
that also means physical access. Therefore, there might not be a need to remotely exploit 
the services or protocols in order to gain access. Insiders are also wary o f setting o f f 
alarms in the process o f misuse, and they are more likely to abuse their existing privileges 
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than to exploit remote \ailnerabilities. This leads us to the need for monitoring at the 
system level. 
43,3 Host-Level Intrusion Detection Systems 
From the discussion in the previous section, it can be noted that some o f the input 
destined for the application may not be easily interpreted/detected by the NIDS, and thus 
requires detection at the operating system level o f the host system for signs o f intrusion. 
Host IDS analyse data collected at the operating system level. Events or measures that 
may be indicative o f an intrusion at the operating system level are resource (CUP, 
memory, disk) usage, modification o f system files (Kim and Spafford 1993), and access 
to user flies. In order to understand why these measures and events may be indicative o f 
an intrusion, the interaction o f hardware, operating system, and applications need to be 
examined. Operating system is responsible for managing the hardware resources such as 
CPU, memory, disk drives, network interface cards, and peripheral components; 
facilitating the user/server applications to read from and write to the resources it manages 
(Silberschatz el al. 2000). The concept o f files and neUvork communications are 
operating system's abstract presentation o f a sequence of zeros and ones at the hardware 
component level. To facilitate applications to access the resources at abstraction level 
(files, terminal, etc), the operating system provides application interface through which 
the applications can read from or write to the hardware components, and request memory 
allocation and CPU processing cycles. Due to this interaction o f application processes 
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(applications in execution) with the operating system, assumpfion is made that a process's 
normal behaviour can be characterised by the nature o f its interaction with the operating 
system through API calls and the process's resource utilisafion. The behaviour o f a 
process changes when exploited, and this change in behaviour can be indicative o f a 
buffer overflow exploit (Aleph One 1996). 
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Figure 4.3 [nteraction o f Entities at Operat ing System Level 
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Buffer overflows and privilege escalation attacks are explained to demonstrate why 
resource utilisation and system calls (Hoftneyr et al 1998) at the operating system level 
can be used to characterise the normal behaviour o f a process. Consequently it helps 
reason why misfeasance may not be detected by analysis o f the same parameters. 
Changes made to the system are most evident at this level and the changes would show 
up in configuration files or the registry. At this level IDS can monitor for the presence o f 
an unauthorised device driver, or the machine listening on an unauthorised port. The 
presence o f a modem might indicate, the user directly connecting to the Internet, 
bypassing the network monitoring system. This also gives the opportunity to send 
information out o f the organisation without being monitored. Executions of unauthorised 
programs are also monitored at this level for they may be Trojan horses or rouge 
programs. There is also a chance o f the user utilising such programs for a malicious 
purpose. For example, access o f database files with the use o f an arbitrary program, in 
order to bypass application level access controls. At this level, atypical usage of I/O and 
atypical file access can be monitored. Atypical usage o f I/O resources by systems may 
also indicate information leakage such as the backup ser\'er establishing connection to the 
Internet. It is also possible to monitor user behaviour at the system level, such as the 
applicafions/commands the user often utilizes, system access times, and the type o f 
network services used. Utilization o f some o f the applications/commands may indicate 
preparatory behaviour, for example the use o f a port/vulnerability scanner by a user, who 
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does not have system administration duties. It may also be appropriate to monitor the 
input source and output destination o f data to and from an application. For example, 
when the file containing proprietary content is used as an input to the encryption 
program, the user might be in die process o f disguising the information before sending it 
out o f the organisation. The suspicion level should naturally increase when the output o f 
the previously mentioned activity is attached in an email to be sent out o f the 
organisation. 
Insiders already have legitimate access to systems and misfeasance does not include 
privilege escalation attacks or system exploits, and thus may not be detected by analysing 
parameters that may be indicative o f system exploits. Therefore, parameters relevant to 
misfeasance activities need to be identified. 
Some types o f abuse w i l l be distinguishable from normal activity only with the 
knowledge o f application-level semantics and subsequently may not exhibit malicious 
behaviour at the system level. Therefore some detection strategies w i l l be necessary at the 
application and database level. However, suitable analysis/inference procedures for each 
type o f misfeasor activities need to be developed. 
4.3.3.1 Application-level monitoring 
IDS monitor user interactions with the application such as request-response, access 
pattems, user input, application output, and user utilisation o f application functions. For 
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the purpose o f misfeasor monitoring, application level monitoring can provide 
information regarding the operation performed and the data affected; because this is 
where the users directly interact with the application environment and the concerned data. 
Therefore the data collected here should reveal more about the user behaviour within the 
environment, and it gives a better understanding o f the user's intentions. Again, the user 
actions and input to the application is more meaningful when monitored at this level. The 
advantages o f collecting data at this level are that the data is unencrypted and it gives an 
insight into how the application interprets the transaction. In order to enable analysis o f 
user activity within the application environment, the knowledge o f the application and the 
context o f the activity need to be provided through inference mies. 
Due to distributed nature o f computer networks. Host-based IDS have evolved into agent-
based IDS where the data collection takes place on the machine being monitored while 
the detection engine resides on a dedicated host (Balasubramaniyan et al 1998). 
Host level intrusion analysis can be broken down into: 
• Resource usage statistic analysis 
• Command/Event pattern matching 
• File Integrity monitoring 
The fact that misuse is originating from authorised users and the abuse o f granted access 
permissions makes insider misuse more diff icul t to detect than net\vork protocol 
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exploitation attacks, and privilege escalation attacks, because the condition o f 
misfeasance depends upon the combination o f data affected, action performed, and the 
user(s) involved, and the security requirements o f the data can vary depending upon the 
action performed and the user(s) involved. In addition, many o f the misfeasor activities 
w i l l only be apparent when monitored at the application level with the knowledge o f 
contextual rules regarding the operation in the context o f the application, because the 
application determines what the user can do with the accessed data/system. However, it 
w i l l be impractical to monitor every user operation within each and every application. 
Therefore, there is a need to identify the applications and the functions within such 
applications that require misfeasor monitoring. In addition, relevant contextual rules that 
are required to identify misuse, and policies regarding function usage needs to be 
provided to the system. 
4.4 Detection Strategies 
Misfeasance is the abuse of access rights and privileges that have been granted 
legitimately, and misfeasance does not involve privilege escalation attacks that require 
modification o f system/process behaviour. Therefore, any inherent ability to detect the 
abuse o f legitimately granted access rights by the authorised users w i l l be a pure 
coincidence rather than by design. However, the strategies and technologies employed 
within currently available EDS can be applied to misfeasor monitoring. Currently IDS 
systems employ two main strategies (Axelsson 2000): 
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• Misuse Detection: Compares current system/user activities against the 
database of misuse signature i.e. characteristics of misuse. 
• Anomaly Detection: Compares current system/user behaviour against the 
historical/statistical profile of system/user behaviour i.e. characteristics of 
norm, and i f current behaviour deviates from the profiled characteristics that 
define the norm then misuse activity is considered to be in the process. 
Indeed the only difference is the monitoring system's perception of reference data 
provided for decision-making during analysis, one refers to behaviour considered as 
misuse, and the other refers to behaviour defined as normal. Therefore, although existing 
detection strategies can be applied to monitoring misfeasance, it is not possible to reach a 
satisfactory conclusion without the availability of relevant facts for reference. Thus, in 
order to achieve accurate detecfion, it is important that all the relevant data that is 
required to identify each type of misfeasor activity need to be provided to the 
misfeasance analysis engine. 
Depending upon the detection system's perception of characteristics referenced for 
decision-making, detection strategies can be categorised into misuse detection, and 
anomaly based detection (Biemiann et al. 2001). 
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• Misuse-based detection 
This approach relies upon knowing or predicting the intrusion scenario that 
the system is to detect. Intrusions are specified as attack signatures (Kumar 
and Spafford 1994), which can then be matched to current activity using a 
rule-based approach. Attack signatures are usually sequence of events that 
correspond to an attack such as certain values within network packet headers. 
Attack signatures are then matched against current activity using rule based 
approach as shown in NIDS examples. I f current user activity matches an 
attack signature, then the user is suspected to be misusing the system. One of 
the problems with misuse detection is how to write a signature that 
encompasses all variations of an attack, and not flag non-intrusive activity as 
intrusive. This approach is also very reliant upon the database of attack 
signatures. With this approach the detection system is only as good as the 
database of attack signatures. For insider misuse detection, the notion of 
misuse is contextual as the operation itself is legal. Therefore, it is difficult to 
generate misuse signatures of misfeasance, and detection requires inference 
rules that include relevant contextual parameters to suit monitoring of each 
activity. This approach can be applied to detect inappropriate configuration 
changes, file access through arbitrary applications, and verification of records. 
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o Anomaly detection (heuristics, i.e. trial and error) 
Rather than being based upon known or predicted patterns of misuse, this 
approach relies upon watching out for things that do not look normal when 
compared to typical user activity within the system (Forrest et al. 1996). In 
standard IDS, the principle is that any event that appears abnormal might be 
indicative of a security breach having occurred or being in progress (Denning 
1987). The assessment of abnormality is based upon a comparison of current 
activity against a historical profile of user (or system) behaviour that has been 
established over time. System/user behaviour may be profiled using statistical 
approaches, neural networks, or historical profiling of events (Marin et al. 
2001). When statistical profiling is used, the measurements taken may be CPU 
usage, network usage, file access, time of access, and any variable that can be 
measured. From insider misuse detection perspective, anomaly-based 
detection seems to be suitable for certain type of insider activities. One of the 
advantages of monitoring insiders compared to outsiders is that the normal 
behaviour of insiders can be profiled and established. This advantage of being 
able to establish a normal user behaviour profile favours anomaly detection 
for some of the misfeasance activities, such as bandwidth usage, the number 
of records access. Generally, this approach can be used to monitor any 
misfeasance activity with measurable characteristics that can be detected 
through statistical analysis. Although the above descriptions make the 
concepts sound relatively straightforward, it must be appreciated that neither 
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technique can be considered 100% reliable, even in the context of traditional 
IDS. The consequence is that they can lead to false positives (where 
legitimate activity is believed to be intrusive) and false negatives (where 
genuine intrusive activities are misjudged as acceptable). The concept of 
applying the techniques for the detection of misfeasor activity makes the task 
more difficult, because it involves dealing with legitimate users who are 
perfonning legitimate operations which can only be deemed inappropriate 
when considered within contextual terms. 
Anomaly detection is sometimes employed to detect intruders by comparing 
the current user*s activities/behaviour against the characteristics of norm 
established for legitimate user(s). The reasoning here is that, i f the 
activities/behaviour of the current user differs from the norms o f legitimate 
users, or historical profile of a certain users, then the current user is deemed as 
an intruder. 
4.5 Detection Technologies 
There are several techniques to apply each detection strategy (Kumar 1995). Misuse-
based detection can be employed using Expert Systems, State Transition Analysis, and 
Model-based detection, while anomaly-based detection can be employed using Statistical 
Profiling, Predictive pattern generation, and Neural Networks. 
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4.5.1 Expert Systems 
This approach uses traditional expert system technology where the expert knowledge of 
the system security officer is coded as rules to identify attacks from the audit data 
(Lindqvist & Porras 1999). The rules are coded as if-then conditions. The conditions that 
constitute an attack are coded and i f the audit data matches the conditions specified in the 
rule, then an attack is recognised. The weakness with this approach is that the system is 
only as good as the person who coded the rules. 
4.5.2 State Transition Analysis 
In this approach, the monitored system is represented as a state transition diagram (Ilgun 
et. al 1995). Here, an intrusion is considered as a sequence of actions performed by the 
perpetrator, which leads the system from a secure state to a compromised state. These 
systems usually list key actions that have to occur in order to complete an intrusion. This 
technique is applied in USTAT (Ilgun 1993). 
4.5.3 Model-based detection 
In this approach, known misuse scenarios are modelled as sequences of user/system 
behaviour (Uppuluri, and Sekar 2001). These behaviours are then modelled as events in 
the audit trail. If current sequence of system events matches with the modelled sequences 
of events that represent an attack, then the user is in the process on misusing the system. 
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For the purpose of misfeasor detection, a combination of expert systems and state 
transition analysis can potentially be used to detect dissemination of confidential data. 
Expert systems can be used to determine the facts, and the state transition analysis can be 
used to model the state of a system based on the facts provided by the expert system. 
4.5.4 Statistical Profiling 
With this approach, user behaviour is profiled using statistical measurements (Singh et al. 
2001), (Barbara et al. 2001). A profile can include several types of measures. An 
intrusion detection measure is an aspect of user or process behaviour. A profile is a 
description of a user's/process' behaviour with respect to certain measures. This approach 
keeps statistic of each user or process for each intrusion detection measure (Lunt 1990). 
These stored statistics form the historical profile of a process or user. The profiles may be 
updated at regular intervals. In an adaptive system, the profiles are updated based on 
obser\'ed user behaviour. Therefore, the thresholds in the profiles will increase or 
decrease as the users' behaviour evolves over time. However, users may gradually train 
adaptive systems to accept intmsive behaviour as normal. 
4.5.5 Predictive pattern generation 
This approach is based on the hypothesis that the sequences of events are not random, but 
follow a distinct pattern (Teng et al. 1990). For example. El to E5 are security events, the 
prediction generated would be something like: 
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El->E2-> E3=> (E4= 95%, E5=5%) 
What the prediction slates is that events El followed by E2 followed by E3, the 
probability of seeing E4 is 95% and E5 is 5%. These patterns generated forms the profile 
of the user. The deviation from normal behaviour is detected i f the observed events match 
the left hand side of the pattem but the right hand side doesn't. A weakness of this 
approach is that unrecognised patterns of user behaviour may not be flagged as 
anomalous because they may not match the left hand side of the pattem prediction. In 
terms of misfeasance detection, analysing events within one environment may not be 
enough to conclude misfeasance, such as transfer o f a confidential file through email, 
which involves events at the application, operating system, and network level. Therefore, 
correlation of multiple events at various levels within the system is required before the 
activity can be analysed in the context of acceptable usage. 
4.5.6 Neural networks 
This approach trains the neural net on a sequence of information units. The information 
units may be at a higher abstraction level than audit trails. For example i f the user 
commands are infonnation units, the input to the neural net would consist of current 
commands and last n commands. A number n for the past commands need to be defined 
so that the neural net can take last n commands into account when predicting the next 
command. If n is set too low, the net will perform poorly, i f it is set too high, the net will 
be affected by irrelevant data. Once the neural net has been trained on the set of sequence 
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of commands that represent the user, the neural net creates the profile of the user. The 
incorrectly predicted next commands measure the deviance of user behaviour fi-om his 
historical profile (Ryan et al 1998). Figure 4.4 illustrates the conceptual diagram of a 
neural net predicting next user commands. 
The arrows directed at the input layer are the sequence of last n commands issued by the 
user. The output layer presents the next command predicted with respect to the sequence 
of last n command issued by the user. This approach is suitable when events within a 





Next Predicted Command 
Input Layer Output Layer 
Figure 4.4 Neural Nets in Intrusion Detection 
Although, statistical analysis and neural networks may be utilised for characterisation of 
behaviour/activity of the application/user, the accuracy of characterisation depends upon 
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the parameters included/considered or available to the application (Lee and Heinbuch 
2001). The nature of insider attacks differs, and the relevant parameters also differ. The 
parameters considered need to be related to the context in which the activity is analysed. 
Again misfeasance is dependant upon the interpretability of acceptable usage policy, 
which entails the knowledge of acceptable use. 
4.6 Relevant Systems 
This section presents existing research that is relevant to misfeasor detection, and some of 
the technologies identified can aid in monitoring. The systems presented were selected on 
the basis of their ability to detect particular forms of misfeasance within the environment 
of their focus, and the relevance of their ftinctions toward development of a 
comprehensive misfeasor monitoring system. The systems presented here are an 
indicative set of tools that focus on some of the misfeasor monitoring issues. The list does 
not represent an exhaustive list of available intmsion detection systems and monitoring 
tools. 
4,6.1 DEMIDS 
DEMIDS (DEtection of Misuse in Database Systems) is proposed by (Chung et. al. 
1999). It is a misuse detection system target at detecting misuse in relational database 
systems, especially abuse by legitimate insiders. DEMIDS uses audit logs to derive 
profiles of user behaviour in the database environment. The hypothesis is that a user will 
not normally access all records within a database schema. This approach assumes that 
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user access patterns in the databases form some working scopes. Working scopes are 
defined by the concept offrequent itemsets, which comprise sets of attributes of queries 
that are referenced together with some value. Frequent item sets, which describe the 
working scope of the users, are searched with the guidance of distance measures, to 
delect anomalous access. DEMTDS also considers the data structure and schema of a 
database through the use of distance measure. Distance measure is metric which measure 
the closeness of a set of query attributes with respect to working scopes. 
Of all the IDSs reviewed, DEMIDS is the only one that is mainly focused on detecting 
insider abuse of privileges. With regards to misfeasor detection, DEMIDS can aid in 
detecting anomalous browsing of databases. Although DEMFDS can detect user activities 
deviating from their respective working scopes, it cannot effectively detect fraud, which 
requires counter verification of data entered, knowledge of organisation hierarchy and 
separation of duties. 
4.6.2 DIDAFIT 
DFDAFIT is the detection of intrusions in database through fmgerprinting transactions. 
Low et al (2002) developed a process for fingerprinting SQL statements through the use 
of regular expressions, so that legitimate queries can be distinguished from malicious 
queries such as SQL injection. 
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With regard to misfeasor detection, DIDAFFT can aid in identifying the specific query a 
user has issued, or detect i f the user query differs fi-om the ones deemed acceptable. 
Although this solves part of the misfeasor problem, it does not include mechanisms for 
verifying the integrity of modified records, or validity of an access within the context of 
business process. 
4,6,3 eXpert-BSM 
eXpert-BSM is a host-based IDS, which analyses Sun Solaris audit trails in real time 
using forward-reasoning expert system (Lindqvist and Porras 2001). Source of data for 
intmsion analysis is gathered from Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM) (Sun 
Microsystems 1998) audit trails. eXpert-BSM utilises knowledge base detection method, 
which is build upon many years of research in intrusion detection. At the core of eXpert-
BSM are an inference engine and a knowledge base built with the Production Based 
Expert System Toolset (P-BEST). P-BEST is an optimised forward-chaining rule-based 
system builder for real-time event analysis (Lindqvist and Porras 1999). P-BEST toolset 
includes a mie translator and a library of run-time routines. P-BEST models utilised in 
eXpert-BSM can detect intrusive behaviour that may involve complex ordering of events. 
This ability to comprehend complex event orderings allows the detection of a wide 
variation of an intrusive activity. At the time of the publication there are 123 P-BEST 
rules that allow the eXpert-BSM to recognise 46 general forms of misuse. eXpert-BSM 
excels at detecting security violations al die operating system level. 
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Although geared towards detecting users who exploit the system and violate security 
policy, some of the activities it can detect may be performed by legitimate users. For 
example, when some of the access permissions or privileges, which are not actually 
required for perfonning their daily responsibilities, may be granted to legitimate users as 
a result of erroneous configuration. The attack coverage of eXpert-BSM is categorised 
into the following broad areas of operating system level misuse: 
• Data Theft - attempts to read files and devices by non-administrative users that 
violate security policy, such as accessing files stored in non public directories 
owned by other users, or read accesses that violates eXpert-BSM's surveillance 
policy. This category includes detection of opening network interface devices in 
promiscuous mode in attempt to sniff network traffic. 
• System/User Data Manipulation - This category covers attempts by users to 
modify system files where security-relevant configuration data is stored. It also 
detects attempts to modify UNIX user environment file (eg. .bashrc, .login, 
.rhosts) and modification of files that violate eXpert-BSM's surveillance policy. 
• Privilege Subversion - illegal attempts to gain higher privileges through illegal 
changing of user ID, or by exploiting privileged programs. Intrusion models in 
this category can detect three variations of buffer overflow attacks: exec argument 
buffer overflows, environment variable overflows, and data-segment overflows. 
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• Account Probing and Guessing - repeated attempts to gain access to the system 
via authentication sen'ices. 
• Suspicious Network Activity ~ various attempts to probe or scan the host. Misuse 
of host's FTP ser\Mces to distribute content to external sites. eXpert-BSM can also 
detect enabled TCP services on the host. 
• Asset Distress - degradation of a system asset or impending failure o f a system 
asset, such as file system or process table exhaustion, and core-dumps by root-
owned services. This category also includes detection of service denials from 
remote agents and self echo flooding by host processes. 
• User-specifiable Sur\>eillance - eXpert-BSM allows the creation of site-specific 
policies, to detect certain acfivities, such as user defined command arguments that 
are considered suspicious. This also allows specification of site surveillance 
policy to monitor user accesses to data, and neKvork ports that should not be 
accessed by extemal clients. 
• Other Security-relevant Events - general security-relevant activities such as 
backward movement of the clock beyond what is normally performed by clock 
synchronisation protocols, indicating possible attempt to manipulate file or log 
state to evade detection. This category also includes creation of symbolic links in 
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worid writable directories, process execution by reserved accounts that should not 
run applications (e.g, bin, sys), and attempts to modify audit configuration. 
eXpert-BSM also provide detailed reports and recommendations of the detected intrusion 
activities. eXpert-BSM is capable of detecting an extensive range of intrusion scenarios. 
4.6.4 Orcltestria 
Orchestria's Data Loss Prevention solution prevents sensitive data from leaving the 
organisation's IT network through applications such as e-mail, web-mail, and instant 
messengers (Orchestria 2007). It employs intelligent agents on the client machines and 
communication servers to monitor user communications. It allows communications to be 
monitored based on the meta-data associated, such as addresses or key words. It also 
monitors the content of file attachments and web uploads. 
4.6.5 PortAutlwrity 5.0 
Websense's PortAuthority tool prevents data leakage through the network and replication 
of files to removable media based on user defined policy (Websense 2007). It also 
includes digital rights management (DRM) mechanism to encrypt confidential 
information. It extracts and classifies information from various file formats. It allows the 
user to define leakage prevention policy, base on the meta data associated with the file, 
and other parameters such as geographical location of the end points of communication. 
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4.6,6 NetReplay 
NetReplay by Chronicle Solutions captures and archives all user communications fi-om 
organisation's systems (NetReplay 2007). A feature that stands out fi-om other tools is 
that it provides CCTV like function, i.e. the security officer can view a particular 
communication as it would be seen by the user. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Each system presented focus upon a function that is different from another and for 
different purpose, and thus cannot be compared to one another. DEMIDS detect 
misfeasance within relational database environments by detecting users who access data 
that is beyond their working scope. DIDAFIT presents a method for generating SQL 
fingerprints so that anomalous queries may be identified. eXpert-BSM detects potential 
violations of acceptable usage policy at the host system level through providing detection 
system with the expert knowledge. Orchestria and Port Authority 5.0 prevent data leakage 
through the network and removable media, while NetReplay captures and archives 
network communications from organisation's systems. 
Each of systems presented here addresses a distinct issue related to misfeasor activity. 
However, none of the systems offer a comprehensive solution addressing various forms 
of misfeasor activity identified in Chapter 2. 
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From the study of existing IDS systems, it can be noted that network-based IDS are 
geared towards detecting network protocol exploits and string signatures within network 
packets. However, misfeasance does not involve exploitations of network protocols or 
network services. Host-based IDS are designed for detection of system level security 
violations, and system level anomalies. However, misfeasance activities do no exhibit 
detectable system level characteristics. 
Despite their orientation towards detecting extemal attacks, the conditions required for 
detecting attacks can be noted and applied towards successful detection of misfeasance. 
In NIDS, the reasoning logic and analysis procedures are tailored for interpreting the 
meaning of parameters within the structure of each network packet. The data necessary 
for analysis of an intrusion is available from capturing network traffic. 
In HIDS, the reasoning logic and analysis procedures are tailored for interpreting the 
meaning of parameters available from system audit logs. The data for analysis is provided 
by the audit mechanism of the system, and sensors placed within the operating system. 
The conditions accommodating successful analysis of misuse/intrusions are: 
• Knowing the characteristics indicative of an intrusion/misuse 
• The availability of data required for comparison against characteristics 
• The reasoning logic tailored to detect each type of activity 
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Therefore, the activities that require misfeasor monitoring and the characteristics that 
may be indicative o f misfeasance need to be identified, and determine the appropriate 
level o f the system from where such data can be collected. In addition, a misfeasor 
monitoring systems requires tailored analysis procedures and reasoning logic to interpret 
parameters representing the characteristic o f the context in which the operation was 
performed or the activity occurred. This also means that the parameters relevant to the 
context in which the activity is analysed must also be made available to the monitoring 
system. In the next chapter, various types o f insider misuse w i l l be categorised based 
upon the system level from where the data relevant for analysis can be collected. 
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5.1 Introduction 
From the discussions in the previous chapter it can be noted that one o f the aspect o f 
successful detection is the availabihty o f relevant data for analysis. Further discussions 
w i l l focus upon the issue o f misfeasance, i.e. performing legitimate operations in 
inappropriate manner or for unapproved purpose, rather than IT misuse in a more general 
sense. Therefore, the term misfeasance wi l l also be used instead o f insider misuse in the 
following discussions. 
This chapter considers how insider misuse incidents may be classified, giving particular 
attention to the points in the system at which different forms o f misuse would be 
discemable. The discussion begins with a brief overview o f existing approaches to 
classifying incidents and abusers, some of which already pay specific attention to the role 
o f insiders. From this, the chapter proceeds to propose a detection-oriented approach to 
classification, and discusses examples o f the different forms o f insider-sourced incident 
that would be detectable at network, operating system, application and data levels within 
the system. 
Existing taxonomies focus upon categorising attacks for: 
- risk analysis 
- describing the nature o f attack 
- describing the attacker, and type o f attack 
- incident reporting 
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- incident response 
However, for the purpose o f this research, a classification o f attacks based upon the level 
o f the system, at which each attack may manifest itself and thus detected is required. 
5.2 A review of current intrusion taxonomies 
In order to be able to focus on the misuses that may be committed by insiders o f an 
organisation, it is important to understand the type and naUire o f all kinds o f misuses. A 
number o f previous investigations have therefore attempted to classify system attacks and 
abusers, in order to aid subsequent analysis. Some o f these relevant works are 
summarised in the sections that follow, along wi th brief commentary in relation to their 
suitability for classifying incidents relating to insider misuse. 
o Cheswick-Bellovin Classification divided attacks into seven categories drawn 
upon their work on firewalls (Cheswick and Bellovin 1994), and the categories 
are listed along with the nature o f attacks belonging to each category. 
Although this approach gives an overview o f the attacks, classifies the main 
categories o f attacks and provides die terms to describe the nature o f attacks, it is 
too general and does not give an insight to the characteristics o f attacks, which is 
required for detection. 
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1. Stealing passwords - methods employed to obtain other users' 
passwords 
2. Social engineering - deceiving unsuspecting individuals in to providing 
information that can aid in compromise o f targeted systems. 
3. Bugs and Backdoors - taking advantage o f systems that have been 
poorly designed/implemented/configured, and/or replacing software wi th 
compromised versions such as Trojans 
4. Authentication failures - means o f defeating authentication mechanisms 
5. Protocol failures - exploitation o f protocols that have design flaws or 
are poorly implemented 
6. Information leakage - utilisation o f protocols such as ICMP, 
Traceroute, DNS, or diagnostic error messages to obtain infomiation that is 
necessary for system administration and proper operation o f the network, 
and abusing it 
7. Denial-of-ser>'ice - attempts to deny legitimate users form utilisation o f 
systems and services 
Table 5.1 Cheswick & Bellovin's seven categories of attacks 
• S R I Neumann-Parker Taxonomy is based upon analysis o f security incidents 
reported over 20 years (Neumann and Parker 1989). It classifies intmsions into 
nine categories, described by the nature o f the misuse within the system 
environment and does not include external factors such as social engineering 
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mentioned by Cheswick and Bellovin. This kind o f categorisation provides terms 
that can be used to describe the nature o f system level attacks, and can be useful 
for incident reporting or for communication between detection system and 
response system. Table 5.2 summarises the overall scheme o f the taxonomy. 
NPl External Misuse Non-technical, physically separate 
intmsions 
NP2 Hardware Misuse Passive or active hardware security 
problems 
NP3 Masquerading Spoofs and identity changes 
NP4 Subsequent Misuse Setting up intrusions via plants, bugs 
NP5 Control Bypass Going around authorised 
protection/controls 
NP6 Active Resource Misuse Unauthorised modification o f resources 
NP7 Passive Resource Misuse Unauthorised reading o f resources 
NP8 Misuse Via Inaction Neglect or failure to protect a resource 
NP9 Indirect Aid Planning tools for misuse 
Table 5.2 S R I Neumann-Parker Taxonomy 
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o Lindqvist-Jonsson Taxonomy is an extension o f Neumann-Parker taxonomy, 
and categories NP5, NP6, and NP7 o f Neumann-Parker taxonomy are further 
classified (Lindqvist and Jonsson 1997). 
Extended NP5 Control 
Bypass 
Password attacks, spoofing privileged 
programs, utilising weak authentication 
Extended NP6 Active 
Resource Misuse 
Exploitation o f write permissions, resource 
exhaustion 
Extended NP7 Passive 
Resource Misuse 
Manual browsing, automated browsing 
Table 5.3 Extension of SRI Neumann-Parker Taxonomy 
Although (extended) NP6 and NP7 above do at least recognise the misuse issue, the rest 
represent the attack methods employed by outsiders, or insiders who utilises the same 
methods. In addition, the classification o f attacks is based on the misuse techniques 
employed and the consequences o f i t , and it is not intended for monitoring purposes. 
However, some other works can also be identified that contain elements more specifically 
related to insider misuse. 
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o Anderson's Taxonomy. Anderson's early work (Anderson 1980) in this domain 
classifies system abusers into External Penetrators, Internal Penetralors, and 
Misfeasors, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. 
Although very useful at a broad conceptual level, the classification does not 
provide any significant assistance in terms o f incident detection, with all insider 
misuse related incidents being grouped under the single 'misfeasor' heading. 
o Tuglular 's Taxonomy is the first comprehensive taxonomy o f misfeasor 
incidents (Tuglular 2000), and the classification is based upon computer misuse 
incident in three dimensions: incidents, response and consequences. The Incidents 
dimension is further classified into target, subject, method, place, and time sub-
dimensions. The Response dimension is divided into recognition, trace, 
indication, and suspect. The Consequences dimension includes disruption, loss, 
effect, violation, misuse type, misuse act, and result. The sub-dimensions 
branches into new branches o f sub-dimensions and so on until it cannot be further 
classified. These dimension and sub-dimensions o f the scheme are used to 
characterise each misuse incident. However, the entire taxonomy is orientated 
towards systematic data collection o f insider incidents to provide evidence and 
incident response. 
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• Magklaras-Furneirs Insider Threat Prediction Model is human centric, and 
the authors argue that all actions that constitute IT misuse lead back to human 
factors. The fundamental aspect o f this taxonomy is classifying people in three 
basic dimensions: system role, reason o f misuse and system consequences 
(Magklaras and Fumell 2002). However, while this scheme is intended to assist 
threat prediction, which can be useful in determining the capability factor o f a 
potential misfeasor. However, it is related more towards risk analysis than 
detection as it does not describe the specific parameters related to each type o f 
misfeasor activity and the related characteristics. 
The above mentioned taxonomies were not developed with the intention o f detecting 
insider IT misuse, and the characteristics that may be indicative o f insider misuse 
activities were not mentioned. A potential approach to this issue is considered in the 
remainder o f the chapter. 
5.3 A detection-oriented approach to classification 
In determining a means to link classification to the method of detection, it is considered 
appropriate to classify insider misuses based on the level o f the system at which tfiey 
might be detected. The basis for this is that different types o f misuses manifest 
themselves at varying levels o f the system (e.g. some may be apparent at the network 
level, whereas others are most visible at higher levels, such as the operating system or 
application levels). 
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With this form o f classification in mind, the concept can be illustrated using a variety o f 
recognised insider misuse activiries, and then considering the different levels at which 
they may be delected. An overall classification is presented in Table 5.4 and then 
examples o f the incidents concerned are considered in the sub-sections that fo l low. The 
list o f misuses presented is indicative rather than exhaustive. They are presented here on 
the basis o f the potential consequences the activity may generate. These consider what 
could be monitored, and how this could be used to detect, control and restrict misuse-
related behaviour. Lunt (1993) suggested the idea o f identifying data that can be 
statistically measured for detecting possible intrusions. This classification has adopted 
Lunt's approach and has identified which data need to be evaluated (statistically or 
otherwise), or referenced to detect possible security violations (Phyo and Fumell 2004). 
Misuse Monitoring 
Level 
Attribute(s) to monitor 
Illegal content Netwcr1< Packet content, MIME types 
Excessive/anomalous 
usage 
Network Bandwidth usage 
Resource exhaustion Network Bandwidth usage 
Playing network/online 
games 
Network Bandwidth usage 
Illegal software 
distribution 
Network Bandwidth usage 
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Misuse Monitoring 
Level 
Attribute(s) to monitor 
Access to isolated 
subnets and machines 
Network IP address 
Access from 
unauthorised machines 
Network IP address, MAC address 
Access to prohibited 
online content 
Network URL 
Use of web-based email Network URL 
Recreational surfing Network URL 
Instant messenger Network Service usage, protocol, port 
Unauthorised network 
services 
Network Service usage, protocol, port 
Unauthorised file sharing Network. OS Service/Bandwidth usage. File attributes 
Unauthorised web 
hosting 
Network Service/Bandwidth usage 
Resource exhaustion OS C P U , Memory. Disk usage 
Storage of image and 
multimedia files 








OS Application utilisation 
Information disclosure Application. 
OS . Network 
File (read). Record access. Copy/Paste. 
Network Transfers 
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Misuse Monitoring 
Level 
Attrlbute(s) to monitor 
Breach of privacy Application, 
OS, Netwofk 
File (read), Record access 
Data theft Application, 
OS. Networ1< 
File (read), Copy/Paste, Network 
Transfers 
Alteration of data files OS File (write), File Checksums, File 
Attributes 
Alteration of system Files OS File (write), File Checksums, File 
Attributes 
Hardware Installation OS File (create, write) configuration files 
Software Installation OS File (execute) unauthorised program 
Illegal program execution OS File (execute) unauthorised program 
Sabotage OS File (write, delete) 
Privileged Program 
Exploits 
OS API/System calls. File/ Memory access, 
I/O usage 
Data Hiding OS Input files to programs 
Encryption OS Input files to programs 
Program Exploitation Application User Input/interaction 
Alteratbn of Input Application User Input 
Function Usage Application Queries, API Calls, Windows Messages 
Anomalous Database 
Access 
Application User Queries, Range of query. Number of 
records accessed 
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Misuse Monitoring 
Level 
Attribute(s) to monitor 
Account creation Application, 
Data 
Feature usage, Data tables 
Inconsistent Data 
(Fraud) 
Data ID Numbers, Date, Time, Strings, 
Numbers 
Duplicate Entries (Fraud) Data Batch Number, Uniquely Identifiable 
Entities, etc. 
Maximum Value Data Number of Employees, Bonuses, Extra-
lime work, gap between payments, etc. 
Minimum Value Data Hourly pay rate, Work hours, etc. 
Table 5.4 Detection Oriented Ciassincation of Insider I T Misuse 
53.1 Network-level misuses 
Given that a great deal o f misfeasor acfivity may relate to the use o f network services, 
several type o f misuse would be detectable by monitoring activity at the network traffic 
level. From a practical perspective, this has the advantage that there is no specific 
necessity to install monitoring / data collection agents on individual end-user systems. 
Examples o f the misuses that could be identified are discussed below. 
• Access of prohibited content: User access o f prohibited content on the web may be 
monitored through logging and examination o f web addresses accessed. Accessed 
web addresses may be checked against a database o f websites containing 
inappropriate content, such as pornographic material. Another approach would be 
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to create a database o f websites that the employees may access to perform their 
day-to-day tasks, then user accessed websites can be compared against the entries. 
It is not necessary to block the access to the websites that are not in the database; 
therefore access is not restricted, but monitored. The latter approach is more 
desirable i f the organisations want to discourage recreational surfing. 
o Downloading inappropriate material: File extensions o f the users' network 
download can be monitored. For example, a user downloading files with image 
extensions may be downloading pornographic material. Other file extensions that 
should be monitored include ".mpeg", " .av i ' \ ".mp3", and '*.zip" files. Ideally, 
download rights should be limited to a few users as any type of downloaded 
material may introduce viruses into the organisation's networked systems. 
Downloading o f large files can also consume valuable bandwidth and delay 
legitimate work. 
o Use of web-based email: Many organisations disapprove the use o f web-based 
email, because o f the difficulties in monitoring usage. Employees may be 
circulating inappropriate material, or wasting work hours by sending personal 
emails through die use o f web-based email, especially when the users' email 
accounts in the organisation are being monitored for usage. User accessed web 
addresses may be checked against a database o f known web-based email sites. 
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• Online shopping: Users may be wasting valuable work hours by shopping online. 
User accessed websites may be checked against a database o f online shopping 
websites. 
• Spamming: Users sending more than normal amount o f emails may be spamming 
using company computers. On the other hand, the user's email client might be 
infected with a worm that mails itself to everyone in the user's contact list. 
Whatever the case, a closer examination is required, when exceeding number o f 
emails are sent from users. 
• Using chat programs: Employee utilisation o f chat programs such as IRC, ICQ, 
and instant messengers can affect the productivity o f the users. Chat programs 
can also affect the security o f the network as they introduce new services and 
those services may be exploited. In addition, such applications also provide new 
channels for unauthorised communications, which may be used to transfer 
confidential information. Network services utilised by users can be monitored to 
look out for utilisation o f chat programs. 
• Video Conferencing: Users may be video conferencing with fiiends or relatives 
using organisation's computing resources. Network service utilisation and 
bandwidth usage may be monitored to detect such abuse. 
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• Playing network games: Employees may be playing games on the organisation's 
local area network. Such activity may consume precious bandwidth. This kind o f 
activity may be monitored through looking out for users with exceedingly high 
bandwidth consumption. 
• Running servers'. Users may be running personal web-servers f rom the company 
network. The motivation o f such activity may be for financial gain or for 
mischievous purposes such as distribution o f illegal software. Regardless o f the 
motivation, unauthorised server applications introduce weak links to the 
organisation's FT security in addition to legal liability. 
• Peer-peer file sharing: Users utilising file sharing programs may be downloading 
and sharing inappropriate materials widi other internet users. Network service 
utilisation can be monitored to detect such abuses. 
• Access of isolated sub-networks: Users accessing sub-networks that are not related 
to their domain may be suspicious. For example, a software developer 
establishing a direct connection to the payroll sub-net may have undesirable 
intentions such as modifying the payroll database to raise one's own wages. Cross 
network connections may be monitored to detect the access o f isolated networks. 
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Having stated the possible monitoring opportunities for insider misuse at the network 
level, we should consider the following statement by Schultz (2002), "Insiders do not 
generally demonstrate the same attack signatures as external attackers'*. Indeed, insiders 
may already have user accounts to access the systems concerned and in most cases that 
also means physical access. Therefore, there might not be a need to exploit the network-
level services or protocols in order to gain access. Insiders are also wary of setting of f 
alarms in the process of misuse, and they are more likely to abuse their existing privileges 
than to exploit remote vulnerabilities. This leads us to the need for monitoring at the 
system level. 
53,2 System-Level misuses 
In contrast to detecting network-level incidents, monitoring at the system level 
necessitates that monitoring activity be conducted upon individual host systems (i.e. 
some form of data collection agent would need to be present on the user system). I f such 
monitoring is available, then the following list constitutes some examples o f the types of 
incident that could be identified. 
• Storing inappropriate materials: Users may be storing inappropriate materials on 
organisation's computers. For example, users may be storing MP3s, movies, 
illegal software, and pornographic materials. Users' home directories may be 
scanned to detect files with certain extensions, such as ''jpeg'' to detect the 
content stored. For example a user having a large number of image/media files 
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may be storing inappropriate materials on the computer. User disk usage may also 
be monitored for excessive usage. Monitoring excessive disk usage may 
sometimes lead to the detection of illegal software being stored on company 
computers. 
• Use of data-hiding programs: Users may be utilising data-hiding programs, such 
as steganographic software to hide inappropriate material. Such programs may 
also be used to disguise proprietary and confidential information before they can 
be sent out of the organisation. Programs that take file(s) as inputs and produce 
File(s) outputs should be examined to make sure they are not data-hiding 
programs, such as encryption and steganographic software. 
• Use of arbitrary} programs: Users may run arbitrary programs to access data. 
Sometimes when data is accessed through the use of arbitrary programs, 
application level access controls and auditing may be bypassed. Program 
executions may be checked against a database of authorised programs. This would 
require a database of authorised programs along with file check sums to guarantee 
integrity of the program being executed. 
• Modifying system configuration: Users may be modifying system configuration 
files, which may affect the way the system and programs behave; such 
modifications are undesirable as the system security may be compromised as a 
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consequence. Monitoring access to vital system and application configuration 
files can lead to the detection of such abuse. This would require a database of 
critical configuration files and their check sums. 
o Adding unauthorised hardware: Adding additional hardware, such as modems can 
affect the systems' security. For example, the user's communications through the 
modem will not be picked up by network intrusion detection systems, and the user 
may be sending confidential informafion out of the organisation. Addition of 
unauthorised hardware can be detected by monitoring system settings and 
configurations. 
o Output redirection: Output from applications may be redirected to undesired 
destinafions (files, networks, or machines). The output fi'om certain applications 
may contain confidential information, which should only be sent to appropriate 
desrinafions. For example, backup process sending the backup data to a different 
machine than usual. In this example, the backup operator may be attempting to get 
proprietary information out of the company. Output destinations of applications 
processing important information can be profiled to detect anomalous output 
destinations. 
o Alteration of audit data: Users may be altering audit and system accounting file to 
cover up traces of system abuse. Log files and audit trails should not be modified 
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even by the system administrator, because they contain evidential information 
regarding system abuses. Modification of log files can be monitored to detect 
users destroying evidential information. 
• Breach of Privacy: Users may be accessing other users' files. The perpetrator may 
be someone with high system privileges or configuration errors may have made 
the file world readable. This type of incidents can be detected by monitoring users 
browsing files/directories own by others, and auditing file permission/ownership 
changes. 
• Batch Deletion: Users or processes deleting a large number o f files may 
sometimes represent sabotage of system or data. Therefore, users or processes 
deleting a batch of files can be monitored to detect possible sabotage of system 
and data. Managerial controls such as separation of duties should also be applied 
to deletion of files in work folders. For example, a user can be assigned the job of 
actually deleting the files, while users can mark files that should be deleted. 
• Installation of unauthorised software: Every software program installed is a link 
in the security chain of the organisation. The newly installed program may 
introduce a new vulnerability through which the system may be exploited. The 
installed program may be a Trojan or viral infected software. In general software 
installation rights should be limited to a few users and programs should be 
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verified and authorised before installed on organisation's systems. In order to 
accommodate this, a list of executable directories needs to be established, and 
only the authorised programs stored in these directories may be executed. A 
database of authorised programs with associated check sums is also required. 
With this approach, users executing unauthorised programs or executing programs 
from arbitrary directories, such as home or temporary directories can be delected. 
• Copying software programs: Users may copy customised software programs used 
in organisation's computers. For example, users can copy executable files, shared 
library files, and registry entries of a proprietary program for malicious purposes. 
Users accessing executable files in *'Read" mode can be monitored to detect 
copying of executable programs. 
• Excessive Printing: Users may be abusing organisation's printer facilities, for 
personal use and private work. Excessive usage of print services may be 
monitored to detect this type of abuse. 
• Input to programs: Files containing confidential data may be passed to 
encryption/steganographic programs as input. Monitoring input to 
encryption/steganographic programs can detect users attempting to disguise 
information before sneaking it out of the organisation. This would require a list of 
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encryption/steganographic programs installed on the system. Then the file inputs 
to such programs can be checked i f they are important confidential files. 
It is clear ft-om the preceding discussion that system-level monitoring gives the potential 
for a far wider range of misuse activities to be identified. However, some types of abuse 
will be distinguishable from normal activity only with the knowledge of application-level 
semantics, and consequently may not exhibit malicious behaviour at the system level. 
Therefore, to be ftilly comprehensive, some detection strategies will be necessary at the 
application and database levels. 
5,3.3 Application and data-level misuses 
Monitoring at this level must again be focused upon individual host systems, but now at a 
deeper level, collecting data fi-om within individual applications that might attract 
misfeasor interest. The list below presents some examples of the general forms that 
misuse at this level might take. 
• Inappropriate inputs: Users may type in inappropriate inputs into the applications. 
Inappropriate inputs can cause the application to crash, behave in an unexpected 
manner, or result in compromised integrity of the data. Entering a different 
type/format of data to the type/format expected by the application can result in the 
application misbehaving and disintegration of processed data. Entering a different 
range of data can result in fi-aud. User input could be monitored at the interface 
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level where the users interact with the application. In a client server environment, 
user inputs/request (server messages) may also be monitored at the serx e^r side. 
• Anomalous access of databases: Anomalous access of databases can result in 
disclosure of confidential information and fi-aud. Insiders may misuse databases 
containing medical records, criminal records, customer data, personal records, and 
statistical information relating to businesses. Query requests by users may be 
monitored to detect anomalous access of databases. 
• Function usage: Commercial off-the-shelf applications include many features 
some of which are not easily disabled, and usage of certain ftinctions may resuh in 
disclosure of information or compromised data integrity. Monitoring user 
interaction within the application environment by auditing feature usage can help 
detect application level abuse. 
For the purpose of monitoring misuse in database and transaction systems, it is 
conjectured that application level monitoring can provide most relevant data: because this 
is where the users directly interact with the application environment and the concerned 
data. Therefore the data collected here should reveal more about the user behaviour 
within the environment, and it gives a better understanding of the user's intentions. 
Again, the user actions and input to the application is more meaningftil when monitored 
at this level. The advantages of collecting data at this level are that the data is 
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unencrypted and it gives an insight into how the application interprets the transaction. It 
also gives the opportunity to reconstruct the session by logging request-response 
transactions. The ability to reconstmct the session is very important as it allows the 
security personnel to investigate what actually happened to find out i f the actions were 
accidental or intentional. Session reconstruction also allows the characterisation of the 
particular misuse scenario, to automate future detection. The disadvantage of this 
approach is the potential effect on the performance of the application. I f innplemented 
without care the collected data may also reveal confidential information and system 
vulnerabilities that can be used by misfeasors. It is also vital how the collection module is 
implemented. With some of the applications it may be sufficient just to monitor the data 
logged; however, with some applications it might be necessary to modify the code in 
order to get the desired data. For the latter approach, it needs to be identified where in the 
application the data collection function should be placed. Again this might vary from one 
application to another. Therefore more research needs to be carried out to identify the 
best manner in which the data can be collected at this level and how it can be transferred 
or stored safely for analysis. Although, potential occurrence of fraud may be detected by 
monitoring for violation of separation of duties, the actual occurrence of ft^ud can only 
be detected by analysing the application data itself within the context of the transaction. 
5-4 Conclusions 
Existing intrusion taxonomies mainly describe characteristics of various attacks, and not 
developed specifically for monitoring insider misuse. Anderson was the first person to 
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classify different types of insiders who misuse the IT systems into, masqueraders, 
clandestine users, and misfeasors. However, these classifications only characterise the 
type of users and not the actual misuse or how they may be detected. Tuglular produced 
the first comprehensive taxonomy of insider misuses. However, Tuglular's taxonomy is 
primarily aimed for systematic data collection of insider incidents to provide evidence 
and incident response. This chapter presented a classification of insider f f misuses based 
upon the level(s) of the system at which each type of incident may be detected or 
monitored. Intemet abuse may be detected at the Network level, while data theft, 
sabotage, resource exhaustion, process behaviour, and system modification may be 
delected at the OS level. Anomalous user interaction with the application, anomalous 
access of databases, and breach of separation of duties may be monitored at the 
application level and within the context of the organisation. Although, potenfial 
occurrence of fraud may be detected at the application level by monitoring violation of 
separation of dufies, the actual occurrence of fraud may only be detected by analysis of 
the data. 
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6.1 Introduction 
It may not be practical to comprehensively log all the user interaction and the information 
affected within each and every application environment. Therefore, applications that 
require misfeasor monitoring, and certain commands/features that may be subject to 
abuse within such applications need to be identified. In addition, monitoring every piece 
of information contained within IT systems may decrease detection efficiency and add 
undesired overhead. Some of the files, databases, tables, records, and data accessed may 
have a greater likelihood than the rest to be abused. With that purpose a checklist has 
been developed for identifying applicafions, operations and information that requires 
misfeasor monitoring. The checklist presented here has been developed as part of the 
research. It is intended as a guide to identify "what" needs to be monitored, and the issue 
of "how" it should be monitored is considered as part of the next chapter. This chapter 
discusses why some types of application are more likely to be misused than others and 
proposes a means by which such applications may be identified. 
A data-centric approach is followed in order to develop the checklist. The data-centric 
approach is followed because without the presence of valuable data, it would not be 
financially viable to protect a system that holds no valuable data. Therefore, as a starting 
point applicafions and commands facilitated by the application in question is evaluated on 
the basis of whether the execution of the command affects confidentiality, and integrity 
of user-generated data. Availability of the data and services depends upon the proper 
fijnctioning of the system. Therefore, the applications and commands fecilitated by the 
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concerned application is evaluated on the basis of whether it affects the proper 
fijnctionality of the system and the services it provides. In addition, the definition of 
misfeasance is contextual, and thus the entities relevant for contextual analysis also need 
to be identified. 
6.2 Relevant Entities 
The emphasis is placed upon misfeasor activities rather than general insider misuse, 
because the research focuses upon detecting abuse of legitimate privileges, while general 
insider misuse can also include insiders performing attacks usually employed by extemal 
attackers. Insiders employing the attack methods used by external attackers can be 
detected by traditional IDS (Bejtlich 2005). 
The entities involved in misfeasor monitoring are the user(s), the application ufilised, the 
command executed, and the data affected/involved. The relevant entities have been 
identified by considering the subjects (user, application, process), and objects 
(application, command, data) involved in the access and manipulation o f data. The 
relationship between the entities is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The user interacts with 
application and executes commands facilitated by the application, while the data is 
accessed or modified through the application. The details of each entity can be used to 
determine possible occunrence of misuse. First of all, it is important to identify the type of 
applicafions/commands that are most likely to be misuse, and the nature o f information 
that is subject to misuse. 
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Figure S.l Relationship betAveen the Entities Involved 
6.2J Content 
The content can be classified depending upon whether its creation took place within the 
organisation, or retrieved from external sources. 
External content 
Content created by external sources may be introduced to organisation's 
IT network via the Internet, or removable storage media. External content 
misfeasors may access include pornography (images, video), copyrighted 
music/video, illegal software, i.e. any content that the organisation can be 
held liable, or can bring disrepute to the organisation. 
Internal content 
Iniemal content may be subdivided into personal (belong to the user), and 
proprietary (belonging to the organisation). Internal content that belongs to 
the organisation may include product designs, blue prints, source code, 
contract details, customer data, marketing data, and supplier details. 
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6.2.2 Policy 
In Chapter 2, it was mentioned that the notion of misuse implies the presence of rules 
defining the acceptable use of systems and information. Acceptable usage policy 
determines the security requirements and acceptable use of the information in order to 
maintain confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability. This is important 
because it is not possible to determine possible misfeasance without a properly defined 
(security or acceptable usage) policy concerning the data accessed. For example, the 
policy may indicate whether the data can be replicated, where the data may be replicated 
to etc. The information may also include the users who have access to the data, and the 
machines from which the file may be accessed. It may also include who should be 
informed of the changes made to the data. Details such as the applications that can be 
used to access the data may be included. 
6.2.3 User Details 
User credentials determine the relevance of data accessed (or received as a result of a file 
transfer) to that of user's responsibilities within the organisation. User details may 
include the department the user belongs to, the user's immediate superior, the role(s) the 
user has been assigned to, projects the user is a member of, user's email address, 
messenger addresses, telephone numbers, machines user may utilise, and the servers the 
user may access to. The identity of the user involved and associated details of each user 
involved are relevant to determining the possibility of misfeasance, because the 
124 
Chapter 6 A Checklist for Identifying Misfeasor Monitoring Opportunities 
acceptable usage depends upon the user involved, the operation performed, the 
data/system affected, and the operational ft-ame of reference in which the activity is 
interpreted (Neumann 1999). 
6,2.4 Application/Command Capability 
Features and commands facilitated by the application programs determine what the user 
can do within the IT system, and with the information accessed. Within the context of 
misfeasor monitoring, the users already have legitimate privileges and carryout abuse 
through the applications developed for completing their daily tasks. Therefore, the 
features facilitated by the application environment correspond to the capability factor of 
the CMO model mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.5. Applications with distinct 
capabilities are considered along with possible misuse scenarios. One of the assumptions 
made is that undesired programs such as file sharing applications and games can be 
prevented fi-om being installed. Therefore, only the applications that are generally used 
by many organisations in order to increase productivity and efficiency will be considered 
for misfeasor monitoring. 
The main objective of IT security is to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the systems and data while allowing storage, management, and 
manipulation of organisation's files and databases, and ensuring accountability for user 
activities. Proper operation of the system/applications relies upon the integrity of 
executable system files, and configuration files which the system and applications depend 
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upon. In addition organisation's valuable data is stored within files or databases. I f no 
data exists, then there would not be any need for security in order to maintain 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Based upon this reasoning, the most harmful 
forms of misfeasance can be considered as data-centric. Thus, the first objective is to 
protect the files/databases stored on the systems from being destroyed, disturbed, 
doctored, or exposed. I f an application provides access to data, a malicious insider may 
inappropriately modify, replicate, transfer, or doctor the data. Therefore, any application 
that can directly access the files, data services, and databases requires misfeasor 
monitoring. Based upon the reasoning that organisation's data is the main focus of 
security, the first step for determining what needs to be monitored can be based upon the 
capability of the application to access files/data. 
• Applications that have access to files/databases. 
• Applications that do not have access to files/databases. 
6.3 Applications with No Direct Access to Files and Databases 
Applications that do not have direct access to user-created files/databases, yet may affect 
the security of the system, need to be considered for monitoring. Examples would 
include: 
• Communication related application/function 
• Security related application/fiinction 
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o Configuration related application/function 
o User management application/function 
Some of the applications with access to files and databases may also have these functions 
as built-in features. In addition, security, configuration, and user management functions 
may not be exclusive of each other. 
6.3 J Communication function 
Networked applications with data communication/transfer features allow the user to 
convey information to other entities over the network, and the facility can be used for 
inappropriate dissemination of confidential data. Applications within this category 
include email, instant messengers, and VoIP software. The communication capability 
through IT systems makes it possible to convey confidential information without passing 
through physical security checks, and facilitates transfer of confidential data to entities 
unauthorised for access. Applications that allow the user to transfer files over the network 
or the hitemet are likely tools to be used for dissemination of data, which can result in 
theft of proprietary information, breach of privacy, or undesired exposure. Therefore, 
applications that can accommodate data transfer to other machines through the network 
needs to be monitored for data transfer activities. 
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6.3.2 User/Registry management function 
Adding users who should not have access to a certain system/daiabase can resuh in 
sabotage, fraud, or information exposure, and can also result in accountability issues. If a 
single administrator had total control over the management of users then there is 
opportunity for the adminisn-ator to abuse the trust, such as creation of ghost accounts for 
use when dismissed by the organisation. Therefore, a form of verification is needed for 
addition and removal of users. For example, the database admin may have the privileges 
to add or remove users, and may subsequently abuse the privilege. Therefore, a separate 
entity or second person should be involved for verification whenever new records are 
added to important registry databases. 
6.3.3 Configuration function 
The system and applications need to be configured properly in order to be effectively 
usable. Depending upon the purpose of the system/application affected, it may affect the 
security or the service provided. I f the system configurations were changed, the system 
and the services it provides may be inaccessible to authorised users. In some cases, poor 
configuration settings may result in undesired exposure of confidential/embarrassing 
information. Therefore, applications/functions that relate configuration should also be 
monitored for misuse. The importance of application with regards to productivity of the 
organisation, and the criticality of the settings adjusted regarding the functionality of the 
applications needs to be considered, and such information needs to be provided to the 
monitoring system. 
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6.3.3.1 Security-relatedfitnctiom 
Security related applications could be used to harden or weaken the system security. 
When the security of the IT system is weakened the data stored in the system becomes 
vulnerable and opportunities for outsider attacks and further insider misuse may arise. 
Therefore, security related applications require misfeasor monitoring, even i f the 
application does not have access to files and may not affect the data directly. 
Security related applications can be further categorised into preventive mechanisms and 
monitoring mechanisms. If preventive mechanisms such as access control are weakened 
then the individuals who should not have access to the systems and data may access, If 
monitoring mechanisms are disabled or weakened then suspicious activities may go 
undetected. Therefore, applications that are related to system security and monitoring also 
need to be included for misfeasor monitoring. 
Preventive and monitoring mechanisms may not be exclusive of each other, and some 
applications may offer a hybrid of both technologies. 
6.4 Applications with Direct Access to Files and Databases 
Applications that have access to the files and databases can be categorised depending 
upon the nature of access they have regarding the file. Applications such as file managers 
cannot open the file and access the content within it, but can copy, move or delete the 
files. Applications such as, Word processors, spreadsheet, and presentation software 
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accommodate the access to entire content of the file i.e. provide facility to 
view/manipulate the contents. However, applications such as database clients may be 
configured to accommodate access to only a small part of the file. 
Applications with data access capability also can be checked whether they have functions 
related to security, configuration, user management, and communication. Applications 
that have data access and are capable of communicating the data accessed to another 
location are likely tools to be used for information theft. 
6,4J File managers 
File manager applications allow the user to access the files but not able to view or 
manipulate the contents directly. However, such applications may be used to replicate, 
move, or delete critical files. Therefore, applications with capability to manage files 
require misfeasor monitoring. 
6.4.1.1 Propagation 
Features such as Copy/Cut/Paste provide the capability to replicate and 
propagate content. 
I f the replicated file ends up in the wrong hands, it may result in information 
theft or undesired exposure without the organisation being aware of it. 
Therefore, this type of activity needs to be monitored. 
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Backup operations are one of the most important contingency plans for 
organisation's data. Therefore, these operations need to be monitored to keep 
track of where the backed up data is located, when it was made, and who is 
responsible for backing up the data. Note: segregation of duties should also be 
applied to performing backups and verifying the backed up data. 
6.4.1.2 Move 
When a file is moved, there may be consequences regarding the 
confidentiality of the information contained, and the accessibility of the data 
by regular users or applications that utilise the file. Therefore, this type of 
activity needs to be included for misfeasor monitoring. 
6.4.1.3 Rename 
When a file/database is renamed, accessibility issues may arise. Therefore, 
regular users of the file/databases should be informed, and configuration 
option of applications that utilise the file/database in order to provide services 
may need to be updated. In addition, i f the monitoring of the file security is 
regulated on the basis of filename then renaming a file may be one of the steps 
in disguising information prior to thefl. 
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6.4. i .4 Delete 
It will have disastrous consequences if the only copy of a critical file/database 
is deleted, or i f the backup of the critical file is deleted then a false sense of 
assurance may be created and contingency plans may be affected. When a 
file/database that is needed for day-to-day ftinctioning of the business 
applications is deleted, productivity may be lost as a result. Therefore, file 
delete actions need to be monitored, and the appropriate authority needs to be 
alerted promptly. 
6.4,2 Databases 
Most of the valuable, confidential, and propriety information are stored, managed, and 
accessed through this type of application. Therefore, database applications require 
misfeasor monitoring. However, within database applications the value of underiying 
data determines whether the application requires monitoring. Thus, a number o f questions 
concerning the importance of data to the organisation need to be asked while evaluating 
the value of data contained within the database system. Additionally, the databases 
themselves can be categorised into static and dymanic approaches, which alters the nature 
of the analysis thai would be performed. 
6.4.2.1 Static databases 
Within this type of database, records are not added, updated, or deleted on regular basis. 
Usually historical records are stored in this type of databases for future analysis and 
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decision-making. I f the answer to one of the questions listed is a "Yes", then the database 
requires misfeasor monitoring. 
• Is the database part of a decision making system? 
I f the information contained within this kind of database is exposed, 
competitors may understand the organisation's decision-making process and 
future strategies, which can eventually result in financial loss. 
• Is the database part of performance analysis system? 
I f the information contained within this kind of database is exposed, 
organisation's reputations and or share prices may be affected. 
• Does the database contain confidential records? 
I f information contained within this type of database is exposed, it may result 
in breach of privacy for individual or persons, for which the organisation may 
finally be held liable. Examples of this type of databases include health 
records, criminal records, financial records, student records, customer records, 
trade records, etc. 
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• Is the database pan of marketing system? 
If information contained within this kind of database is revealed, the 
competitors may understand the organisation's marketing strategy and take 
advantage of such valuable knowledge. 
• Does the database contain valuable research data? 
I f information contained within this kind of database is exposed, the 
competitors may gain competitive edge over the organisation. 
• Does the database contain customer data? 
If information contained within this type of database is exposed, competitors 
may have the opportunity to prise away organisations' existing and potential 
customers. 
• Does the database contain information that can lead to identity theft? 
Today, identity theft has become a great issue (Kotadia 2003). For example, i f 
the records contain the name, address, national insurance number, driver's 
licence information, date of birth, mother's maiden name etc. then such 
information may be used to create false identities, which can result in the 
organisation being held liable. In addition the information may be used to 
create false identities for attacks against the organisation, and for fraud. 
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6.4.2.2 Dynamic databases 
Within this type of databases, records are added, updated, and sometimes deleted. 
Dynamic databases can again be categorised into transaction databases and non-
transaction databases. 
The checklist for static databases also applies to dynamic databases, and the subsequent 
points apply in addition. 
• fs the database part of deliver}' system? 
I f goods are delivered to the wrong address or at a later date, it may result in 
fraud, or delay production on the part of the customer, resulting in the 
organisation being held liable. 
• Is the database part of booking/reservation system? 
I f the information contained in this type of database is revealed, customer's 
privacy may be breached and the organisation may be held liable. For 
example, i f the flight destination of the customer is revealed, the customer's 
privacy may be inadvertently breached. 
• Is the database part of pricing system? 
I f the wrong pricing information for goods and services are entered, it may 
result in fraud or financial/customer loss. 
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Is the database part of ordering system? 
I f the quantities ordered are inaccurate it may delay production. I f the goods 
are ordered to be delivered to an address other than that of the organisation's 
then it may result in fraud. There may also be opportunities for employees to 
generate kickbacks from suppliers. Statistics may be needed to determine and 
compare the quantities ordered fi-om each supplier for each type of product. 
/5 the database part of an inventory system? 
If incorrect information is entered within this type of database fraud may 
result as a consequence, such as recording non-existent items, orders that did 
not arrive, or a different quantity than that acnaally arrived or ordered. 
Is the database part of payroll system? 
I f information contained within this type of database is revealed, it may 
expose financial details of employees, which can result in low morale among 
employees or result in identity theft. There may also be opportunities to create 
ghost employees or dubious pay calculations in order to generate financial 
gain. 
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• Is the database part of invoice system? 
There may be opportunities to commit fraud within this type of databases, i f 
the data entered is inaccurate, such as the billing address and the registered 
address of the credit/debit card. 
• Is the database part of a claimant system? 
Within this type of databases, false claims may be made to generate financial 
gain. 
• Is the database part of a trading system? 
Fraud may result within this type of databases i f the contextual rules or 
business controls regarding each trade are not satisfied, or i f the values entered 
are inaccurate. 
• Is the database part of a manufacturing system? 
I f the data/information entered within this type of databases is incorrect, it 
may delay production. For example, ordering less quantity of raw material 
than needed. Ordering more quantity then needed may also result in fraud. 
Another example is, ordering the product to be delivered at a later date than 
required. 
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o Is the database part of an accounting system? 
This type of databases usually contains sensitive financial information, which 
i f revealed may affect share prices. I f inaccurate data is entered within this 
type of databases, it may also result in fi*aud. 
o Is the database part of a transaction processing system? 
There may be many steps involved in a single business transaction, and i f the 
contextual rules or business controls for each step are not complied, fi-aud may 
result as a consequence. 
Non-transaction databases 
Within this type of databases, modification of a record wil l not have direct 
effect upon another unrelated record. For example, modifying the marks of a 
student will not affect another student's record directly. For example, entering 
a type of allergy to a patient's record will not affect another patient's record 
directly. However, i f the patient is prescribed with medicine, it wi l l also affect 
the inventory database. 
/ . Are there pre-requisite conditions to he satisfied? 
For example, a student's record must exist in the registry, and the student 
must have registered with the institution from a certain date, and the student 
must have achieved required marks for specified modules before a 
certificate of graduation can be issued. 
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2. Are there post-requisite conditions to be followed through? 
For example, when an order is placed through the stock ordering system, the 
inventory system needs to be checked for the receipt of goods after a 
specified time (expected date for receipt of goods). Appropriate example in 
the banking scenario will be the Account Receivable, and the Cash Receipt 
Account. 
3. Does verification depend upon the values entered? 
For example, i f the student did not obtain pass marks, then the student 
cannot be graduated. In addition, the student cannot be still registered for the 
same course after a number of years. 
For example, the expected date for receipt of goods may be entered while 
placing orders. The date entered may be used to check for the arrival of 
goods, and ifthe date entered is unusual it may postpone verification. 
> Transaction databases 
Within transaction systems, modification of a record may have knock on effect 
upon another record. For example, when a fund transfer is carried out, the 
transferred amount wil l be deducted from the source account and added to the 
destination account. 
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1. Are there conditions that must be satisfied for the operation to be 
legitimate? 
For example, when a reimbursement operation for overdraft charges is 
carried out, the system needs to check the conditions qualifying a 
reimbursement, and also calculate that the amount reimbursed is correct. 
2. Are there contextual conditions that must be checked? 
For example, when an order is placed through the stock ordering system, the 
inventory system needs to be checked for the receipt of goods after a 
specified time (expected date for receipt of goods). Appropriate example in 
the accounting scenario will be the Account Receivable, and the Cash 
Receipt Account to monitor cash flow. 
3. Is there a possibility of verification being deterred/delayed as a result 
of this operation? 
For example, bank customers verify their transactions through bank 
statements. If the customer's address is changed without the knowledge of 
the customer, then the verification of transactions carried out on that 
customer's account would be deterred or delayed. 
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4. Are there codes/ID/batch numbers that can be related to an operation? 
For example, a range of batch numbers may be used only for claiming travel 
expenses, and a different range numbers may only be used for reimbursing 
equipment purchase etc. 
5. Are there matches to be verified? 
For example, expense claims having the destination account number 
different from that of the claimant. 
6. Is the value entered related to calculation of loss/profit, bonus, charges, and 
interest rates? 
For example, calculation of interest payment for each type of accounts can 
be complex, and an employee who understands how interest rates are 
calculated may defraud the organisation, the customer, or both. An 
appropriate example within the business environment will be the Accounts 
Payable fraud where the date for the payment to be made is significant in 
calculation of loss and profits, in addition it may also relate to prompt 
payment discount. 
However, in order to detect possible occurrence of fraud, the detection system needs to be 
provided with the business/application specific contextual conditions, which can be 
provided through appropriate analysis procedure (inference rules) for a given operation. 
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If the activities deviate fi-om the defined norm of contextual conditions, then there is the 
possibility of fraud in progress. Someone who has in-depth knowledge of the application 
or the business may provide such contextual conditions. Example of such personnel 
includes fraud auditors, and business managers. This highlights the fact that insider 
misuse is very much a management problem as much as a technical problem. 
6,4.3 Access to entire files 
While utilising applications that access the content of the file as a whole, the user may 
view and/or edit any part of the file. Such applications include word processors, e-book 
readers, spreadsheet programs, image viewer/editor, audio software, and video editors. 
Some research is being earned out to implement page level control within document 
management systems (Garg et al. 2004). 
Within these types of applications, content propagation activities need to be monitored. 
Therefore, policies regarding data propagation also need to be defined before monitoring 
can detect misfeasance. Printed documents are beyond the scope of monitoring sofhvare, 
and monitoring shifts into physical realm. Due to lack of defined stmcturc within such 
files, automated monitoring of data integrity is difficult, especially when users are 
authorised to modify. 
The main concern with accessing valuable files is the dissemination o f confidential 
information by legitimate users. Therefore, acceptable usage policy needs to indicate: 
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• whether replication of the file is acceptable 
• whether replication o f the file's contents is acceptable 
• whether saving the file to a removable media is acceptable 
• to which users the file/contents may be transferred 
• the machines fi-om which the file may be accessed 
• the machines to which the file may be transferred 
• who should be alerted i f the acceptable usage policy is violated 
6.5 The special case of browsers 
Although editing capability is limited, Web browsers provide an interface that may be 
used for communication, file management, database access, viewing documents, viewing 
images, listening to audio files, and viewing video content. 
6.5,1 External Content 
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Graphic, video, and audio downloaded from dubious web sites may affect the 
organisations reputation, and some may have legal liabilities. Therefore, web 
pages containing highly visual content needs to be monitored. 
6.5,2 Internal Content 
\ . I f the user is accessing files, then apply checklist provided for access to entire 
files. 
2. I f the user is accessing databases, then apply checklist provided fo r access to 
databases. 
6.6 Software development tools 
Software development tools should not be installed on operational systems, because the 
compiler can be used to execute malicious code. Machines installed wi th software 
development tools should be segregated from machines containing sensitive/critical data. 
6.7 Conclusions 
A methodical process for identifying applications/operations, and data that requires 
misfeasor monitoring has been presented in this chapter. For effective misfeasor 
monitoring, details regarding the security requirements o f the files/databases, the role o f 
the user within the organisation, and the capability o f the applications are needed. 
Applications can first be categorised into those that have direct access to files and 
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databases, and those that do not have direct access. Whether an application has direct 
access to data or not, the functions related to security, configuration, communication, and 
user management need to be monitored for possible misuse. Within applications that have 
direct access to files and databases, user operations performed upon data need to be 
monitored to ensure that the security and acceptable use policy are satisfied. Download o f 
video, audio, and images fi-om the Internet should also be accounted and monitored. For 
fraud monitoring, additional verification process needs to be included in the transaction 
applications. 
Merely having data indicative o f misuse is not enough to detect insider misuse. Due to 
the fact that misfeasance is a contextual perception, appropriate inference/analysis 
procedures need to be developed for each activity considered, so that the data analysed 
may be interpreted within the context o f the activity. The next chapter presents a generic 
conceptual architecture o f a misfeasor monitoring system and appropriate analysis 
procedures that considers relevant data identified here for the analysis o f misfeasance. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the architecture o f a generic misfeasor monitoring system, and the 
processes involved in detecting potential misfeasance resulting from operations and 
activities identified. Concluding from the analyses made in the previous chapters, the 
activities that can result in misfeasance include: 
1. Application Utilisation 
The application the user is actively interacting with can be used for performance 
and productivity monitoring. 
2. Internet access 
a. URL/IP address 
The address o f an Internet server can be used to determine the nature o f 
content available to the user accessing it. 
b. Bandwidth 
i . Total bandwidth consumption attributed to each user 
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i i i . Bandwidth consumption attributed to each user by service type 
(e,g. Web, Email, I M , etc.) 
3. Bypassing application level controls 
a. File access through anomalous application 
4. Compromise o f availability 
a. File deletion 
b. Configuration changes 
5. Compromise o f confidentiality 
a. Database access (read) 
b. Dissemination o f confidential data 
Partial replication o f contents 
File replication 
Transfer o f file/data through network applications 
6. Compromise o f integrity 
a. Database access (Insert/updates, accounting) 
b. Registry Management (record addition, account creations) 
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Therefore, a misfeasor-monitoring tool should include features that can analyse such 
activities to detemiine possible misfeasance. 
7.2 Overview of the conceptual monitoring tool 
In order to accommodate analysis o f various activities through a single analysis engine, it 
w i l l be appropriate to identify and differentiate each user activity depending upon the 
suitable method o f detection i.e. behaviour-based (statistical) or knowledge-based 
(inferential). Figure 7.1 illustrates the basic components o f an intrusion detection system 
(Denning 1987), upon which the components needed to facilitate misfeasor monitoring 
w i l l be added in Figure 7.2. Sensors provide the detection engine with the audit data 
related to the activity being monitored. Inferential component refers to knowledgebase 







( Profiles ] 
Knowledgebase 
Figure 7.1 Basic Components of IDS 
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7.2.1 Statistical Analysis 
Activities that may be monitored through statistical analysis for detection o f misfeasance 
include; 
• Amount o f time spent interacting with each application environment 
• Amount o f network bandwidth utilised by each user 
• The number o f database queries issued by each user 
• The number o f records returned per query 
• The number o f records accessed per user within a time frame 
• The percentage o f a data table accessed per user within a time frame 
• The percentage o f a database accessed per user within a time fi-ame 
For the monitoring system to be effective the activity monitored and the acceptable usage 
policy needs to be closely related. For example, in order to detect the bandwidth usage 
abuse, the policy regarding bandwidth usage thresholds needs to be provided for 
automated decision-making. The values needed for reference can be manually defined by 
the assigned authority, or characterised through usage panems of an individual, all 
system users, or users with similar responsibilities. 
7.2.2 Inferential Analysis 
Activities that may be monitored through inferential analysis for detecfion o f misfeasance 
include. 
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• URL/IP address accessed 
• File access through arbitrary applications 
• Compromise o f confidentiality through replication and dissemination o f data 
• Compromise o f confidentiality through unethical access o f database records 
• Compromise o f availability through deletion o f critical data 
• Compromise o f availability through inappropriate configuration changes 
• Compromise o f integrity through inappropriate configuration changes 
• Compromise o f integrity trough inappropriate modification o f data 
The inference rules, the complexity o f the rule and parameters needed by each rule differs 
for each user activity monitored. Therefore, the next step would be to define appropriate 
decision making rules, and identify the set o f knowledge/facts/thresholds needed as 
reference to determine violation o f acceptable usage policy associated with each activity. 
This wi l l be discussed later in detail during analysis o f decision making mles and 
reference data needed for each activity. 
7.3 Components of the Misfeasor Monitoring System 
Audit logs generated by various systems and applications may dif fer in format and the 
number o f parameter logged. This varied format and parameters need to be parsed in 
order to generate a standardised format so that log data from heterogeneous systems can 
be processed. Appropriate analysis procedure and associated log data also need to be 
identified in order to accommodate monitoring o f various user activities. In addition, 
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some o f the log data from various level o f the system or dispersed databases may need to 
be correlated or processed (such as add, subtract, compare etc.) in order to derive usable 
information that can be provided as facts. Segregation o f duties and involvement o f users 
who have intimate knowledge o f the content and context is also an important issue related 
to misfeasor monitoring. The aforementioned factors were considered upon deciding the 
components needed by the misfeasor monitoring system, and determining which 
ftinctions need to be decoupled. The additional components needed to facilitate misfeasor 
monitoring is combined with the basic components o f an intmsion detection system to 
form the conceptual architecture o f a misfeasor monitoring system as shown in Figure 
7.2. The basic components o f an intrusion detection system in Figure 7.2 are shaded. 
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Figure 7.2 Overview of Misfeasor Monitoring System Components 
7.3.1 Parser 
Users may carryout numerous operations that may lead to misfeasance and a number o f 
activities have been identified for monitoring. Each type o f activity requires an 
appropriate analysis procedure. Therefore, the nature o f the activity must be identified 
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prior to analysis o f misfeasance. The Parser component performs pre-processing o f audit 
data, classification o f log data and identifies the nature o f activity so that an appropriate 
analysis procedure can be chosen by the detection engine. 
7.3.2 Fact Processors 
In some cases such as dissemination o f data, unethical access o f records, and verification 
o f database updates, the facts needed for inference o f misfeasance, and determining the 
authority for verification can only be derived fi-om live databases o f the organisation. 
Therefore,yac/ processors are needed to infer the data fi-om the organisation's databases 
and provide to the knowledgebase as facts. The fact processors also need to be provided 
with the inference rules regarding how each fact may be determined. 
7.3.3 Alert Generator 
One o f the aspects presenting the opportunity for misuse is the lack o f segregation o f 
duties between the person responsible for the activity and the person verifying the 
activity'. Therefore, i f all alerts are sent to one person, segregation o f duties w i l l not be 
enforced. In addition the nofion o f misfeasance is contextual dependent, and a single 
person may not know all the contextual conditions relating to acceptable usage of the 
system/application/data involved. 
Within the conceptual misfeasor monitoring system, the process o f analysing events to 
determine whether an event should be alerted, and the process o f determining the person 
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to be alerted are treated as two separate processes. The alert process is treated separately, 
so that rather than alerting all the events to the same administrator, alerts can be sent to 
the responsible authority depending upon the affected machine/application/file/record, 
and assigned authority. This approach allows segregation o f duties to be enforced 
between the user performing the activity, and the user verifying the activity. 
Alert generator determines the responsible authority by checking the knowledgebase 
directly, or derives the responsible authority from organisation's live databases according 
to the inference rules defined within the knowledgebase. Therefore, i f the responsible 
authority cannot be determined directly fi-om the facts witf i in the knowledgebase, but can 
only be derived from organisation's live databases, inference rules relating to 
identification o f responsible authority needs to be provided within the knowledgebase. 
The architecture presented here differs from the one described in (Phyo and Fumell 
2004b). The framework presented in (Phyo and Fumell 2004b) relies upon the ability to 
characterise user behaviour based upon the role o f the user within the organisation and 
the user's daily responsibilities. However, the ability to characterise user behaviour based 
upon the role o f the user within the organisation can differ f rom one organisation to 
another. Therefore, the framework presented in (Phyo and Fumell 2004) was abandoned 
and the architecture presented in this chapter was developed. 
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7.4 Application Utilisation Monitor 
With the exception o f dedicated terminals, many o f the organisations computers include 
applications that can be used for recreation purposes. Users may not be able to carry out 
productive work while utilising such programs for long periods. Therefore, the amount o f 
time each user spends actively interacting with certain application environments need to 
be checked to ensure that organisation's IT systems are used mainly for productivity 
purposes, and that the users are not wasting lime surfing the web, chatfing on messenger, 
writing personal emails, or playing computer games. 
Monitoring o f this can be accomplished through statistical analysis o f the amount o f time 
each user spent interacting within each application environment. The data for analysis can 
be collected through logging the focus window, i.e. the application the user is actively 
interacting within, and analysing the amount o f time spent using the application either 
cumulative or per session. 
Logging this information can also help determine the exact time at which the user was 
interacting with a particular application environment, and this can later be used in 
conjunction with other log data for misfeasor analysis. For example, when determining 
whether the user is/was utilising a communication application while accessing 
confidential information, or to determine the application that is/was in focus when screen 
capture operation was carried out. 
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The logged data may also be used for characterisation o f each user's application usage 
patterns. For example, chronologically the user checks emails after logging in , then reply 
emails, access word documents, write emails, then utilise web browser etc. 
Note: The values within the various log tables presented in this chapter were created 
artificially in order to illustrate the principle. 
Log ID Date Time Window Handle Application 
38 20/05/2007 10:40 3736472 Internet Explorer 
39 20/05/2007 10:42 System Idle 
40 20/05/2007 10:55 3736472 Internet Explorer 
Table 7.1 Active Window Log 
From the collected data further characteristic and be derived, such as the amount o f time 
each user spent utilising each application for a particular day. 
Date User Name Application Name Time Spent Interacting 
20/05/2007 A.Phyo Internet Explorer 3:27hr 
20/05/2007 F.Steve Internet Explorer 1:12hr 
20/05/2007 A.Phyo Visual Studio 2:50hr 
20/05/2007 F.Sleve Visual Studio Ohr 
Table 7.2 User Application Usage Log 
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The data can then be used to calculate the averages o f all users within the organisation or 
users belonging to similar responsibilities. These characteristics can be used as reference 
in order to detect anomalies. 
Date Characteristic Category Application Time Spent 
20/05/2007 Employee Average Internet Explorer 2;17hr 
20/05/2007 Role 9A Average Internet Explorer 2:45hr 
Table 7.3 Application Utilisation Characteristics 
Altematively the organisation policy may explicitly state thresholds o f acceptable usage 
for reference. 
Threshold Category Application Acceptable Time 
Employee Internet Explorer 1:30hr 
Role 9A Internet Explorer 3:00hr 
Table 7.4 Applicat ion Utilisation Reference Thresholds 
7.5 Internet Access 
Users may spend great amount o f time surfing the web, or downloading media unrelated 
to work. This not only affects their productivity, but also the productivity o f the 
organisation as a whole, because it may delay access (how significant depends on the 
total bandwidth available to the organisation and the load the user is utilising) for users 
performing legitimate work, and it may also l imi t the ability to provide Intemet-based 
ser\'ices. In addition, the media downloaded by the user may be inappropriate such as 
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pornography, which can tarnish the organisation's reputation, or copyrighted material for 
which the organisation may be held liable. 
User Name Date Time URUIP Visited 
APhyo 20/5/2007 10:57 http://www.plymouth.ac.uk 
Table 7.5 Internet Sites Accessed Log 
The log o f URL/IP visited by each user needs to be referenced against a list o f addresses 
deemed acceptable and a list o f addresses deemed unacceptable to facilitate automated 
detection. 
Acceptable Addresses Unacceptable Addresses 
http://www.plymouth.ac.uk http://www.pomography.com 
http://www.network-research-group.org http://www.ware2.com 
Table 7.6 Address Reference 
In addition to the URL/IP visited, each user's bandwidth consumption can also be 
monitored for indications o f possible misuse. 
User Name Date Interval Category Mega Bytes 
A.Phyo 20/05/2007 10-1 lam Total Download 100 
A.Phyo 20/05/2007 10-11am Total Upload 50 
A.Phyo 20/05/2007 10-11am Image download 10 
A.Phyo 20/05/2007 10-11am Video download 20 
A.Phyo 20/05/2007 10-11am Audio download 70 
Table 7.7 Bandwidth Usage Statistics 
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The monitoring approach for this is to either define thresholds for bandwidth usage limit, 
or to determine the normal bandwidth usage o f a user for each role, then comparing it 
with the acuial bandwidth usage o f each user to identify those who may be abusing the 
bandwidth usage. 
Norms o f bandwidth usage for all employees o f the organisation, those o f a particular 
user group can also be derived from the collected data. This can be used as reference 
when detecting anomalous bandwidth usage. 
Date Interval Application Name Category Mega Bytes 
20/5/2007 10-11am Internet Explorer Average Download 50 
20/5/2007 10-11am Intemet Explorer Image Download 10 
20/5/2007 10-11 am Intemet Explorer Video Download 0 
20/5/2007 10-11am Intemel Explorer Audio Download 25 
Table 7.8 Bandwidth Usage Norms 
7.6 Conflguration Changes 
Proper configurations need to be made in order for an application (service/security 
related) to function as desired. Therefore, configuration changes/updates need to be 
monitored to ensure that the application functions as expected. In order to enable this type 
o f monitoring, the monitoring system needs to know the required configuration settings 
for each application within each and every monitored system [Table 7.11]. 
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The data needed to log are: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Event ID 9 
User Name APhyo 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS1 
Application Name Firewall 
Table 7.9 Conflguration Changes Log 
Event ID is needed to correlate the user input values associated with the event, and for 
chronological ordering o f events. 
User Name is needed for identification o f the user responsible for the activity. 
Machine Name and Application Name are needed to identify the configuration policy 
associated with the application for the given machine. 
Event ID Flag 
9 Turn On 
9 Limewire 
9 MSN Messenger 
Table 7.10 Flags Associated With Configuration Change Event 
Event ID is needed to correlate the Flags associated with the each configuration change 
event. 
Flag attribute is needed to describe the user input associated with each configurBtion 
change event. 
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Standard or normal configuration settings are required as a reference to determine 
whether the user actions are acceptable. The required application settings for one 
web/database server may be different to another, while settings for workstations in one 
network may be different to those in another network. 
The data needed for reference are: 
Machine Name and Application Name are needed to describe the associated configuration 
policy o f each unique Machine-Application combination. 
Required Flag attribute is needed to define the acceptable user inputs for the 
configuration changes made to each unique Machine-Apphcation combination. 
Machine Name Application Name Required Flag 
PSQ_A304_WS1 Firewall Turn On 
PSQ_A304_WS1 Firewall Don't Allow Exceptions 
Table 7.11 Application Connguration Policy 
The main purpose is to identify i f the changes w i l l affect functionality o f the 
system/application. A system with weak controls wi l l be \ailnerable, however i f the 
controls are too tight accessibility may be reduced, and i f legitimate uses cannot access 
the services dien it may reduce productivity. 
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Monitoring Process: 
1. The "Machine Name" and "Application Name" values ft-om the event log are 
compared against the "Machine Name", and "Application Name" values within 
the data table containing the required settings for each machine-application 
combination. This step is needed for identifying the acceptable configuration 
policy o f each unique Machine-Application combination. 
2. The monitoring system notes the "Flag" value o f each and every matched entry o f 
the required settings data table. This step identifies the flag values that the user 
input must correspond, in order to satisfy configuration policy. 
3. The noted "Flag" values are compared against the list o f "Flag" values associated 
with die event. This step determines whether current user input conforms to the 
configuration policy. 
4. I f all the required "Flag" values do not appear in the "Flag" values associated with 
the event, the event is logged into the "Configuration_Changes" data table o f the 
alerts database. This step determines whether current user input includes all the 
flags required to satisfy the configuration policy. I f all the required flags are not 
included, functionality, availability and security o f the system may be affected. 
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5. I f all the "Flag" values associated with the event do not appear in the list o f 
required "Flag" values, the event is logged into the "Configuration_Changes" data 
table o f the alerts database. This step determines whether current user input 
exceeds the requirements defined in the configuration policy. I f new flags are 
added, the ftinctionality, availability and security o f the system may be affected. 
Alert Process: 
1. The "Machine Name" value is used to locate the record containing the details o f 
the machine, so that the "System Administrator" can be identified and alerted. 
This step determines the appropriate person to be alerted, depending upon the 
machine affected, so that the alerts can be distributed correctly. 
2. Perhaps file custodians o f all the listed files located on the affected machine 
should also be alerted? 
Information systems security officer (ISSO) should be assigned responsibility for 
defining security policies regarding the network and computer systems, and to ensure that 
the security is implemented as defined. The ISSO w i l l only be responsible for defining 
system security, and network security, including communication and data transfer within 
intemal sub-networks. While developing security policy for communication and data 
transfer, the ISSO may also have to arrange discussions with personnel from various 
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departments, so as to reach a balance between security and accessibility. One o f the 
focuses o f these discussions should be to define communication/transfer fi-om one 
geographical location (building/room/department) to another, which the system 
administrator can later map to IP addresses. 
System administrator's responsibility should only be to maintain functionality o f the 
network, machines, and network services, and to configure the security applications as 
defined by the security policy. 
7.7 Issues Regarding File Usage 
One o f the problems o f access control is that it cannot determine what the user does with 
the file after the user has gained access to it especially with regards to dissemination o f 
data. The user may create a copy o f the confidential information and transfer/take it out 
o f the organisation. The user may encrypt the data so that other legitimate and authorised 
users o f the file cannot access it. The user may delete critical files in order to delay 
productivity or to cause sabotage. The user may move the confidential file to another 
location so that the information may be exposed. In order to monitor such misuse o f 
privileges, the security requirements o f the system/application/file need to be defined and 
the system needs to provide mechanism to create an acceptable usage policy for critical 
files, which wi l l indicate what the user can do with the system/application/information 
the user has gained accessed to. However, it is not practical to include each and every file 
stored on organisation's computers for misfeasor monitoring, since the users may also 
store personal files on the workstations or their personal folders on the network drive. 
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Therefore, critical files that are considered as part o f organisation's intellectual property 
needs to be listed for misfeasor monitoring, and the security policy for each f i le needs to 
be defined in order to enable misfeasor monitoring [Table 7.12]. 
A reference required by the misfeasor monitoring tool is the list o f files that need to be 
included for misfeasor monitoring in the file inventory table o f the knowledgebase and 
specify policy regarding dissemination o f data. 
Once a file is included in the list, the user wi l l be asked to answer a number o f questions 
with regards to the file's acceptable usage policy. The user listing die file for monitoring 
and answering security requirements may be someone responsible for watching over the 
file, *Tile guardian/custodian". System administrator is not responsible for listing files and 
answering the questions regarding what the user can do with the information accessed. 
Required Parameters Example Values 
File ID 9 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Surveys\Mi5use.doc 
File Custodian F.Steve 
File Description Misuse survey report 
Application for Access MS Word 
Allow Save to Removable? No 
Allow File Replication? No 
Allow Partial Replication? Yes 
Table 7.12 File Inventory Table 
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For example, a head o f Human Resource w i l l be responsible for listing files containing 
employee details, and answering questions related to the security requirements o f the file. 
The advantages o f this approach is that the file guardian w i l l have better knowledge than 
the system administrator regarding the sensitivity o f the information contained in the file 
and which personnel need access to it, in addifion it w i l l also reduce workload for the 
system administrator. The novelty lies in getting "f i le custodians" involved in the security 
process. The anticipated drawback w i l l be the need to provide training for users i.e. file 
guardians/custodians. File custodians should be those who understand the sensitivity o f 
the content, and also (partly/wholly) responsible for deciding who needs access to the 
content and maintaining its confidentiality. 
o Wliich users need direct access to the file? 
This policy is to be defined in the OS/Application level access control 
permissions. 
o Which users need indirect access to the fde? 
These are the users who do not have permission to read or write at the 
OS/Application level yet may need access to a copy o f the file and thus can 
request from those who have direct access. Therefore, the monitoring system 
needs to be provided with information regarding which users may have access to 
replicated data [Table 7.20, and Table 7.21]. Within the misfeasor monitoring 
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system the policy can be defined within the FileReceivableRole, and 
FileReceivableUsers data tables in the knowledge database. 
• From which computers can the recipient retrieve the transferred file? 
Some o f the sub-neuvorks within the organisation may be segregated to prevent 
computers outside die sub-net fi-om directly accessing those within . However, 
some o f the users f rom outside the sub-net may need access to some o f the files 
hosted on the server within the subnet. As noted previously, a user who has direct 
access may transfer the file to the person needing access to a replica. However, 
the security o f the data may be compromised i f the machine the recipient uses to 
access the replica does not meet certain standards. Therefore, the machines that 
meet the standards required to host the replicated files from each server also need 
to be defined within the knowledgebase so that it can be referenced during 
inference [Table 7.23]. 
7.7./ FHe Access 
When a user accesses a file, the entities involved are the user, the application, and the 
file. Every entity involved is a link in the security chain, and thus the monitoring system 
needs to verify that all entities involved conform to the security (or acceptable usage) 
policy. I f a users utilises an application different to the one normally used for accessing a 
classified file o f certain type, the user may bypass application level controls, and may 
also evade auditing. Therefore, the monitoring system needs to determine not only 
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whether the user has the access rights to a file, but also whether the application utilised 
for accessing the file is acceptable. However, this type o f regulation should only be 
applied to the files considered as die organisation's intellectual property. Therefore, an 
inventory o f files considered as organisation's property is needed as reference [Table 
7.14]. 
The data needed to log from the user activity are; 
User Name is needed to identify the user responsible for the activity. 
Machine Name is needed to determine where the activity was carried out fix)m. 
Application Name is needed to identify the application utilised for accessing the file, and 
to determine whether the application utilised is acceptable for accessing the file in 
question. 
File Server and File Path are needed to identify the usage policy associated with the file 
involved. 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name A.Phyo 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS1 
Applicatbn Name Windows Explorer 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Security\Survery04.doc 
Table 7.13 File Access Log Table 
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The data needed for reference are: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
File ID 9 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Surveys\Misuse.doc 
File Custodian F.Steve 
File Description Misuse survey report 
Application for Access MS Word 
Allow Save to Removable? No 
Alow File Replication? No 
Allow Partial Replication? Yes 
Table 7.14 File Inventory Table 
File ID is needed to represent the unique combination o f Machine Name and File Path o f 
inventoried files. 
File Custodian is needed to enforce multi-person verification o f alerts for the file 
concemed. 
File Description is needed to describe the nature o f the content within the file when 
alerting. 
Application for Access is needed to define the application that can be used to access the 
file concemed. 
Allow Save to Removable is needed to define whether it is acceptable to save the file on to 
a removable media. 
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Allow File Replication is needed to define whether replication o f the file is acceptable. 
Allow Partial Replication is needed to define whether partial replicafion o f the file's 
contents is acceptable. 
Monitoring Procedure: 
1. The "File Server" and "File Path" or "File I D " f rom the user activity log are 
compared against the entries within the file inventory table to determine whether 
the accessed file requires monitoring. This step is needed to identify the security 
policy associated with the file involved. 
2. I f a match is found in the file inventory, the application utilised to access the file 
is compared against the application defined as normal. This step is needed to 
determine whether the application utilised for accessing the file is acceptable 
according to the file's security policy. I f the application utilised differs ft-om the 
one defined, application level controls may be bypassed and application level 
auditing may be avoided. 
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3. I f the application utilised for access is different from the one defined as normal, 
the event is logged in the database o f alerts. This step logs the event for alerting, i f 
the activity violates the acceptable usage policy associated with the file. 
Alert Procedure: 
1. The "File Server" and "File Path" from the alert log are used to locate the record 
containing the details o f the file, so that the "File Custodian" can be identified and 
alerted. This step is needed to identify the person responsible for verifying the 
alerts associated with the file affected, so tfiat the alerts can be sent to the 
appropriate person for multi-person verification purpose. 
2. The "File Server" value is used to locate the record containing the details o f the 
machine, so that the "System Administrator" can be identified and alerted. This 
step is needed to determine the administrator o f the file server on which the 
affected file is hosted, so the appropriate administrator can be alerted. 
7J,2 File Deletion 
When a user deletes a file, the monitoring system needs to determine whether the file 
being deleted is a personal file, or an organisation file. Therefore, die files regarded, as 
organisation's intellectual property need to be listed in a file inventory [Table 7.14]. In 
addition, the monitoring system also needs to know who is responsible for watching over 
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the security o f the file so that the appropriate authority can be alerted promptly [Table 
7.14]. 
The data needed to log are: 
User Name is needed to identify the user responsible for the activity. 
Machine Name is needed to determine where the activity was carried out fi-om. 
Application Name is needed to identify the application utilised for accessing the file. 
File Server and File Path are needed to identify the usage policy associated with the file 
involved. 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name A.Phyo 
Machine Utilised PSQ_A304_WS1 
Application Utilised Windows Explorer 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Surveys\Misuse.doc 
Table 7.15 File Deletion Log Example 
Monitoring process: 
1. The 'Ti le Server" and "File Path" or "File I D " fi-om the event log are compared 
against the files listed within the file inventory table to determine whether the 
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accessed file requires monitoring. This step is needed to determine whether the 
file involved is intellectual property o f the organisation. 
2. I f the file is listed, then the event is logged into the alerts database. This step logs 
the event i f the user deleted the file considered as intellectual property o f the 
organisation, because deletion o f information regarded as intellectual property o f 
the organisation can result in sabotage. 
Alert Process: 
1. The "File Server" and "File Path" or "File I D " fi-om the alert log used to locate 
the record containing the details o f the file, so that the "File Custodian" can be 
identified and alerted. This step determines the person responsible for verifying 
alerts associated with the file involved, so that multi-person verification can be 
enforced. 
2. The "File Server" value is used to locate the record containing the details o f the 
machine, so that the "System Administrator" can be identified and alerted. This 
step is needed to determine the administrator o f the file server on which the 
affected file is hosted, so the appropriate administrator can be alerted. 
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7,7.3 File Replication 
When a user replicates a file containing sensitive information, the replicated file also 
needs to be apphed identical security policy in order to maintain confidentiality o f the 
contents. However, in order to enforce the security policy, the replicated fi le also must 
reside on one o f the computers monitored by the monitoring system. I f the file containing 
sensitive information is replicated to a system that is not monitored, or on to a removable 
disk, the security o f the infomiation is compromised. Therefore, the monitoring system 
needs to know whether it is acceptable to replicate a file listed for monitoring, and 
whether replicating the file to a removable disk is acceptable. Policy regarding replication 
o f content and replication o f the file needs to be provided in the file inventory table for 
reference [Table 7.14]. 
The data needed to log are: 
User Name is needed to identify the user responsible for the activity. 
Machine Name is needed to determine where the activity was carried out f rom. 
Application Name is needed to identify the application utilised for accessing the file. 
File Server and File Path are needed to identify the usage policy associated with the file 
involved. 
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Destination Machine and Destination File Path are needed to identify the location in 
which the replicated file is saved. 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name A.Phyo 
Machine Utilised PSQ_A304_WS1 
Application Utilised Windows Explorer 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Surveys\Misuse.mdb 
Destination Machine PSQ_A304_WS1 
Destination File Path D:\Documents\Misuse.mdb 
Table 7.16 File Replication Log 
Monitoring Process: 
1. The 'T i le Server" and "File Path" from the event log are compared against the 
listed flies to determine whether the accessed file requires monitoring. This step is 
needed to determine the security policy associated with the file involved. 
2. I f the file is listed, then the system checks whether replication o f the file to a 
removable disk is acceptable. I f it is, no further analysis is made, and no alerts 
generated. This step determines whether the security policy allows the file to be 
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saved to removable media. I f saving the file to removable media is acceptable 
then it is assumed that replicating the file to any machine (insider or outside the 
organisation) is acceptable. Therefore, no further analysis needs to be made. 
3. I f the replication o f file to removable disk is not acceptable, the system checks 
whether file replication is acceptable. I f it is, the system logs the event to the 
File_Replications table o f the alert database, with the alert value set to false. This 
is logged in order to keep track o f the number o f copies made, where the copies 
are saved, and to enforce security policy on the replicated files. In addition, in 
case o f the original file being deleted, replicated files can be used for data 
recovery. 
4. I f the replication o f the file is not acceptable, the system logs the event to the 
File Replications table o f the alert database with the alert value set to true. This 
step logs the event and associated data to a relevant log table, i f replication o f the 
file is not acceptable. 
Alert Process: 
I . The "File Server" and "File Path" or 'T i le I D " ft-om the alert log used to locate 
the record containing the details o f the file, so that the "File Custodian" can be 
identified and alerted. This step determines the person responsible for verifying 
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alerts associated with the file involved, in order to enforce muhi-person 
verification. 
2. The "File Server" value is used to locate the record containing the details o f the 
machine, so that the "System Administrator" can be identified and alerted. This 
step is needed to determine the administrator o f the file server on which the 
affected file is hosted, so the appropriate administrator can be alerted. 
7.7.4 Partial replication of file content 
In some scenarios, a misfeasor may not copy an entire file through a file management 
application, but copy majority o f the information through applications that have direct 
access to the content o f the file, which can still compromise the confidentiality o f the 
information. Therefore, the monitoring system needs to know whether partial replication 
o f file contents is acceptable, and where the contents have been copied. 
The data needed to log are; 
User Name is needed to identify the user responsible for the activity. 
Machine Name is needed to determine where the activity was carried out fi-om. 
Application Name is needed to identify the application utilised for accessing the file. 
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File Server and File Path are needed to identify the usage policy associated wi th the file 
involved. 
Destination Machine and Destination File Path are needed to identify the location o f the 
file in which the replicated content is saved. 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name A.Phyo 
Machine Utilised PSQ_A304_WS1 
Application Utilised MS Access 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Surveys\Misuse.mdb 
Destination Machine PSQ_A304_WS1 
Destination File Path D:\Documents\Misuse.mdb 
Table 7.17 Content Replication Log 
Monitoring Process: 
1. The "File Server" and "File Path" ft-om the event log are compared against the 
files listed in the file inventory to determine whether the accessed f i le requires 
monitoring. This step is needed to determine the security policy associated with 
the file involved. 
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2. I f the file is listed, then the system checks whether replication o f the file to a 
removable disk is acceptable. I f it is, no further analysis is made, and no alerts 
generated. This step detemiines whether the security policy allows the file to be 
saved to removable media. I f saving the file to removable media is acceptable 
then it is assumed that replicating the file to any machine (insider or outside the 
organisation) is acceptable. Therefore, no fiirther analysis needs to be made. 
3. I f the replication o f file to removable disk is not acceptable, the system checks 
whether file replication is acceptable. I f it is, no further analysis is made, and no 
alerts generated. This step determines whether the security policy allows the file 
to be replicated. I f replication o f the file is acceptable, then it is assumed that 
partial replication o f contents is acceptable. Therefore, no further analysis needs 
to be made. 
4. I f the replication o f the file is not acceptable, the system checks whether partial 
replication o f contents is acceptable. I f it is, no further analysis is made, and no 
alerts generated. 
5. I f partial replication o f contents is not acceptable, the system logs the event to the 
Partial_Content_Replication table o f the alerts database. This step is needed to log 
information regarding the event and where the replicated content is saved, and for 
alert generation. 
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Alert Process: 
1. The "File Server" and "File Path" or "File I D " fi-om the alert log used to locate 
the record containing the details o f the file, so that the "File Custodian" can be 
identified and alerted. This step determines the person responsible for verifying 
alerts associated wi th the file involved, and for multi-person verification purpose. 
2. The "File Server" value is used to locate the record containing the details o f the 
machine, so that the "System Administrator" can be identified and alerted. This 
step is needed to determine the administrator o f the file server on which the 
affected file is hosted, so the appropriate administrator can be alerted. 
7.7.5 File Transfer 
In some scenarios, a misfeasor activity may result f rom a user transferring a file 
containing sensitive information to anodier individual who may or may not have 
legitimate access to the concemed file, hi order to understand the situation, the entities 
involved in the data communication/transfer needs to be discussed and analysed. 
The entities involved in this type o f activity are shown in [Figure 7.3], and include the 
user sending the file, the machine utilised by the sender, application utilised by the 
sender, the file ser\'er on which the file involved is stored, the file path o f the file 
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involved on the file server, the ser\'er mediating the communication/transfer ( i f it is not 
peer-peer transfer), the user receiving the file, the machine utilised by the user to retrieve 
the file, and the application ufilised by the receiver to retrieve the file. Therefore, the 
monitoring system needs to be provided with the security related contextual information 
regarding all entities involved in [Figure 7.3], and stored in the Knowledgebase [Figure 
7.2]. Sensors [Figure 7.2] also need to be placed within the systems and applications 
involved in the file transfer activity [Figure 7.3], so that the log data related to the activity 
and relevant for analysis o f misfeasance can be fed to the Detection Engine [Figure 7.2] 
for identification o f potential misfeasance. 
Assuming the sender has legitimate access to the file, and the machine utilised by the 
sender has direct access the server hosting the file concerned. Other factors to consider in 
the context o f data transfer activity include: 
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Figure 7.3 Il lustration of the entities involved in data transfer 
• The server mediating the transfer 
The first point o f concem is the ser\ er mediating the communication or the data 
transfer. I f this server is not managed by the organisation's FT department, the file 
would have left the organisation's IT boundaries and further monitormg would 
not be possible. Therefore, the monitoring system needs to determine whether the 
communication ser\ er involved is internal or extemal [Figure 7.3]. by referring to 
the contextual information contained within the Knowledgebase described in 
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[Figure 7.2]. Due to this requirement the knowledgebase should contain a data 
table with the list o f machines considered to be internally managed by the 
organisation [Table 7.22]. 
• The recipient o f the data 
o Insider or outsider? 
Another fact that needs to be determined by the monitoring system is 
whether the recipient is an insider. The knowledgebase should contain a 
data table with the list o f users considered as insiders o f the organisation 
[Table 7.19]. Within the context o f the research only employees o f the 
organisation are considered as insider. In real life cases, contractors, 
customers, or suppliers may also be considered as insider. In such case the 
notion o f insider would depend upon the context o f the data contained 
within the file, and it may not be possible to provide a single list o f users 
considered as internal. Due to this problem, the inference rules for 
determining the contextual insider for each unique scenario should be 
provided in the knowledge base, so that Fact Processors [Figure 7.2] can 
extract the information from organisation's databases. Email or 
communication address can be used as a parameter to determine whether 
the recipient is an insider [Table 7.19]. 
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" I f the recipient is an insider, does the data security policy allow the 
recipient to access the data? 
I f the recipient is considered as an insider within the context o f the 
file involved, the monitoring system needs to determine whether 
the recipient is authorised for accessing the contents o f the file. 
Assuming that the recipient does not have required permissions to 
access the file at the OS and application level, the monitoring 
system needs to determine whether the user is authorised to receive 
a copy o f the replicated file. Therefore, the monitoring system 
needs a data table containing the list o f users authorised to access a 
replica o f each inventoried file [Table 7.20]. 
o The machine the recipient utilised to retrieve the data 
As mentioned previously some o f the machines may be prevented ft-om accessing 
a file server within the subnet. Referring to Figure 7.3, due to security reasons 
machines fi-om subnet B and subnet D do not have direct access to the file server 
within the subnet A. The security policy may allow an authorised user utilising 
machines within subnet B to receive files from the file server o f subnet A, i f 
transferred by a user with direct access permissions. However, the security policy 
may also state that machines within subnet D should not be used to retrieve mail 
containing files originating fi-om the file server o f subnet A. Therefore, the 
monitoring system needs to determine whether the machine, utilised by the 
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recipient o f a file transfer, is authorised to receive the file. \n order to infer this 
fact, the knowledgebase should contain a data table listing the list o f machines 
that may receive files originated from each file server [Table 7.23]. 
• The application the recipient utilised to retrieve the data 
\n order to accommodate further monitoring the application utilised by the 
recipient needs to provide audit data. For example, the recipient o f a file transfer 
decides to forward the file to another user. Therefore, it is also important to 
determine the application utilised by the recipient to retrieve the transferred file. 
The data tables needed to accommodate successful monitoring would look similar to 
those described below. 
Sender Address is needed to identify the sender o f the file transfer. 
Machine Utilisedhy Sender is needed to determine where the transfer is conducted from. 
File Server and File Path are needed to determine the source o f the file involved, and the 
security policy associated with the file. 
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Communication Server is needed to determine whether the communication server 
mediating the file transfer is an internal machine managed by the organisation [Table 
7.22]. 
Receiver Address is needed to determine whether the recipient of the file is an insider and 
whether the recipient should have access to the file involved [Table 7.20 and Table 7.21]. 
Machine Utilised by Receiver is needed to determine whether the machine used at the 
receiving end is secure enough to host the file involved [Table 7.23]. 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Sender Address aung@plymouth.ac.uk 
Machine Utilised by Sender PSQ_A304_WS1 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S :\S u rvey s\M isu se .m d b 
Communication Server 192.168.3.5 
Receiver Address r.shukor@plymoulh.ac.uk 
Machine Utilised by Receiver 192.16821.59 
Table 7.18 File Transfer Log 
The data needed for reference are: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name a.phyo 
Email Address aung@plymouth.ac.uk 
Table 7.19 List o f lns ide r s 
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Required Parameters Example Values 
File ID 9 
User Name r.shukor 
Table 7.20 Users allowed to receive each inventoried file 
Required Parameters Example Values 
File ID 9 
Role ID 3 
Table 7.21 Roles allowed to receive each inventoried file 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Machine ID 6 
Machine Name PSQ A304 MS1 
Machine Type Mail Server 
IP Address 192.168.3.5 
System Administrator D.Paul 
Table 7.22 List o f internal machines 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Server Name PSQ A304 FS1 
Allowed Machine PSQ_B201_WS9 
Table 7.23 List o f machines allowed to receive files f r o m each ser\'er 
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Monitoring Process: 
1. The "File Server" and "File Path" fi-om the event log are compared against the 
listed files to determine whether the accessed file requires monitoring. This step is 
needed to determine the security policy associated with the file involved. 
2. I f the file is listed, then the system checks whether replication o f the file to a 
removable disk is acceptable. I f it is, no further analysis is made, and no alerts are 
generated. This step determines whether the security policy allows the file to be 
saved to removable media. I f saving the file to removable media is acceptable 
then it is assumed that replicating the file to any machine (insider or outside the 
organisation) is acceptable. Therefore, no further analysis needs to be made. 
3. I f replication to a removable disk is not acceptable, the system checks whether the 
server mediating the communication/transfer is an internal machine by checking 
in the list o f internal machines. I f the server mediating the communication/transfer 
is not an intemal machine, the event is logged in to the File_Transfers table of the 
alerts database with the alert status set to true. I f replication of the file to a 
removable media is not acceptable, it is assumed that the file must remain within 
the organisation's intemal machines. Therefore, this step determines whether the 
ser\'er mediating the transfer is an intemal machine. I f the server mediating the 
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transfer is not an internal machine the security o f file cannot be further 
managed/regulated by organisation, and thus need to be alerted. 
4. I f the server mediating the communication is an internal machine, the system 
checks whether the recipient is an insider by checking the recipient's address in an 
appropriate registry (Employees, Students, Contractors, Customers etc.). I f the 
recipient's address is not found in the registry, the event is logged into the 
File_Transfers table o f the alerts database with the alert status set to true. This 
step determines whether the recipient o f the transfer is an insider, because i f the 
recipient is not an insider then the confidentiality o f the file w i l l be compromised. 
5. I f the recipient's address is found in the registry, the system gets the name (or user 
name), and assigned role o f the recipient. It then checks whether the recipient's 
role is authorised to access the concerned file by checking in the data table 
containing the roles allowed access to each listed file. This step determines 
whether it is acceptable for the recipient to have access to the file, based on the 
role the recipient belongs to, because i f the recipient does not have necessary 
clearance for access, the confidentiality o f the data w i l l be compromised. 
6. I f the recipient's role is not found in the list o f roles allowed to access the 
concemed file, the system checks whether the recipient is allowed access to the 
file by checking the data table containing the list o f users allowed access to each 
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listed file. This step determines whether it is acceptable for the recipient to have 
access to the file, because i f the recipient does not have the necessary clearance 
for access, the confidentiality o f the data w i l l be compromised. 
7. I f both the user and the user's role are not allowed access to the concerned file, 
the event is logged in to the File_Transfers table o f the alerts database with the 
alert status set to tme. This step logs the event i f the recipient does not have 
necessary clearance to access the file involved, because the confidentiality o f the 
file is compromised as a result o f the activity. 
8. I f either the user or the user's role is allowed access to the concerned file, the 
system checks whether the machine utilised by the recipient to retrieve the file is 
allowed access to the file server fi-om which the file originated by checking the 
data table containing the list o f machines allowed access to each file/database 
server. This step determines whether the machine utilised by the recipient is 
secure enough to host die file involved in the transfer, because i f the machine 
utilised by the recipient does not meet the security requirements (not managed by 
the organisation, or does not have security controls) then the security o f the file 
can be compromised inadvertently. 
9. I f the machine utilised by the recipient is not allowed access to the file fi-om 
which the file originated, the event is logged in to the FiIe_Transfers table o f the 
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alert database with the alert status set to true. This step logs the event i f the 
machine utilised by the recipient does not have appropriate security to host the file 
involved in the transfer. 
10. I f the machine utilised by the recipient to retrieve the file is allowed access to the 
file server from which the file originated, then the analysis process logs the event 
in to the File_Transfers table o f the alert database with the alert status set to false. 
This step merely logs the file transfer to keep track o f the files for further 
monitoring, and does not generate any alerts because current activity satisfy all 
security requirements. 
Alert Process: 
1. The "File Servef and "File Path" from the alert log used to locate the record 
containing the details o f the file, so that the "File Custodian" can be identified and 
alerted. This step identifies the appropriate person to be alerted for multi-person 
verification purpose. 
2. The "File Server" value is used to locate the record containing the details o f the 
machine, so that the "System Administrator" can be identified and alerted. This 
step identifies the administrator o f the system on which the originating file is 
hosted, so that the appropriate administrator can be alerted. 
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7.8 Database Access 
Issues concerning database access by insiders include. 
• The number o f database queries issued by each user 
• The number o f records returned per query 
• The number o f records accessed per user within a time frame 
• The percentage o f a data table accessed per user within a time frame 
• The percentage o f a database accessed per user within a time frame 
Many database systems include statistical analysis features to monitor information such 
as the number o f records viewed by a user, the number o f records updated by a user, and 
the number o f records returned by a user query. However, such techniques w i l l not be 
able to detect a query affecting a single record. For example, a police officer checking the 
criminal records o f a neighbour may constitute misuse i f there was no valid reason for 
access although the operation itself is legitimate and part o f the job. Confidentiality or 
integrity o f a record(s) may be compromised i f each access is not verified. When a user 
updates or views a record, the monitoring system needs to verify the validity o f the 
access. However, in order to accommodate this kind o f verification, the monitoring 
system needs to be provided with information regarding how the validity o f the access or 
integrity o f the record may be verified. 
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Assuming the user has authorised access and that the query issued is legitimate, other 
factors to consider in the context o f a database access and the fol lowing question needs to 
be answered. 
• I f it is read access, is the access valid i.e. is there a valid reason for access? 
i . Can the validity o f the access be checked through referencing 
another record? 
• I f it is write access, the integrity o f the record needs to be verified. 
• Each attribute within the affected record needs to be verified for 
contextual integrity. 
i . Can the integrity o f each data field within the affected record be 
checked by referencing another record? 
Assuming the answers to the questions asked is positive. The successful monitoring 
depends upon being able to identify 
o The database, data table, and the record affected 
The monitoring system may need to monitor a number o f databases, and 
each database may contain numerous data tables containing a large 
number o f records. 
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• An appropriate record required for reference 
The reference record depends upon the affected database, data table, and 
record. The monitoring system must be able to establish a unique link 
between the affected record and the reference record. Therefore, the 
monitoring system needs to be provided with information regarding the 
identification o f a reference record. 
Database 1 : Table 1 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C Attribute D 
Record 1 Value 1A Value 1B Value 1 C Value 1 D 
Record 2 Value 2A Value 2B Value 2 C Value 20 
Record 3 Value 3A Value 3B Value 3C Value 3D 
r \ 
/ " N ^ Value of affected record corresponds 
to value of reference record 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C Attribute D 
Record 1 Value 1A Value 1B Value 1 C Value 1 D 
Record 2 Value 2A Value 2B Value 2C Value 2D 
Record 3 Value 3A Value 3B Value 3C Value 30 
Database 3 : Table 2 
Figure 7.4 Relationship between affected record and reference record 
• Under certain circumstances, validity o f the access can be verified by 
ensuring existence o f a reference record. In some cases the monitoring 
system may need to test a value within the reference record or compare a 
value o f affected record and that o f the reference record. In such cases, the 
monitoring system needs to be provided with information regarding the 
value(s) that need to be tested, and the conditions o f a successful test. 
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The data needed to log are: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name A.Phyo 
Machine Utilised PSQ A304 WS1 
Database Server PSQ A304 DBS1 
File Path D:\CustomerRecords.mdb 
Table Name Account Details 
Affected Record ID 7 
Table 7.24 Database Access Log 
User Name is needed to identify the user responsible for the activity. 
Machine Utilised is needed to identify where the activity was carried out f rom. 
Database Server and File Path are needed to identify the database affected, and to 
identify the person responsible for verifying the integrity o f the database. Table Name is 
needed to identify the data table affected, and to identify the person responsible for 
verifying the integrity o f the data table. A unique combination o f Database Server, File 
Path, and Table Name are needed to identify the appropriate reference data required for 
automated verification o f the integrity o f the record affected. 
Affected Record ID is needed to identify the record that is affected as a result o f the 
activity, and to identify the appropriate reference data required for automated verification 
o f the affected record. 
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The data needed for reference are: 
• List o f monitored data tables (or queries) requiring verification 
• List o f associated reference data for each listed query 
List o f monitored data tables (or queries) requiring verification 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Query Name Detail Update 
Database Server PSQ_A304_DBS1 
File Path D:\CustomerRecords.mdb 
Table Name Account Details 
Table Custodian J.Jones 
Primary Key Account ID 
Link Key Account ID 
Attribute to be Tested Update ID 
Table 7.25 Data required for identifying the affected record 
Query} Name is needed to identify the reference data required for automated verification 
o f the affected record. There may be more than one query available for each data table. 
Therefore Database Sender, File Path, Table Name, and Query Name combination is 
used as a unique identifier. 
Table Custodian is needed to identify the person responsible for manual verification o f 
the data table when the reference data needed for automated verification o f the affected 
record cannot be located by the system. 
Primary Key is needed to identify the primary key attribute o f the affected data table, so 
that the affected record can be located. 
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Link Key is needed to identify the attribute that can link the affected record to the 
reference record, so that an attribute from the affected record can be tested against an 
attribute from the reference record. 
Attribute to be Tested is needed to identify the attribute o f the affected record that needs 
to be tested against the reference record. 
List o f associated reference data for each listed query: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Query Name Detail Update 
Database Server PSQ A304 DBS1 
File Path D:\CustomerService.mdb 
Table Name Account Update Requests 
Table Custodian B.Marley 
Link Key Account ID 
Attribute to be tested against Update ID 
Condrtion for testing Equals 
Table 7.26 Data required for identifying the reference record 
Query Name is needed to represent the corresponding record that contains information 
{Database Server, File Path, Table Name, Link Key) to identify the reference data for 
automated verification. The Query Name for identifying the reference record corresponds 
to the Query Name for identifying the affected record. 
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Database Server and File Path are needed to identify the database serx'er and database 
fi le containing the reference record. 
Table Name is needed to identify the data table containing the reference record. 
Table Custodian is needed to identify the person responsible for manual verification o f 
the data table containing the reference record. In case the reference record needed for 
automated verification cannot be located, the Table Custodian o f the affected record and 
the Table Custodian o f the reference record may need to communicate for manual 
verification. 
Link Key identifies die atnnbute within the reference record that can be used to link the 
affected record and the corresponding reference record. 
Attribute to he Tested Against identifies the attribute within the reference record that 
needs to be tested against an attribute o f the affected reconJ. 
Condition for Testing defines the condition that must be hold true, when testing the 
attributes from the affected and the reference record, so that the validity/integrity o f the 
affected record is ensured. 
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Monitoring Process: 
1. The "Database Server", "File Path", and "Table Name" values f rom the event log 
are compared against the listed data tables to determine whether the affected 
datable requires monitoring. In future developments query ID may be used instead 
o f the "File Path" and "Table Name" in order to identify affected data table(s). 
This step is needed to identify the contextual rules that must be conformed in 
order to ensure the validity/integrity o f access. 
2. I f the query or data table is not listed, then no fijrther analysis is made, and exist 
the analysis procedure without generating any alerts. 
3. I f the data table is listed. The monitoring system notes the "Query Name" and 
locates the corresponding entry in the list o f associated reference data, so that the 
data required for verification can be located. This step is needed to identify the 
record that contains information for locating the reference data 
4. Now, the value o f the "Affected Record I D " from the event log, and the value o f 
"Primary Key Attribute" from the listed data tables are used to locate die affected 
record in the data table indicated by the values o f "Database Server", "File Path", 
and "Table Name" o f the event log. This step is needed to identify the affected 
record, so that its integrity can be verified. 
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5. Once the affected record is located, the value stored within the attribute indicated 
by the "Link Key" is used to search the corresponding reference record. This step 
is needed to identify the reference record, so that an attribute from the affected 
record can be compared against an attribute from the reference record. 
6. I f the condition o f testing is "Exist" and a corresponding reference record is not 
found, the event is logged into the "Database_Access" table o f the alerts database. 
This step checks whether a reference record exists. I f a reference record does not 
exist the integrity o f the affected record is in doubt, and thus requires manual 
verification by the Table Custodian o f the affected data table. 
7. I f the condition o f testing is "Equals", the value stored within the attribute 
indicated by "Attribute_To_Be_Tested" o f the affected record is compared 
against the value stored within the attribute indicated by 
"Attribute_To_Be_Tested_Against" o f the reference record, to determine whether 
the condition is satisfied. I f the condition is not satisfied, the event is logged into 
the Dalabase_Access table o f the alerts database. This step compares a value f rom 
the affected record against a value from the reference record, and the two values 
must be equal in order to ensure the integrity o f the affected record. 
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8. I f the condition o f testing is "Tme", the value stored within the attribute indicated 
by "Attribute_To_Be_Tested_Against" o f the reference record is checked. I f the 
value contained within the attribute indicated by 
"Attribute_To_Be_Tested_Againsf' is false, the event is logged into the 
Database_Access table o f the alerts database. This step test whether the identified 
attribute in the reference record is "True", to ensure the validity o f the access. 
Alert Process: 
1. The "Database Server", "File Path", and "Table Name" fi-om the alert log are used 
to locate the record containing the details o f the file, so that the "Table Custodian" 
can be identified and alerted. This step identifies the person responsible for 
manual verification o f the data table affected, so that when the integrity/validity o f 
the access is in doubt, manual verification can be requested. 
7,8.1 Registry Management 
To an information system, whedier a user should have access or not depends on whether 
the concemed user exists in the registry referred to by the access control (or 
authentication and identification) system. Therefore, anyone who can add an entry to the 
registry may abuse the privilege i f the additions o f new records are not verified. Within 
an organisation, more than one registry may exist for various purposes, and thus the 
person responsible for each registry may also vary. Therefore, it is critical that the right 
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personnel are alerted so that the verification wi l l be authentic, and prevent abuse by 
privileged users. However, in order to accommodate this facility, the monitoring system 
needs to know which registries/lists (data tables, or categorised lists within each table) 
need to be monitored, and how to determine the person responsible for verification. The 
monitoring approach is similar to verifying the validity o f database access. The difference 
is that the reference record is used for identification o f the person responsible for 
verification. 
Data needed to log are: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
User Name A.Phyo 
Machine Utilised PSQ_A304_WS1 
Database Server PSQ A304 DBS1 
File Path DAUserAccounts.mdb 
Table Name UserRoles 
Affected Record ID 7 
Table 7.27 Registr>' Update Log 
User Name is needed to identify the person responsible for the activity. 
Machine Utilised is needed to determine where the activity was carried out f rom. 
Database Server, File Path, and Table Name are needed to identify the data table 
affected. 
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Affected Record ID is needed to identify the record affected as a result o f the acfivity and 
require verification. 
Data needed for reference are: 
Required Parameters Example Values 
Registry Name User Rotes 
Database Server PSQ_A304_DBS1 
File Path D:\UserAccounts.mdb 
Table Name User Roles 
Primary Key Recond ID 
Link Key Role Name 
Table 7.28 List of registries to be monitored 
Registry Name is needed to locate the record containing information to identify the 
person responsible for verification o f the affected record. 
Database Server, File Path, and Table Name are needed to identify the data table 
affected. 
Primary Key is needed to locate the affected record within the affected data table. 
Link Key is needed to identify the attribute within the affected record tfiat can be used to 
locate the corresponding reference record. 
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Required Parameters Example Values 
Registry Name User Roles 
Database Server PSQ_A304_DBS1 
File Path D:\UserAccounts.mdb 
Table Name Roles 
Link Key Role Name 
Attribute Containing Authority to be Informed Rote Manager 
Table 7.29 Information to locate appropriate authority to be alerted 
Registry Name is needed to represent the record containing information for identifying 
the person responsible for verification o f the affected record. 
Database Server, File Path, and Table Name are needed to locale the data table 
containing the identity o f the person responsible for verification o f the affected record. 
Link Key is needed to locate the corresponding reference record containing the identity o f 
the person responsible for verification o f the affected record. 
Attribute Containing Authority to be Informed is needed to identify the attribute that 
contains the identity o f the person responsible for veri6cation o f the affected record. 
Monitoring Process: 
1. The "Database Serx'er", "File Path", and "Table Name" values from the event log 
are compared against the listed registries to determine whether the affected 
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datable requires monitoring. This step is needed to determine whether the 
validity/integrity o f the access needs to be verified. 
2. I f the registry is not listed, then no further analysis is made, and exist the analysis 
procedure without generafing any alerts. 
3. I f the registry is listed. The event is logged into the "Registry_Management" table 
o f the alerts database. This step logs the events as requiring verification by 
appropriate authority. 
Alert Process: 
1. The monitoring system notes the "Registry Name" and locates the corresponding 
entry in the list o f associated reference data, so that the data required for 
identifying the authority to be alerted can be retrieved. This step locates the record 
containing information for identifying the record that contains the identity o f the 
person responsible for verification o f the affected record. 
2. Now, the value o f the "Affected Record I D " fi-om the event log, and the value o f 
"Primary Key Attribute" fi*om the listed registries are used to locate the affected 
record in the data table indicated by the values o f "Database Server", "File Path", 
and "Table Name" o f the event log. This step locates the affected record so that 
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the corresponding reference record containing information for identification o f the 
person responsible for verification can be located. 
3, Once the affected record is located, the value stored within the attribute indicated 
by the '*Link Key" is used to search the corresponding reference record containing 
the authority to be alerted, stored in the data table indicated by "Database Server", 
"File Path", and "Table Name" o f the "Registry Custodian" list. This step uses a 
value from the affected record in order to locate the corresponding reference 
record containing the identity o f the person responsible for verification o f the 
affected record. 
4. Once the corresponding reference record is found, the authority indicated by the 
value stored within the attribute indicated by "Attribute Containing Authority" is 
alerted. This step requests the responsible person identified in the previous step to 
manually verify the affected record in order to ensure integrity. 
7,8,2 Fraud Detection 
Although ensuring integrity o f data by verification o f each record after an update 
minimise the risk o f fraud occurring as a result o f corrupted database, it does not 
guarantee detection o f fraud. Fraud can result from creative accounting, and loopholes 
within reward policy, which requires human judgement to determine occurrence o f fraud. 
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Fraud occurs mostly in areas where some kind o f purchase, inventory, sales, payment, 
and accounting or performance analysis is involved, and usually related to some type o f 
accounting or recording o f trade/transaction. Therefore, performance/accounting data is 
required for fraud monitoring. Computer aided fraud monitoring tools already exist 
(Coderre 1999), and the methods applied are fairiy trivial such as indexing, sorting, 
sequencing, stratifying, classifying, counting, counter verifying calculations, performing 
statistical analyses, finding gaps and duplicates. However, it is critical that the correct 
analysis method is applied to the relevant data, and the diff icul ty lies in identifying the 
relevant data within the application and associated contextual mies for fraud monitoring. 
Therefore, the most important factor in detecting fraud is the in-depth understanding o f 
the business application and contextual conditions related to each business transaction. 
Since business applications and contextual conditions differ from one organisation to 
another, it would be fair to say that it would be extremely dif f icul t i f not impossible to 
develop an automated fraud-monitoring tool that w i l l suit all organisations. A generic 
fraud-monitoring tool w i l l work only i f the data structures for business applications are 
identical and contextual rules related to each and every business transactions are 
identical. Since businesses try to make money by operating differently to their 
competitors in one way or another, it would be naive to assume that it w i l l be possible for 
one business to have the same contextual rules as another in the same line o f business. In 
addition, contextual rules related to transactions for today may not be the same in a 
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week's time as the business strive to be competitive and develop creative/attractive offers 
to their potential and existing customers. 
At most the tool w i l l be able to provide the auditor with the charts and graphs comparing 
the performance statistics o f an employee to the rest in the same role. However, it 
depends upon the auditor to decide the parameters that need to be included for analysis, 
and human judgement is required to determine whether fraud has occurred by applying 
the knowledge o f the application and related contextual conditions. 
7.9 Conclusions 
This chapter highlighted the activities that may lead to misuse and presented a misfeasor 
monitoring system to detect misfeasance that may result from the identified activities. 
Each activity monitored requires varying analysis procedure and relevant parameters. 
Misfeasance is a contextual perception as explained in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1, and thus 
information related to the context in which the activities are analysed need to be included 
for analysis o f possible misfeasance. Within the architecture (Figure 7.2), the contextual 
information is fed to the Knowledgebase o f the monitoring system through Fact 
Processors. The context in which the activities are considered needs to be provided to the 
monitoring system through appropriate analysis/inference procedures. It is also important 
to segregate duties by distributing alerts to authorities who have intimate knowledge o f 
the content and the context in which the activity is acceptable. 
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The chapter presented a misfeasor monitoring architecture that accommodates analysis o f 
various user activities, allowing the utilisation o f audit logs from heterogeneous systems. 
The architecture facilitates, and also shows methods for, extraction o f relevant contextual 
information from organisation's various databases for analysis o f misfeasance. Suitable 
analysis/inference procedures were also developed and presented, so that the activities 
can be analysed within the context o f acceptable usage. 
Within the presented architecture, the process o f distributing alerts have been decoupled 
from the analysis procedures, so that the alerts can be sent to the authority wi th the most 
intimate knowledge o f the system/content affected. This approach consequently provides 
the mechanism to implement segregation o f duties for authorities verifying the alerted 
activity. The proposed architecture accommodates detection o f some o f the misfeasor 
activities identified in Chapters, and in particular: 
File access through arbitrary applications 
Information disclosure/theft 
Dissemination o f data 
- Unauthorised fi le sharing 
- Access from unauthorised machines 
Inappropriate modification o f system settings/configurations 
- Account creation 
- Inappropriate modification/access o f database records 
210 
Chapter 7 Conceptual Architecture for a Misfeasor Monitoring System 
Inconsistent database records 
In the next chapter, a prototype system built upon the architecture described in this 
chapter is used to demonstrate the detection o f misfeasor activities considered here. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a prototype misfeasor monitoring system built upon the architecture 
described in the previous chapter, utilising the methods o f data extraction, and analysis 
procedures presented. The aim is to provide proof that existing detection technology and 
strategies can be employed in a novel way for misfeasor monitoring, and that components 
proposed in the previous chapter are relevant for extracting contextual data and 
distribution o f alerts to appropriate authority. This chapter also aims to validate the 
requirement o f data identified in Chapter 5 for monitoring o f misfeasance, emphasising 
the need to provide the system with data relevant to misfeasance for successful detecfion. 
The prototype system also evaluates the applicability o f analysis procedures suggested in 
the previous chapter, and demonstrates how die contextual conditions governing the 
acceptable usage can be implemented through appropriate inference/analysis procedures. 
The prototype system is evaluated on the basis o f its ability to detect a number o f 
activities within a generic organisafion that can result in misfeasance as identified in 
Chapter 5, which includes: 
o File Access through an arbitrary application 
o Deletion o f files considered as property o f the organisation 
o Replication o f confidential files 
o Replication o f confidential content 
o Dissemination o f confidential files 
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• Modification o f database records 
• Addition o f users or new records to organisation's registry databases 
• Modification o f system/application settings 
The activities included here is only a subset o f the activities listed in Chapter 5, because 
other forms o f misuse excluded from the above list can be detected by existing detection 
and monitoring tools. 
Visual Basic was used for the development o f the prototype system, and Microsoft 
Access was used for creating databases and data tables required by the monitoring tool. 
Visual Basic and Microsoft Access were chosen due to the fact that they provide all the 
features needed for the validation o f the concept, development o f graphical interface and 
rapid development o f the prototype system. Programming language C/C-H- was not used, 
because system level programming was not needed in order to validate the relevance o f 
data identified as a requirement for successfijl monitoring. Although the system 
developed in Visual Basic and Microsoft Access would run only on Microsoft Windows 
systems, it can analyse data collected from heterogeneous systems, because the data 
identified for analysis is generic across all systems and not Microsoft Windows specific. 
Source code o f the prototype system and databases are included in the accompanying CD 
at the back o f the thesis. 
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8,2 Overview 
The prototype system consists o f three modules: Event Generator, Event Analysis Engine, 
and Alert Generator. 
The prototype monitoring system architecture (Figure 8.1) resembles the conceptual 
system described in the previous chapter (Figure 7.2), although the conceptual version is 
more modularised. Fact Processor and Parser components described in the conceptual 
version are embedded within the Analysis Engine in the prototype version. Analysis 
Engine within the prototype version includes only the Inferential component and does not 
include Statistical component. 
Event Generator 
Kiiouiedgebase 
Analysis Engine ^ Event Log Database 
I 1 






Figure 8.1 Components of the Protot>'pe Misfeasor Monitoring System 
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The prototype system makes use o f three databases. Events Database, Knowledge 
Database (acceptable usage policies are also stored here), and Alerts Database, for the 
analysis and alerting o f possible misfeasor activity to the appropriate authority. The 
functionality o f the monitoring tool depends upon the three databases mentioned, and 
thus it would be appropriate to explain the purpose and details o f each database to discuss 
how each user activity is analysed to determine whether possible misuse activity is in 
progress. 
8.3 Event Generator 
Due to the absence o f ful ly functional data collection agents, and lack o f application level 
user activity logs, an event generator is required to simulate user activities for the 
scenarios considered. Event generator simulates the logging o f user activity and relevant 
data associated with each activity within the concerned application environment. The logs 
generated for each activity wi l l be analysed by the Event Analysis Engine (decision 
making logic/mles are embedded within it) in order to determine possible misuse. Event 
generator is used because the log data required for misfeasor analysis is not provided by 
currently available desktop applications, and to actually get the required data from a 
commercial application wi l l take enormous efforts to modify the application without the 
availability o f the application source code. 
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Figure 8.2 Event Generator M a i n Interface 
By demonstrating the relevance o f the data within certain applications, it w i l l also 
emphasise the need for application vendors/developers to include features to provide log 
data outlined in each scenario, which is required for misfeasor monitoring. Event 
generator logs relevant data in the Events Database. Events Database consists o f a data 
table listing all events and separate data tables to log the relevant details regarding each 
type o f user activity. The data tables within the Events Database are: 
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8,3 J, Events 
The Events table is used, so that all identified activities that may lead to misuse can be 
logged in chronological/sequential order. The Events table contains three attributes, 
EventID, CommandID, and EventType. 
Event/D: is used for identification o f each unique event, and for sequential 
ordering o f events. 
CommandlD: is used to identify the appropriate analysis procedure for misfeasor 
analysis o f the concerned event. 
EventType: describes the nature o f the event and is related to the CommandlD. 
The code responsible for interpreting the values within this table, which identifies an 
appropriate analysis procedure for each event, corresponds to the Parser component 
described in the contextual architecture. Other relevant details regarding each event type 
are logged in their respective log tables within the Events database. 
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^ frmEvents 
Events 
1 1 EventID CommandlD EventTvpe 
1 1 4 7 File Access 
48 s RIe Access 
49 8 Database Access 
50 8 Database Access 
51 3 Settings Management 
52 8 Database Access 
53 7 User Management 
53 8 Database Access 
54 7 User Management 
54 8 Database Access 
55 7 User Management 
55 8 Database Access 
5B 8 Database Access 
57 8 Database Access 
58 8 Database Access 
59 7 User Management 
60 7 User Management 
60 8 Database Access 
61 7 User Management 
61 8 Database Access 
62 4 File Transfer 
63 4 File Transfer 
I Generate New Event 
Figure 8.3 Events Interface 
83.2 File Access 
The File Access table is used for logging data regarding each user's file access details. 
The File Access table contains six attributes, EventID, UserName, MachineName, 
ApplicationName, ServerName, and FilePath. 
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EventID: The EventID is related to the EventID attribute in the Events table. This 
is used, so that the analysis procedure wi l l be able to link the Uvo records together, 
i.e. the Events table and the File Access table. 
UserName: This attribute is used to store the name o f the user responsible for the 
activity. 
MachineName: This attribute is used to store the name of the Machine from which 
the user performed the activity. 
ApplicationName: This attribute is use to store the name o f the application the 
user utilised for accessing the file. 
ServerName: This attribute is use to store the name o f the machine on which the 
accessed file is stored. 
FilePath: This attribute is used to store the exact file path o f the concerned file on 
the server. 
The combination o f Server Name and File Path is used to identify each unique file within 
the IT network. 
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Figure 8.4 File Access Log Generator Interface 
8,3,3 File Deletions 
The File Deletions table is used for logging data related to file deletions by each user. 
The FileDeletions table contains six identical attributes to FileAccess table. 
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Figure 8.5 File Deletion Log Generator Interface 
8.3.4 FUeReplications 
The FileReplications table is used for logging data related to replication of files by each 
user. The FileReplications table contains seven attributes, six o f them are identical to 
those in FileAccess and File Deletions tables, and a CommandlD is added to separate 
capturing o f data (Copy/Cut events) from reproduction o f captured data (Paste events). 
For the data capture (Copy) events, the Server Name indicates the machine the source file 
is located on, and the File Path indicates the location o f the file on the machine. For the 
222 
Chapter 8 Prototype Misfeasor Monitoring System 
reproduction (Paste) events, the Server Name indicates the machine to which the file is 
copied, and the File Path indicates the location o f the replicated file. 
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Figure 8.6 File Replication Log Generator Interface 
8,3,5 Data Replications 
The DataReplications table is used for logging data related to partial replication o f 
information by each user through applications (such as word processors) that provide 
direct access to the contents o f a file. The DataReplications table contains seven 
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attributes identical to those in FileReplications table. Again the capturing o f the data and 
reproduction o f the captured data are treated separately. 
83.6 Clipboard 
The Clipboard table is used for logging clipboard data resulting from data capture 
(Copy/Cut) events for use in analysing file and data replication activities. The two 
activities are treated separately because capturing the data does not necessarily mean it 
w i l l be reproduced. The Clipboard table contains five attributes, Event/D, CommandID, 
UserName, MachineName, and SourceFile/D. 
SourceFilelD: This attribute is used to store the FilelD (a unique identifier within the 
file inventory table o f knowledge database) o f the file f rom which the file/data is 
copied. 
8J. 7 DatabaseAccess 
The DatabaseAccess table is used for logging data related to database access by each 
user. The DatabaseAccess table contains eight attributes; six o f them are identical to 
those in FileAccess table, with the addition ofTabieJVanie, and RecordlD. 
TableName: This attribute is used to store the name o f the data table affected. 
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RecorcJID: This attribute is used to store the identifier o f the record affected. This 
value is returned by the database apphcation. The example in the figure, adds a 
new employee to the employees data table o f the Contextuallnfo database located 
on the PSQ_A304_FSI server, and returns the affected record's ID to the event 
generator. For the purpose o f the demonstration, it is assumed that only one type 
o f query is available to the user for each data table and that each query affects 
only one data table. In future developments o f the system, layered analysis may be 
employed to detect various queries, such as utilising query signatures to identify 
the query prior to associating each query with an analysis query or a counter 
verification query. 
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Figure 8.7 Database Access Log Generator Interface 
83,8 Registry Management 
The Registry Management table is used for logging data related to addition o f individuals 
to lists o f employees/users/students etc. Each registry represents a white list fo r relevant 
activities within the context o f the prototype system. The Registry Management table 
contains eight attributes identical to those in the Database Access table. 
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83,9 Settings 
The Settings table is used for logging data related to updating/changing o f 
system/application configurations/settings. The Settings table contains four attributes, 
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Figure 8.8 Configuration Change Log Generator Interface 
UserName: This attribute is used to store the user responsible for the activity. 
MachineName: This attribute is used to store the machine affected. It is assumed that 
the user also used the same machine for carrying out the activity. 
ApplicationName: This attribute is used to store the application affected. 
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8 J JO Flags 
The Flags table is used in conjunction with the Settings table, in order to store flags 
associated with each event. The Flags table contain two attributes, EventlD, and 
FlagDescription. 
EventlD: This attribute indicates the event to which the associated flag belongs. There 
may be more than one flag associated with each event. 
FlagDescription: This attribute is used to store the description o f the flag used for the 
event. This attribute stores only one flag for each record. Thus i f there are more than 
one flag associated with a unique event, each associated flag w i l l be paired with the 
same EventlD. 
83,11 Data Transfers 
The Data Transfers table is used for logging data regarding the transfer o f files/data 
through network/communication applications with file transfer capability. The 
DataTransfers table contains eight attributes, EventlD, SenderName, 
SenderMachineName, ApplicationName, CommunicationServer, FilelD, Sender Address, 
and Receiver Address. 
SenderName: This attribute is used to store die name o f the user sending/transferring 
the file. 
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SenderMachineName: This attribute is used to store the name o f the machine the user 
transferred the file from. 
ApplicationName: This attribute is used to store the name o f the application utilised 
for transferring/sending the file. 
CommimicationServer: This attribute is used to store the IP address o f the server 
involved in mediating the transfer o f the file. 
FilelD: This attribute is used to store the identifier o f the file transferred. 
SenderAddress: This attribute is used to store the communication address o f the 
sender. For the purpose o f the demo, email address is used. 
Receiver Address: This attribute is used to store the communication address o f the 
receiving user. For the purpose of the demonstration, email address is used. 
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Figure 8.9 File Transfer Log Generator Interface 
83,12 Data Retrievals 
The Data Retrievals table is used in conjunction with the DataTransfers table for logging 
related data regarding retrieval o f transferred file/data. The Data Retrievals table contains 
four attributes, EventID, Reference Event ID ^  ApplicaiionName, and Receiver Machine. 
ReferenceEventID: This attribute is used to store the EventID o f the data transfer 
event that appears in the DataTransfers table, so that the two events can be linked. 
ApplicationName: This attribute is used to store the name o f the application the 
receiving user utilised for retrieval o f the file/data. Note; This may not be available i f 
the receiving user was accessing from an external machine. 
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ReceiverMachine: This attribute is used to store the IP address o f the machine from 
which the data was retrieved. 
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Figure 8.10 Data Retrieval Log Generator Interface 
8 J J3 Add Query 
The Add Query table is used for adding database queries that need to be verified. The Add 
Query table contains four anributes, UserName, MachineName, QuerytName, and 
QueryType. This data table is used as a reference by the analysis engine. Thus addition o f 
new entries to this data table needs to be verified by the monitoring tool administrator and 
the custodian o f the database affected by the query. 
QueryName: This attribute is used for storing the name/identification o f the query. 
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QueryType: This attribute is used for describing the type o f the query. Currently 
there are only two available query types, a general Query, and Registry 
Management queries. 
In order to accommodate misfeasor monitoring, the operating system and applications 
must be able to provide the parameters needed for analysis o f activity. 
8.4 Knowledge Database 
Knowledge Database is utilised by the Analysis Engine and Alert Generator as a 
reference in order to determine whether the user activity may be deemed misuse in the 
context defined by the application and the organisation, and to provide information 
regarding the appropriate authority to be alerted for each suspicious activity. Knowledge 
Database contains thirteen data tables, Employees, File Inventory, Roles, UserRoles, 
FileAllowedRoles, FileAllowedEmployees, Machines (Considered as Internal), Settings, 
ServerA I lowed Machines, Queries, Query VerificationReference, Registries, and 
RegistryCustodians. 
8.4,1 Employees table 
This table contains list o f employees o f the organisation, in the context o f the 
demonstration, each record represents an insider For ftiture developments o f the system, 
it may also include contractors, and customers, or devise a way o f adding data tables 
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containing details o f perceived insider. The Employees table contains six attributes, 
EmployeelD, Full Name, Department, ImmediateSuperior, JobTitle, and EmailAddress. 
EmployeelD: This is an automatically generated number, used to represent each 
unique record. 
FidlName: This attribute stores the ftill name o f the employee. 
Department: This attribute stores the department to which the employee belongs. 
ImmediateSuperior: This attribute stores the name o f the person responsible for 
supervision o f the employee within the organisation. This is used to present 
knowledge o f hierarchy to the monitoring system. For example, i f the person 
transferring sensitive information to someone outside the organisation happens to be 
the custodian o f the information, the immediate superior may be informed o f the 
activity as a precautionary measure. Immediate Superior may also become the 
temporary custodian o f the data managed by the employee in the event o f 
redundancy. 
JobTitle: This attribute stores the job title o f the employee for descriptive purpose. 
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Email Address: This attribute stores the email address o f the employee. In the context 
o f the prototype system, this attribute is used to detemiine whether file 
transfer/communication is between insiders or insider-outsider. 
8,4.2 File Inventory 
It may not be practical to include all files for misfeasor monitoring. The purpose o f the 
File Inventory table within the Knowledge database is used for listing files that require 
misfeasor monitoring. The File Inventory table contains nine attributes, File/D, 
MachineName, FilePath, FileCitstodian, FileDescription, ApplicationForAccess, 
PartialReplicationAllowed, IVholeReplicationAllowed, and SaveToRemovableDisk. 
File/D: The value o f this attribute is unique, and automatically generated by the 
database. The number associated represents each file listed, i.e. the unique 
combination o f the machine on which the file is located {Machine Name), and the 
exact file path (File Path). 
MachineName: This attribute stores the name o f the server machine on which the 
listed file is stored. 
FilePath: This attribute stores the exact file path o f the listed file on the server 
machine. 
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FileCustodian: This attribute stores the name o f the person who understands the 
sensitivity o f the contents and responsible for the security o f the file listed. In the 
context o f the prototype system, the alerts related to the file w i l l be sent to the 
associated file custodian. 
FileDescription: This attribute contains a short description o f the file. 
ApplicationForAccess: This attribute contains the name o f the application defined as 
the norm for access by majority o f the users. In the context o f the prototype system, 
the value is used as a reference for determining whether the user is attempting access 
to the file through an arbitrary application. 
PartialRepiicationAIlowed: This is a Boolean value, and this anribute indicates 
whether partial replication o f the file's contents is acceptable. 
WfwleReplicationAllowed: This is a Boolean value, and this attribute indicates 
whether the replication o f the file is acceptable. 
SaveTo Removable Disk: This is a Boolean value, and this attribute indicates whether 
replicating the file to a removable disk is acceptable. 
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8,4,3 Roles table 
The purpose o f the Roles table is to group uses with similar responsible responsibilities, 
in order to simplify management o f user access rights. The Roles table consists o f five 
attributes, RolelD, RoleName, Department, RoleManager, and RoleDescription. 
RolelD: This attribute is the primary key and contains automatically generated 
number to represent each unique record. 
RoleName: This attribute stores the given name o f the role. 
Department: This attribute stores the name o f the department to which the role 
belongs. Currently, the prototype system does not utilise this value in the decision 
making process. 
RoleManager: This attribute stores the name o f the personnel responsible for deciding 
which users should belong to the role, and managing the access rights required for the 
role. In the context o f the prototype system, this is the person responsible for 
verifying the addition o f new users to the role. I f the role manager adds a user to the 
role under his management, then the custodian(s) o f the file(s) accessible by the role 
should be informed. 
RoleDescription: This attribute stores a short description o f the role. 
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8.4.4 UserRoles table 
UserRoles table list the users and the role they are associated with. 
RecordlD: This is an automatically generated number to represent each unique 
record. 
UserName: This attribute stores the name o f the user. 
RoleName: This attribute stores the name o f the role the user belongs to. 
8.4.5 File Allowed Roles table 
This table list the roles and the files allowed access to the role members. 
FileAllowedRoles contains two attributes FilelD, and RoleName. 
FilelD: This is the number representing the record in the Files table, from which 
the machine the file is located on and the exact path to the file can be derived. 
RoleName: This attribute stores the name o f the role allowed to access the file. 
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8.4.6 File Allowed Employees table 
This table lists individual users who may not belong to the role allowed access to a 
particular file, yet may still be allowed access to the file on individual basis. This table 
contains two attributes, File/D, and FullName. 
File/D: This is the number representing the record in the File /nventory table, 
ft-om which the machine the file is located on and the file path can be derived. 
FullName: This is the name o f the individual allowed access to the file. 
Note: FileAllowedRoles and FileAllowedEmployees are used to determine the 
acceptability o f data dissemination and do not represent access control policies at system 
or application level i.e. the users defined here may not actually have the access rights at 
systeiWapplication level to read or write the contents, but may receive i f a user who has 
access transfers the file/contents. 
8.4.7 Machines table 
The Machines table list the details o f organisation's internal machines. It contains seven 
attributes, MachinelD, MachineName, MachineType, Subnet Description, IPAddress, 
SystetfiAdministrator, and MachineDescription. 
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MachinelD: This attribute is an automatically generated number to represent each 
machine. In future developments o f the system it may be more practical to utilise 
this value for identifying machines, although the current prototype system uses 
the machine name for identification. 
MachineName: This attribute stores the given name o f the machine. In the 
prototype system a naming convention is used, so that the machine's physical 
location can be derived from the machine name. The ability to derive the physical 
location o f a machine is important i f the acceptable usage policy include the 
physical location o f a machine, and the physical security o f each location is 
considered for analysis. 
MachineType: This attribute stores the machine type, i.e. File Server, Database 
Server, Mail Server, Web Server, Print Server, User Workstation, etc. Current 
prototype system does not utilise this value during decision-making process. 
Subnet Description: This attribute stores a short description o f the sub-network the 
machine belongs to. 
IPAddress: This attribute stores the TP address assigned to the machine, hi the 
context o f the prototype system, the values o f this field are used for reference in 
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determining whether communication occurs beKveen machines managed by the 
organisation or those outside the organisation. 
SysteniAdministrator: This attribute stores the name o f the person responsible for 
the security and proper functioning o f the machine, b the context o f the prototype 
system, alerts related to the security and functionality o f the system are sent to the 
administrator associated with the machine, ( I f formal segregation o f duties are 
defined, the alerts should be sent to the System Security Officer, and not the 
system administrator.) 
MachineDescription: This attribute stores a short description o f the machine's 
purpose, such as backup server, mail server, etc. 
8.4.8 Settings table 
The Settings table list the required settings o f each application on each machine. The 
Settings table contain three attributes, MachineName, ApplicationName, and 
FlagDescription. Within this table a compound key (MachineNanie & ApplicationName) 
is used, so that the same application on different machines can have different settings. 
MachineName: This attribute stores the name o f the machine the policy is 
associated with. 
240 
Chapter 8 Prototype Misfeasor Monitoring System 
ApplicationName: This attribute stores the name o f the application the policy is 
associated with. 
FlagDescription: This attribute stores the flag/option, required for proper 
functioning and security o f the associated machine/application. This attribute 
accommodates only one option/flag each. Therefore, i f an application requires 
more than one flag/option, multiple records need to be created in this table. 
Within the prototype system, flags are associated with machine-application combination. 
In the future developments a compound key (Machine ID, and Application ID), may be 
created in a separate table, and flags may then be associated with the compound key. 
8,4,9 ServerAUowedMachines table 
Serx'erA I lowed Machines table list the pairing o f ser\'er and the machine allowed to access 
the associated server. This table contains two attributes, ServerName, and MachineName. 
In the context o f the prototype system, this table is referenced to determine whether the 
machine utilised by the recipient o f a file transfer is also allowed to access the server 
from which the file originated, in order to detect indirect bypass o f controls. 
ServerName: This attribute stores the name o f the server that may be accessed by 
the associated machine. 
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MachineName: This attribute stores the name o f the machine allowed to access 
the associated server. 
Note: The associated machine may not actually have direct access to the file ser\'er, but 
have adequate security to receive the file(s) through a file transfer activity. Therefore, the 
pairing here does not represent firewall rules. 
8.4JO Database Access 
In order to accommodate monitoring o f database access, the monitoring system needs to 
identify databases that require monitoring, and the associated reference data needed for 
decision making during analysis. 
Within the prototype system, two monitoring approaches are available for database 
access. One approach is for monitoring databases thai are considered part o f registries, 
and the other is for general-purpose databases. The aim o f registry monitoring is to 
identify the appropriate authority to be alerted so as to accommodate a form o f 
segregation, whereas the aim of general-purpose database monitoring is to ensure 
integrity o f the records by way o f counter verification according to the data integrity 
policy. 
The prototype system identifies database that require monitoring through the use o f 
Queries Table, and Registries Table, and determines the associated reference required for 
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decision-making through the use o f Query Verification Reference Table, and Registry 
Custodian Table. This approach allows the monitoring system to utilise data fi-om 
dispersed databases for decision-making during analysis. The code responsible for 
performing this function within the prototype system corresponds to the Fad Processor 
component o f the conceptual system. 
8,4,11 Queries table 
This table list the queries that need to be verified for integrity and validity o f access. This 
table contains eight attributes, QueryName, ServerName, FilePath, TableName, 
TahleCustocIian, PrimaryKeyAttribute, ForeignKeyAttribute, and AttributeToVerifyK 
QueryName: This attribute stores the name o f the user queries that need to be verified. 
Ser\'erName: This attribute stores the name o f the server on which the database file is 
stored. 
FilePaih: This attribute stores the path to the database file on the server. 
TableName: This attribute stores the name o f the data table affected by the query. 
TableCtiStodian: This attribute stores the name o f the person responsible for the 
security o f the data table. 
243 
Chapter 8 Prototype Misfeasor Monitoring System 
PrimaryKeyAttribute: This attribute stores the unique identifier o f each record in the 
concerned data table. 
ForeignKeyAttribute: This attribute stores the foreign key, i.e. the name o f the 
attribute containing the value that should also appear in the reference record needed 
for verification, so that the relevant reference record can be identified and linked with 
the affected record. 
AttributeTo Verify: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute in the affected data 
table that needs to be verified. In situafions when the verification only needs to check 
whether a reference record exists or merely need to check the Boolean value within 
the referenced record, i.e. the values within this record do not need to be compared 
against a value contained within the referenced record; this attribute may store the 
foreign key value. 
In future developments, database maybe used instead o f file path, and since a query may 
affect more than one data table, the table name attribute may be dropped, and creafing a 
separate table in which the affected table names are associated with each query. 
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8,4.12 QiteryVerificationReference table 
Query Verification Reference table list the data tables required for reference by the data 
verification process. This table contains seven attributes, QueryName, ServerName, 
FilePath, TableName, ForeignKeyAttribute, AttributeTo Verify, and Condition. 
QueryName: This attribute stores the name o f the query for which reference is 
associated with. The query name in this attribute corresponds to that stored in the 
Queries table. 
ServerName: This attribute stores the name o f the server on which the database 
containing the data required for reference is stored. 
FilePath: This attribute stores the path to the database file that contains the data 
required for reference is stored. 
TableName: This attribute stores the name o f the data table containing the data 
required for reference. 
ForeignKeyAitribute: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute that contains 
the value also appearing in the record affected, so that the affected record and the 
relevant reference record can be associated. 
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A ttributeTo Verify: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute that needs to be 
tested against a specified attribute o f the record affected by the query. 
Condition: This attribute stores the condition that must be satisfied in order to 
maintain integrity and security o f the affected record. Within the prototype 
system, one o f three possible conditions (Exists, Be True, Be Equal) can be used. 
In future implementations, i f additional conditions need to be determined such as 
whether a value within a record is greater than a value within the referenced 
record, the procedure for determining the condition can be implemented as a Fact 
Processor and Boolean (True or False) value o f the fact can be returned. 
8,4.13 Adding New Queries 
Database queries that require monitoring (i.e. affected records require counter verification 
against another record) can be added through the event generator. 
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Figure 8.11 Interface for Adding Queries to be Monitored 
8,4,14 Registries table 
Registries table contains the name and details o f the registries (such as employees, 
students, users, etc.), to which i f a new entity is added; the event should be notified to the 
person responsible for the integrity o f the registry. This table contains eight attributes 
RegistryName, ServerName, FilePath, TableName, PrimaryKeyA ttribute, 
RecordNameAttribute, AttributeName, RegisfryDescription. 
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RegistryName: This attribute stores the given name o f the registry. 
ServerName: This attribute stores the name o f the server on which the affected 
database is stored. 
FilePath: This attribute stores the file path to the database affected. 
TableName: This attribute stores the name o f the data table the registry is stored 
m. 
PrimaryKeyAttribute: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute in which the 
unique identifier o f each recond is stored. 
RecordNameAttribute: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute in which the 
associated with the affected record is stored. 
ForeignKeyAttribute: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute containing a 
value that w i l l be used to identify the person responsible for the integrity o f the 
record or the affected registry. 
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RegistryDescripiion: This attribute stores a short description o f the list. 
8,4,15 RegistryCustodians table 
RegistryCustodians table contains the reference records that w i l l identify the custodian 
responsible for ensuring the integrity o f the records added to the Registries table. 
RegistryCustodians table contain six attributes, RegistryName, ServerName, FilePath, 
TableName, ForeignKey, and CusiodianAttribute. 
RegistryName: This attribute stores the name o f the registry. This value 
corresponds to the value stored in the RegistryName o f the Registries data table. 
ServerName: This attribute stores the name o f the ser\'er on which the database 
containing the custodian o f the registry. 
FilePath: This attribute stores the path to the database file containing the 
custodian o f the registry. 
TableName: This attribute stores the name o f the data table in which the custodian 
o f the registry is stored. 
ForeignKeyAttribute: This attribute stores the name o f the attribute containing the 
same value as the foreign key in the affected record. 
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CustodianAttribute: This attribute stores the name o f the custodian responsible for 
ensuring integrity o f the registry. 
8.4J6 Adding New Registries 
New registries that require monitoring (i.e. the addition o f new entries to the registry need 
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8.5 Event Analysis Engine 
Event Analysis Engine works in the background, and does not have visible interface. It 
examines the Events, refers to relevant information from the Knowledge Database, and 
makes decisions according to the logic described in the previous chapter. In the prototype 
system, each event type is associated with a decision-making logic each. Upon detecting 
a suspicious activity, the event is logged into the alerts database. The Alert Generator 
checks the Alerts Database and refers to the Knowledge Database in order to alert the 
appropriate authority through suitable alert interface. 
At the moment, reasoning procedure in the prototype system does not branch out once the 
activity has been identified, and thus sufficient with sequential programming. For 
example, NIDS needs to use expert system because reasoning can branch out depending 
upon the protocol used. For example, an IP packet may contain (ICMP, TCP, UDP) and 
many other protocols. In addition, each protocol also contains a number o f fields, the 
values o f which may vary, and the variations may require a different analysis approach. 
Event Analysis Engine is able to successfully detect misfeasance activities listed in the 
introduction secfion o f this chapter. Test data and results are included in the Appendix A. 
The activities analysed by the Event Analysis Engine are only a subset o f activities listed 
in Chapter 5. Activities that can only be detected through statistical analysis are not 
included, because characterisation o f normal behaviour through statistical analysis was 
not carried out as part o f the research. 
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8,6 Alert Generator 
Alert generator checks the entries in the alerts database, and provides detailed alert 
information to the appropriate authorities such as system administrator, file custodian, 
table custodian, or registry custodian. 
The main alerts interface list all alerts within the alerts database, indicating the Event / D , 
the perpetrator name, and the misuse type. The administrator can view the details o f each 
alert by clicking on the alert entry in the list. In addition this interface also provides 
statistics o f the alerts, such as total number o f alerts in the database, the number o f alerts 
for selected misuse type, the number o f alerts for selected user, the number o f alerts for 
selected type by selected user, and percentages. 
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n Aung Htike Phyo File Transfer 
17 Aung Hlike Phyo File Transfer 
19 Paul Dowland User Management 
20 Sevi Arbitrary Settings 
22 Mr. Jon Doe Data Replication 
23 Aung Htike Phyo User Management 
2t Aung Htike Phyo Database Access 
28 Aung Htike Phyo Database Access 
28 Aung Htike Phyo Database Access 
30 Aung Htike Phyo Database Access 
31 Aung Htike Phyo Database Access 
33 Sevi Arbitrary R e Access 
35 Aung Htike Phyo File Deletion 
38 Sevj File Replication 
39 Sue Kendall Arbitrary File Access 
43 Shukor Razak File Deletion 
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Number of AJerts 
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Figure 8.13 Misfeasor Activity Alerts Main Interrace 
The administrator can also view new queries/registries that have been added to be 
monitored by clicking on View, then Quer>'/Registr>' additions. 
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8.6,1 Arbitrary File Access Alert 
I f the selected alert to v iew is an alert fo r arbitrary f i l e access, the details o f the event w i l l 
be shown through the Arbitrary File Access Alert interface. 
& frmAfbitraryFileAccessAlert 
File A c c e s s Through Arbitrary Application 
r A l e r l T o 
File custodian: Aung Hlike Phyo 
Servei Adminislraloc Paul Dowtand 
Perpetrator: Sevi 
has accessed the file 
S: '^AungM hesrsVChapt er 1 Doc 
Located on machine 
PSQ_A304_FS1 
using U nknown Application 
The file is normally accessed through 
MS Word 
« Previous N e x t » 
Figure 8.14 Arbitrary File Access Alert Interface 
In order to accommodate moni to r ing user activity' w i t h i n an appl icat ion environment , the 
application the user ut i l ised for accessing the f i le must be able lo provide necessar>' log 
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data. I f the user utilised an application that does not provide necessary log data, it w i l l not 
be possible to determine the user activity within the application environment. Therefore, 
as a first point o f monitoring, the system determines whether the application utilised by 
the user to access the file matches the one defined as the norm. I f the application utilised 
for accessing the file did not match the one defined as norm, the custodian o f the file, and 
the administrator o f the file server is alerted with the details. The details include the name 
o f the perpetrator, the name of the file server, the file affected, the application utilised, 
and the application defined as norm. 
Case Scenario: 
A user accesses the document file through the web browser application in order to upload 
it onto the web, or to send it through web based mail application. 
8.6.2 File Deletion Alert 
Some o f the monitored files may contain highly valuable content such as product designs, 
blue prints, and source codes. Therefore, deletions o f monitored files need to be alerted to 
the file custodian, and file server administrator. The alerts o f this type are presented 
through the File Deletion Alert interface. The details o f the alert include, the perpetrator 
name, file server, affected file, and file description. The user can also view the details o f 
the file by clicking o f the "View File Details" button. 
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Ca-.fnmFileDetetionAtert 
111 II • • 
Alert To-
File custodian: Aung Hbke Phyo 
S ei ver Administialor Paul Dowland 
PeipeUator; Sevi 
Hat deleted the fi!e 
File Desciiplion 
Misfeasor monitoiing tool design. 
S: VAung\D emoVSystemD esign doc 
l_ocaled on the machine 
PS0_A304_FS1 
« Pievious Aieit | View File Details NextAleit» 
Figure 8.15 File Deletion Alert Interface 
In the event o f a critical file being deleted; the user may wish to determine whether a 
replication o f the file exists within the network in order to attempt recovery. This 
information is available within the File Details interface. The details provided by the File 
Details interface include: 
File ID: used for identification within the registry o f monitored files 
File Custodian: responsible for security o f the f i le , and the person to be alerted 
File Description: for quick identification o f contents 
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Application for normal access: application acceptable for accessing fi le 
Partial replication of contents: acceptable usage policy 
Replication of entire file: acceptable usage policy 
Saving file to a removable media: acceptable usage policy 
Server administrator: administrator o f the file server 
Server: the machine on which the file is/was located 




Flo OMcriubon: . 
Andcation (a nonno) access: 





Locations ol (he repfc t^mJ fte: 
AmgHbkePrvo 







Setva Name Fie Path 
C.VMy DocunentaVSysIemDesgndoc 
Figure 8.16 File Details Interface 
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In addition the interface also lists the replicated copies o f the file within the network. In 
order to assist recovery/shredding process, it provides the name o f the machine the 
replica is located, and the exact file path. 
8,63 File Replication Alert 
Some of the monitored files may contain information regarded, as intellectual property o f 
the organisation, and replication o f such files need to be monitored. The decision-making 
logic used for the demonstration is: 
1. I f the file security policy states that replication o f the file to a removable media is 
acceptable, no alerts w i l l be generated and replication w i l l not be logged. 
2. I f the file security policy states, that replication o f the file to a removable media is 
not acceptable, but replication o f the file to local hard drives or network drives is 
acceptable, then the activity w i l l be logged, but not alerted. 
3. I f the file security policy states, that replication o f the file to a removable media is 
not acceptable, and replication o f the file to local hard drives or network drives is 
not acceptable, then the activity w i l l be alerted to the file custodian, and the 
administrator o f the file server. 
The details o f the file security policy can be viewed by clicking on the "View File 
Details" button. 
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The details provided by the File Replication Alert include, file custodian, server 
administrator, perpetrator name, file server, file path, application utilised, destination 
machine name, and destination file path. 
^ frmFileReplicdtionAlert Hop 
SendAleitTo: 
Fie custodian: Aung Htike Phyo 
S ei ver Admiraslralof: Paul D owland 
Peipetratoi Name: Sevi 




using Windows Explorei 




« Pievious Alert NexlAleit» 
Figure 8.17 File Replication Alert Interface 
8.6.4 Partial Content Replication Alert 
Some o f the monitored files may contain highly sensitive information, such as a summary 
o f market analysis, customer survey, etc. In some scenarios the users may copy (a small 
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or large percentage oO the content through applications that accommodate direct access 
to the contents o f the file. Depending upon the sensitivity o f the content, such activity 
may result in compromise the confidentiality o f the information. Therefore, partial 
replications o f file contents need to be analysed to determine whether the activity is 
acceptable. The decision-making logic utilised in the prototype system is: 
1. I f the file's acceptable usage policy state that the replication o f the file to a 
removable media, a local hard disk, or a network drive is acceptable then partial 
replication o f content should be acceptable, and thus analysis ends without 
alerting anyone. 
2. I f the file's acceptable usage policy states that the replication o f the file to a 
removable media, a local hard disk, a network drive, or partial replication o f 
content is not acceptable, then the file custodian and the server administrator are 
alerted o f the activity. 
The acceptable usage policy o f the file can be vied by clicking on the "View File Details" 
button. 
The details provided by the Partial Content Replication Alert include, file custodian, 
server administrator, perpetrator name, file server, file path, application utilised, 
destination machine name, and destination file path. 
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^ frmOataReplicationAlert •IDS' 
•Alert To-
Ffle custodian; Steven Furnell 
S erver Administrator: Paul 0 owland 
Perpetrator Name: Aung H tike Phj»o 
has partially replicated the information 
while S:\Surveys\MisuseSurveySummerv.doc 
Located on PSQ_A304_FS1 
was accessed using MS Word 
and inserted the data within the file 
C:\My Documents\Misuselncidents.doc 
Located on PSQ A304 V/S1 
<< Previous Alert View R e Detaas Next Alert» 
Figure 8.18 Content Replication Alert Interface 
8.6,5 File Transfer Alert 
In some scenarios, controls may be indirectly bypassed by transferring monitored files 
through networked applications. Therefore, transfer o f files through networked 
applications need to be monitored. The decision-making logic utilised by the 
demonstration is: 
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1. I f the file's acceptable usage policy states that saving it to a removable media is 
acceptable then, further analysis is not necessary, and no alerts need to be 
generated. 
2. I f the file's acceptable usage policy states that saving it to a removable media is 
not acceptable then, the further analysis is made. 
3. Is the servers mediating the communication is not managed by the organisation 
then the activity is alerted. The reasoning is that the file is effectively leaving the 
organisation's managed systems. 
4. I f the server mediating the communication is managed by the organisation. Is the 
recipient an employee o f the organisation? 
5. I f the recipient is not an employee o f the organisation, the activity is alerted. 
6. I f the recipient is an employee, but not authorised to access the file (derived from 
file allowed roles/users data tables), then the activity is alerted. 
7. I f the recipient is an employee and allowed access to the file, but the machine 
utilised for retrieving the mail is not allowed access to the file ser\'er the hosting 
the source copy o f the attached file, then the activity is alerted. 
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& frmFileTransferAtert EM© 
Aleit to: Aung Htike Phyo 
Paul Dowtand 
Perpetrator Steven FwneD 
Accessing from 
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PSQ_A304_WS1 
has tiansfered the lile • File ID; 7 
S: VAungVD emo\SystemD esign. doc 
Located on machine 
PSQ_A304_FS1 
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Through communicatoin seivei PSQ_A304_MS1 
To: iohn_doe(3ihotmaicom Receiving user's name, if address is internal 
Retrieving data from Local machine name oi outside IP address, or outside emait/messengei address 
« Previous Aleit NextAIeit» 
Figure 8.19 File Transfer Alert Interface 
Case Scenario /: 
A user attaches the file with an email sent through a mail server that is not managed by 
the organisation. This would require reconfiguration o f the mail client by the user prior to 
sending the mail, which should also be detected by configuration changes monitoring. 
The prototype system detects activities o f this nature. 
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Case Scenario 2 : 
For example, a user who is allowed access to the file attaches the file with an email and 
sends it to someone who is not an employee o f the organisation. The prototype system 
detects acfivities o f this nature. 
The current implementation o f the prototype system determines whether the recipient is 
an employee o f the organisation by checking the email address associated with each 
employee. In future implementations domain name checking may also be employed, i.e. 
i f the receiving mail server is not managed by the organisation then the file has 
effectively left the organisation. 
Case Scenario 3: 
A user mails the file to a colleague, who is not authorised to access the file. In this case, 
although the recipient is an employee o f the organisation, the recipient is not authorised 
to access the file, and thus is a violation o f security policy. The prototype system detects 
activities o f this nature. 
Case Scenario 4: 
A user mails the file to a colleague, who is also authorised to access the file. The recipient 
retrieves the file fi-om outside the organisation's network. In this case, although the 
recipient is authorised to access the file, by retrieving the file f rom a machine outside the 
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organisation's network, the file's security w i l l not be monitored or controlled by the 
organisation's systems. The prototype system detects activities o f this nature. 
Case Scenario 5: 
A user mails the file to a colleague, who is also authorised to access the file. The recipient 
retrieves the file from a machine within the organisation's network. However, the 
machine utilised for retrieving the file is not allowed to access the file server hosting the 
source copy o f the attached file. In this case, the machine may not be allowed access to 
the file server because it does not have a monitoring agent installed, or located in a less 
secure physical location, which may ulfimately result in the compromise o f the file's 
security. The prototype system delects activities o f this nature. 
8.6.6 Database Access Alert 
Database abuse such as accessing a greater percentage o f records compared to the rest o f 
the users, or users issuing a query that has wide search criteria w i l l be easily noticed by a 
competent database administrator, and database management systems already include 
such monitoring features. However, a single query that may constitute misuse within the 
context o f business controls/process may not be easily noticed, and thus require 
automated counter verification approach for each query issued within critical databases. 
265 
Chapter 8 Prototype Misfeasor Monitoring System 
8,6,7 Registry Access Alert 
Within organisations registries play an important role. Human resource registry provides 
the list o f employees belonging to the organisation, and thus may receive salary. 
Customer registry provides the list o f individuals eligible for the services provided by the 
organisation. A computer user registry provides the list o f users authorised to utilise the 
organisation's computers. A database user registry provides the list o f users authorised to 
access the database system. A criminal registry provides the list o f individuals consider as 
a danger to the society, and thus to be treated with suspicion and contempt. Therefore, 
belonging to a registry has its rewards or punishments. Thus addition o f new records to 
each o f organisation's registries needs to be verified by the appropriate authority. This 
requires the monitoring system to identify which registry has been affected, and to 
determine the authority to be alerted for verification. The prototype system provides this 
feature, and the alerts are presented through the Registry Access Alert Interface. 
8.6.7.1 Identifying appropriate authority for verification 
Case Scenario / : As a starting point, it would be most appropriate to verify the addition 
o f new records to the employee database o f any organisation, since this database can be 
used as a reference for monitoring other activities (computer user account creation, 
creation o f payroll account, etc). In any organisation, each and every employee reports to 
someone in a supervisory position. Therefore, involving the person in supervisory 
position for verification would be appropriate, and create a segregation to detect the 
abuse o f the ability to add new records to the employee database. The figure illustrates. 
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when user "Aung Htike Phyo" adds a new record "Daniel Rosenberg" to the Employees 
registry with the user "Bruce Lee" as assigned supervisor. 
Case Scenario 2: For example, i f access rights and privileges are associated with user 
roles/groups, the addition o f a user to a role/group w i l l grant that user with the access 
rights o f the role. A role manager w i l l certainly have the knowledge o f which users 
should belong to the role. This wi l l aid in detecting privilege misuse by system 
technicians, and create a verification/authorisation scenario to prevent abuse o f tmst. 
Alert To: Bruce Lee 
Recoid Name Dariel Rosenberg 
has been added to Est Bruce Lee 
[)etcflptjon 
T heist of employees , 
.Qcatsdon PS0_A304_FS1 
Database Fte PaiK F;\Ai#jtfs thMb\Demo 2Cp7\AIeiUV|i1on#argEn£jrw\Event Genera 
Data Table: Employees 
ly A u i g H t 9 ( e P ^ 
From PS0_A3CM_WS1 
[«Pte>QU£AJe[t! N e x i A l e d » | 
Figure 8.20 Registry Modification Alert Interface 
267 
Chapter 8 Prototype Misfeasor Monitoring System 
Case Scenario 3: Upon addition o f an employee to the payroll database, the manager o f 
the department the employee belongs to can be involved for verification process. The 
department attribute o f the affected record can be referenced against the department 
manager attribute within the human resource database (or any other database) to 
determine the appropriate person to be involved for verification. 
8,6.7.2 Ensuring existence 
For example, in order to detect creation o f ghost accounts (payroll-account, user-
account); when a user account is created or a user is added to a system, verification can 
be made to ensure that the account creation or user addition is legitimate. In order do 
accommodate automated verificafion a reference is needed. The verification may need to 
reference one o f the organisation's registry (employees, contractors, customers, etc) 
database, and the monitoring rule may state that the added entity must exit in the 
referenced registry, and i f the rule is not satisfied, the activity can be alerted to the 
information systems security officer and respond accordingly. 
Case Scenario / : A system administrator creates a ghost user account for a non-existent 
employee. The system detects this by referring to the employee registry. 
This type o f rule can certainly be implemented in to custom applications as application 
level control. However, such capability may not be available in commercial o f f the shelf 
applications, and indeed it may not be practical to include such controls because each 
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organisation's registry location/structure/purpose can be different to that o f another, and 
may not be easily tied to the application. In addition it may be desirable to enable similar 
verifications for various applications, and to add such functionality to each applicafion 
may require large overheads. 
8.6.73 Status check 
Case Scenario / : In order to detect creation o f illegal system user accounts i.e. addition o f 
new reconis to the system user database, the verification status o f the employee's record 
within the employee registry can be referenced. 
Case Scenario 2: In order to detect creation o f ghost accounts within payroll database, the 
verification status o f the employee's record within the organisation's employee registry 
can be referenced. 
Case Scenario 3 : For each successful login session, the status (actively employed) o f the 
individual within the organisation's employee registry may also be checked in addition to 
identification and authentication mechanism o f the accessed system. 
8.6.7.4 Ensuring equality 
Case Scenario: In order to detect possible fraud, upon creation/update o f an employee's 
payroll record, the agreed salary for the given employee within the human resource 
database can be referenced for verification. 
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Case Scenario I: Difference o f total deposits and total withdrawals must equal to account 
balance. 
Although it is possible to include such verification as part o f access control, it is not 
practical to include such many factors within the access control system, as it would 
complicate application functionality and contribute to compatibility issues in future 
developments o f application. In addition, i f application level controls also exist this type 
o f counter verification ensures that the application functions as expected, and i f there 
were anomalies, such as the salami case problem in which the application code itself is 
affected, the monitoring tool would be able to detect. 
IDS systems are a counter verification technology to ensure that software/users behave in 
a particular manner, despite the existence o f access control mechanisms. IDS systems 
exist because software/users can behave in ways unexpected at the time o f the system 
design. 
8,6.8 Arbitrary Settings Alert 
In order to ensure proper functionality o f the applications (be it security related or service 
related), it is essential that the application be correctly configured. Therefore, verification 
is required to ensure that the system/application configurations are exactly as desired. In 
order to accommodate verification, the desired settings for each application on each 
machine are stored in the Settings table o f the Contextual Information database for 
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reference. I f the settings made by a user do not match the settings defined, the activity is 
logged and the administrator o f the affected system is alerted. The prototype-monitoring 
tool provides this type o f alerts through the Arbitrary Settings Alert interfece. 
&.f rmSetti ngsAle rt 
Arbitrary Settings Alert 
AlerlTo: PaulDowland 
Petpetratoi: Aung H tike Phyo 
has changed the security settings of Windows FirewaO 
on PSQ A304 WS1 
User Attempted Settings Required Settings 
Iu/.DjPJQ.Ii[ewalL 
Lime wire 
Turn on lire wall 
Dont allow exceptions 
« Previous Alert Next Alert» 
Figure 8.21 Arbitrar>' Settings Alert Interface 
Case Scenario I: Turning o f f vims scanner, or changing the settings o f anti-virus 
software can result in organisation's machines being infected with malicious code. 
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Case Scenario 2: Changing the firewall settings, and allowing unauthorised listening 
services, or allowing unauthorised applications to access the Internet. 
Case Scenario 3 : Changing the settings of back up application, so that the data is backed 
up to a different machine than desired, resulting in compromise o f data security. 
8.7 Conclusions 
A prototype misfeasor monitoring system developed according to the architecture 
described in Chapter 7 is presented here. The prototype is evaluated against a number o f 
activities that may result in misfeasance within a generic organisation. The prototype has 
been successfully validated against a number o f activities selected for evaluation, 
including: 
• File Access through an arbitrary application 
• Deletion o f files considered as property o f the organisation 
• Replication o f confidential files 
• Replication o f confidential content 
• Dissemination o f confidential files 
• Modification o f database records 
• Addition o f users or new reconJs to organisation's registry databases 
• Modification o f system/application settings 
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The evaluation validates the theory that existing detection technologies and strategies can 
indeed be employed for detection o f misfeasance. The prototype has utilised inferential 
analysis, and a knowledgebase containing specification o f acceptable norms related to 
each activity in order to successfully detect potential misfeasance. The prototype also 
validates the claim made in Chapter 5 that die successful detection o f misfeasance 
depends upon the availability o f data relevant for analysis o f misfeasance. The prototype 
demonstrated that relevant audit data f rom appropriate level o f the system (Network, OS, 
Application, and Data), and contextual information relating to each parameter analysed 
are needed for successful detection. Through the use o f the prototype system to detect a 
number o f scenarios, it has also demonstrated that in some cases (such as dissemination 
o f data, and verification o f database access), the data required for analysis may need to be 
gathered from more than one level o f the system. 
The prototype system has validated the concepaial architecture presented in Chapter 7, 
including the analysis procedures developed for contextual analysis o f user activities. It 
validates the fact that the activity needs to be identified in order to determine appropriate 
analysis procedure, consequently validating the relevance o f Event Identifier [Figure 7.2] 
in the concepmal architecture. The prototype has also shown that the audit data associated 
with each activity needs to be classified, which validates the relevance o f Data Classifiers 
[Figure 7.2.] in the conceptual architecture. The prototype has also shown that contextual 
information from dispersed databases can be extracted for misfeasance detection and alert 
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distribution; validating the relevance o f Fact Processors, and Aiert Generator 
components [Figure 7.2] o f the conceptual architecture. The prototype has demonstrated 
that alerts can be dynamically distributed (by extracting information from organisation's 
live databases) to the appropriate authority for verification o f the activity, which validates 
the relevance o f the A/ert Generator component [Figure 7.2] o f the conceptual 
architecture. The prototype system has also demonstrated the fact that some o f the data 
representing contextual conditions may only be available from organisation's production 
databases. 
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9 Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the thesis by presenting a summary o f the achievements, and the 
limitations o f the research. It also presents the improvements that can be made and the 
future work that can be based upon the work carried out. 
9.1 Achievements of the research 
The research has achieved all o f the objectives specified in Chapter 1, with introduction 
o f new conceptual architecture and practical work carried out in a number o f areas in 
order to validate the theory and concepts. The specific objectives achieved are: 
1. Limitations o f access control mechanisms with regards to insider misuse 
(especially dissemination o f data and sabotage through deletion o f files) have 
been identified, and possible improvements have been suggested (Chapter 3). 
Access controls require that the mechanism be embedded within the environment 
in which the activity is regulated, and thus pose a limitation. 
2. Limitations o f traditional IDS design with regards to detecting misfeasance have 
been identified (i.e. most o f the data available for analysis by traditional IDS is 
not particulariy relevant for detection o f misfeasor activities). The reasons why 
misfeasance activities cannot be detected by traditional IDS was established 
(Chapter 4). Consequently, requirements that need to be met for successful 
detection o f misfeasance have been identified. 
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3. A taxonomy for identifying the appropriate level within the IT system where 
relevant data for misfeasor analysis can be collected has been developed (Chapter 
5). Relevant data needed for analysis o f each type o f misfeasance has been 
identified. 
4. The applications, operations, and data that are likely to be misused have been 
identified. A checklist for identifying applications, operations, and data that is 
most likely to be misused by insiders has been established (Chapter 6). 
5. A conceptual architecture for monitoring misfeasor activities has been designed; 
facilitating the use o f contextual data only available from dispersed databases, and 
highlighting where existing detection technologies fit within the architecture. 
Appropriate inference algorithms have been developed for monitoring each type 
o f misfeasor activity (Chapter 7). 
6. A prototype misfeasor monitoring system has been developed incorporating novel 
use o f existing detection technologies and strategies, and tested against a number 
o f misfeasance scenarios prove the validity o f the concept (Chapter 8), and how 
misfeasance can be detected. The prototype proves that existing IDS technologies 
and strategies can be applied to misfeasor monitoring i f relevant data for analysis 
is available and suitable analysis procedures are developed. 
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A number o f papers relating to each part o f the research have been presented at refereed 
conferences and journals, (the published papers are attached in Appendix) and have 
received encouraging comments fi-om delegates and reviewers. Thus it is believed that the 
research has made valid and useful contributions to the field o f IT security, intrusion 
detection, and misfeasance detection in particular. 
9.2 Limitations of the research 
Despite achieving the overall objectives outlined at the start, the limitations associated 
with the work needs to be explained, so that improvements can be made in the future. The 
main limitations o f the research are: 
1. Data collection components are developed only for Active Window Monitor, and 
Bandwidth Usage Monitor. The data used for validating the prototype system was 
generated artificially. The monitoring system relies upon the operating system and 
the application vendors to include features for collection o f relevant tog data. In 
that sense, the monitoring system cannot be considered complete. Difficult ies and 
compatibility issues may arise when vendors attempt to implement new 
Application Programming Interfaces within the operating system. 
2. The prototype uses higher-level information, which requires a number o f stages to 
process and correlate lower-level log data in to facts that can actually be used for 
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inference. Collection and correlation o f lower-level logs are not carried out as part 
o f the research. 
3. Regarding statistical analysis, the characterisation o f norms is not carried out as 
part o f the research i.e. die process for establishing normal profiles o f user/system 
behaviour was omitted. As a consequence, detection based upon statistical 
analysis and historical profiling was not conducted. 
4. Database records made accessible to the monitoring system may become subject 
o f inference attacks. Safeguarding o f log data or contextual data accessed by the 
monitoring system was not considered as part o f the research. 
9.3 Suggestions and scope for future work 
On the basis o f the discoveries made from the research, it is possible to identify a number 
o f areas in which future work can be carried out to build upon the work undertaken. A 
number o f ideas have been suggested in parts o f the previous chapters. New ideas in 
addition to those mentioned previously are outlined here. 
I . One o f the areas that could not be solved by monitoring is the abuse o f privileges 
by system administrators. Therefore, system administrative operations that 
requires segregation and system components that can be separated needs to be 
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identified in order to enforce segregation o f duties for administrative users, so that 
the consequences o f sabotage by system masters can be minimised. 
2. It has been identified that some o f the contextual data may only be available from 
dispersed databases o f the organisation. Therefore, middleware components that 
w i l l accommodate the monitoring system to easily extract the data f rom relevant 
databases need to be developed. 
3. From the discussions within the thesis, it can be noted that the ability to include 
relevant parameters enables existing detection technologies to be applied in a new 
context. Therefore, future work should focus upon features that w i l l al low users to 
create inference rules that consider new parameters relevant to the context in 
which the activity is analysed. 
4. Inference rules need lo be developed to represent contextual conditions governing 
acceptable usage o f legitimate user activities. However, contextual conditions 
vary from one organisation to another. In addition, such conditions may only be 
understood by business managers. Therefore, user friendly interfaces/process need 
to be developed, so that little technical knowledge is required to create inference 
rules and fact identifiers to define the acceptable conditions governing the access 
o f database access. 
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9.4 The future of misfeasor monitoring 
Organisations across various disciplines are becoming increasingly reliant upon fT 
systems for the proper functioning o f their businesses. Therefore, advance security 
countenmeasures need to be developed to ensure the integrity and availability o f the 
systems while maintaining confidentiality o f data. Intmsion detection systems have been 
widely employed within many FF environments. However, traditional IDS were designed 
to detect attacks and misuses usually employed by those who do not have legitimate 
system level access, and they were not designed to detect misuse o f legitimate access. 
Nonetheless, authorised users with legitimate access may misuse granted privileges, and 
the consequences o f privilege misuse can be severe as IT dependency increases. 
Although, acceptable usage monitoring systems are available on the market, they focus 
mainly on the monitoring o f Internet access by employees. As have been highlighted 
throughout the research, in addition to Intemet access, various activities such as 
dissemination o f data, configuration o f systems, creation/management o f accounts, and 
database access can result in misfeasance. Thus future IDS need to include features to 
analyse such activities in order to determine whether the operation is acceptable within 
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Appendix A - Evaluation of Prototype 
This section presents the test scenarios and event data used for evaluation of the 
prototype, and the outcomes of each test for detecting potential misfeasance. The 
activities listed below have been tested in varying scenarios, some of which violate 
contextual mles and thus result in misfeasance. 
File Access through an arbitrary application 
Deletion of files considered as property of the organisation 
Replication of confidential files 
Replication of confidential content 
Dissemination of confidential files 
Modificafion of database records 
Addition of users or new records to organisation's registry databases 
Modificafion of system/application settings 
File Access through Arbitrar>' Application 
This section evaluates the prototype system's ability to detect access of files through 
applications that difTer from the defined norm for accessing the file concemed. 
The logic of the analysis procedure for file access test scenario is described in Chapter 7, 
section 7.7.1. 
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Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user accessing a file through an application that does not match 
the norm defined in the security policy associated with the file. 
File ID 4 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Technology\Expenses.mdb 
File Custodian Steven Fumell 
File Description Expense claims for technology department 
Application for Access MS Access 
Entry of File Details in File Inventor>' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 6 
User Name Sue Kendall 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS3 
Application Name Open Office 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S:\Technology\Expenses.mdb 
Entry of File Access Log within the Events Database 
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Event ID Command ID Event T)pe 
6 6 File Access 
Entry of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the A/en database, because the application utilised 
for accessing the file does not match the defined norm. 
fimAi bitiaiyPileAccessAleit 
File Access Through Arbitrary Application 
AleHTo-
File custodiaa Steven FuineD 
S er ver Admintstratoi; Paul D o wland 
PerpeUator: Sue Kendali 
has accessed the fBe 
S:\Technology\Expenses.mdb 
Localed on machine 
PS0_A304_FS1 
using Open Office 
The file is normally accessed through 
MS Access 
' N e x l » « Previous 
Outcome of Arbitrary File Access Test Scenario 
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Deletion of Files Considered as Propert>' of the Organisation 
This section evaluates the prototype system's ability to detect deletion o f files considered 
as intellectual property o f the organisation. 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user deleting a file considered as intellectual property o f the 
organisation. The logic for the analysis procedure is described in Chapter 7, section 7.7.2 
File ID 2 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
File Custodian Steven Fumell 
File Description Entire Thesis 
Application for Access MS Word 
Entr>' of File Details in File lnventor>' within Knowledgebase 
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Event ID 24 
User Name Sevi 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS3 
Application Name Windows Explorer 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
Cntr>' of File Deletion Log within the Events Database 
Event ID Command ID Event Type 
24 9 File Deletion 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because the file is listed in the 
File Inventory, and thus considered as intellectual property o f the organisation. 
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& (imFileDeletionAleit 
•Alert To-
Ft!e custodian: Steven Furnel 
SeiverAdminbtratof: PeutDowland 
Perpelialor; Sevi 
Has deleted (he file 
File Description 
Entire Thesis 
S: \Aung\T hestsVT hesis. doc 
Located on the machine 
PSO A304 FSr 
« Pievious Alert i View FHe Detaas Next Alert » • 
Outcome of File Deletion Test Scenario 
Replication of Conlidential Files 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user replicating a file that is allowed to be saved to a removable 
media. The logic for the analysis procedure is described in Chapter 7, section 7.7.3. 
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File ID 3 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FSi 
File Path S:\Nath\SharedNewDesign.jpg 
File Custodian Nathan Clarke 
File Description Picture 
Application For Access ACD See 
Partial RepHcation False 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable True 
Entry of File Details in File Inventor)' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 17 
Command ID 10 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
User Name Aung Htike Phyo 
Application Name ACD See 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S:\Nath\SharedNewDesign.jpg 
Entr>' of File Replication (Copy) Log within Event Database 
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Event ID 18 
Command ID 11 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
User Name Aung Htike Phyo 
Application Name A C D See 
Server Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
File Path C:\My Documents\NewDesign.jpg 
Entr>' of File Replication (Paste) Log within Event Database 
Event ID Command ID Event Type 
17 10 File Replication 
18 11 File Replication 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Outcome; 
The analysis engine does not log the event to the Alert database, because the replication 
o f the file to a removable media is defined as acceptable. 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user replicating a file that is not allowed to be saved to a 
removable media, but allowed to be replicated. The logic for the analysis procedure is 
described in chapter 7, section 7.7.3. 
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File ID 5 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Chapterl .Doc 
File Custodian Aung Htike Phyo 
File Description Thesis Chapter 1 
Application For Access MS Word 
Partial Replication False 
Whole Replication True 
Save to Removable False 
Entr>' of File Details in File Inventorj' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 20 
Command ID 10 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS3 
User Name Sevi 
Application Name Windows Explorer 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Chapterl .Doc 
Entr>' of File Replication (Copy) Log within Event Database 
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Event ID 21 
Command ID 11 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS3 
User Name Sevi 
Application Name Windows Explorer 
Server Name PSQ_A304_WS3 
File Path C:\My Documents\Chapterl.doc 
Entr>' of File Replication (Paste) Log within Event Database 
Event E) Command ID Event Type 
20 10 File Replication 
21 11 File Replication 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database with the alert status set to false, 
thus keeping track o f the replicas, but no alerts generated, because replication o f the file 
is defined as acceptable. 
Test Scenario:This scenario presents a user replicating a file that is not allowed to be 
saved to a removable media, and not allowed to be replicated. The logic for the analysis 
procedure in described in chapter 7, section 7.7.3. 
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File ID 2 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
File Custodian Steven Fumell 
File Description Entire Thesis 
Application For Access MS Word 
Partial Replication True 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable False 
Entr>' of File Details in File Inventory within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 22 
Command I D 10 
Machine Name PSQ_A304 WS2 
User Name Nathan Clarke 
Application Name Windows Explorer 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
Entr>' of File Replication (Copy) Log within Event Database 
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Event ID 23 
Command I D 11 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
User Name Nathan Clarke 
Application Name Windows Explorer 
Server Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
File Path C:\My Documents\Thesis.doc 
Entr>' of File Replication (Paste) Log within Event Database 
Event ID Command ID Event Type 
22 10 File Replication 
23 11 File Replication 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Outcome; 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database with the alert status set to true, 
thus keeping track o f the replicas and generating alerts, because replication o f the file is 
not acceptable. 
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^ fimFileReplicationAleit - • - - - • -•- • • i _ 
Send Alert To: 
Ffc custodian: Steven Fuinel 
Server Admlnislratof: Paul Dov^and 
PerpeUaloT Nome: Nathan Clarke 




using Windows Explorer 




« Previous Alert' | View File Deta3s Next Alert» i 
Outcome of File Replication Test Scenario 
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Application for normal access: 
Pailial repfication of contents: 














Server Name FdePath 
CXMy Documenls\Thesis.doc 
File Details from Outcome of Test Scenario 
Replication of Confidential Content 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user replicating the contest o f a file that is not allowed to be 
replicated, and replication o f contents is not acceptable. The logic for the analysis 
procedure is described in chapter 7, section 7.7.4. 
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File ID 6 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Demo\SystemDesign.doc 
File Custodian Aung Htike Phyo 
File Description Misfeasor monitoring tool design. 
Application For Access Open Office 
Partial Replication False 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable False 
Entr>' of File Details in File Inventor>' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 26 
Command ID 1 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WSI 
User Name Nathan Clarke 
Application Name Open Office 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S;\Aung\Demo\SystemDesign.doc 
Entr>' of Data Replication (Copy) Log within Event Database 
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Event ID 27 
Command ID 2 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WSI 
User Name Nathan Clarke 
Application Name Open Office 
Server Name PSQ_A304_WSI 
File Path C:\My Documents\DetectionSystems.doc 
Entry of Data Replication (Paste) Log within Event Database 
Event ID Command ID Event Type 
26 1 Partial Data Replication 
27 2 Partial Data Replication 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because replication o f the file's 
contents is not acceptable. 
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fimDataReplicationAleil EM 
r Alert To-
File custodian; Aung Htike Phyo 
Server Administrator: Paul Dowland 
Perpetrator Name: Nathan Darke 
has partially reph'cated the information 
while S:VAung\Demo\SystemDesigh.doc 
Located on. P S Q . A m F S l 
was accessed using Open Office 
.and inserted the data within the file 
C:\My Docimenlt\petectionSystems.doc 
Located on PSQ_A304_WS1 
«'Previous Alert View File Detais I NextAlerl» 
Outcome of Content Replication Test Scenario 
Dissemination of Confidential Files 
For the analysis o f file dissemination, the analysis procedure utilises information from 
several data tables within the knowledge base, which includes: 
Employee Registry 
List o f Intemal Machines 
- Users allowed to receive each inventoried file 
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- File hiventory 
List o f machine allowed to host files fi-om each server 
The logic o f the analysis procedure for all file transfer test scenarios is describe in chapter 
7, section 7.7.5. 
Machine Name IP Address System Administrator 
PSQ_A304_FSI 192.168.0.1 Paul Dowland 
PSQ_A304_WS1 192.168.0-3 Tarik 
PSQ_A304_PS1 192.168.0.2 Nathan 
PSQ_A304_WS2 192.168.0.4 Shukor Razak 
PSQ_A304_WS3 192.168.0.5 Aung Htike Phyo 
PSQ_A304_MS1 192.168.0.6 Andy 
PSQ_A304_WS4 192.168.0.7 Sevi 
Table: List of Internal Machines 
Full Name Report To E-mail Address 
Steven Fumell steve@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Paul Dowland Steven Fumell paul@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Aung Htike Phyo Steven Fumell aung@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Nathan Clarke Steven Fumell nathan@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Sevi Nathan Clarke sevi@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
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Full iName Report To E-mail Address 
Shukor Razak Paul Dowland shukor@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Sue Kendall Steven Fumell sue.kendall@plymouth.ac.uk 
Jules Sue Kendall jules@plymouth.ac.uk 
Table: Employee Registr>' within the Knowledgebase 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user transferring a file that is not allowed to be saved to 
removable media. Specific conditions violating the policy were tested, which includes: 
- Communication server is not an internal machine 
Recipient is not an insider 
Recipient is an insider but does not have authority to receive the file involved 
Recipient is an insider and has authority to receive the file involved, but the 
machine utilised by the recipient is not authorised to host files fi-om the 
originating file ser\'er. 
Test: Communication Ser\>er is Not an Internal Machine 
File ID 5 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Chapterl .Doc 
File Custodian Aung Htike Phyo 
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File Description Thesis Chapter 1 
Application For Access MS Word 
Partial Replication False 
Whole Replication True 
Save to Removable False 
Entr>' of File Details in File Inventor>' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 14 
Sender Name Sevi 
Sender Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
Application Name Email 
Communication Server 200.168.0.6 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S;\Aung\Thesis\ChapterI .Doc 
Sender Address sevi@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Receiver Address thano@hotmail.com 
Entry of Data Transfer Log 
Event ID Command ID Event Type 
14 4 File Transfer 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
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Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because the communication 
sender mediating the transfer is not an internal machine. 
^ ffmFi(«TiAnsfeiA1eii •ma 
Alsrt lo: Aing Htike Phyo 
PdulDov4and 
Perpebalor Sevi sevi@iack.£ee.pfymoulKoc,Ut 
Accesiinglfom PSQ_A304_WS2 
haslramfaiedthefae Fie ID: 5 
S:\Aung\Thejis\Chaptei1.DOC 
Localtd on machine 
PSO_A304_FS1 
Ufing appEcalion Ernai 
T htouj^ communiMitoin servei 200.168.0.6 
Ta lhano€*»tma4com Receiwig usei's name, if addieis is internal 
Retrieving data trom Local machine name oi outside IP address, or outside emd/messengei addrew 
« Previous Alert View File Detaas NextAleit>> 
Outcome of File Transfer Test Scenario 1 
Test: Recipient is Not an Insider 
File ID 2 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
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File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
File Custodian Steven Fumell 
File Description Entire Thesis 
Application For Access MS Word 
Partial Replication True 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable False 
Cntr>' of File Details in File Inventory within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 28 
Sender Name Paul Dowland 
Sender Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS1 
Application Name Email 
Communication Server 192.168.0.6 
File Server PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
Sender Address paul@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Receiver Address john.doe@yahoo.com 
Entry of Data Transfer Log 
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Event [D Command ID Event Type 
28 4 File Transfer 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Ci (imFiteTiansfeiAleit-
Max ta Steven FuneB 
Pad Dowland 
Pwpebatoi: Paul Dowland - paii@iacK.£ee.pty>moutKeciic - . - . ^ „ . , 
Acceding fiom PSO jX3tM_W51 
hasliansfenedthefte FisID: 2 
S: VAungM hesisM hesis. doc 
Located on madve 
PSOji304_FSl 
Using application Email 
Through coireTwnicatohseiver PSQ_A304_MS1 
To; iohadoe@y^TOO.com Receiving user's name, tfaddrewbhteinal 
Retrieving data fiom Local mactvw name or ouUida IP'adcke£&. o( oiisbe emait/meuengei addess 
j « R e v i o u i A h ^ VjewFtePetais | . N ^ Ale r t» | 
Outcome of File Transfer Test Scenario 2 
Test: Recipient is an Insider, but does not have Authority to Access 
File ID 4 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
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File Path S:\Technology\Expenses.mdb 
File Custodian Steven Fumell 
File Description Expense claims for technology department 
Application For Access M S Access 
Partial Replication True 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable False 
Entr>' of File Details in File Inventor>' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 12 
Sender Name Sue Kendall 
Sender Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS1 
Application Name Email 
Communication Server 192.168.0.6 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Technology\Expenses.mdb 
Sender Address sue.kendall@plymouth.ac.uk 
Receiver Address jules@plymouth.ac.uk 
Entr>' of Data Transfer Log 
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Event ID Command ID Event Type 
12 4 File Transfer 
13 5 Data Retrieval 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Event ID Reference Event ID Application Name Receiver Machine 
13 12 Email 192.168.0.7 
Entry of Data Retrieval log table of Events database 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to Alert database, because although the recipient is an 
insider, the recipient is not authorised to access the file received. 
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(iiiiFileTiansfeiAleir ^  m 
Afemo; Steven Funel 
Paul Dowtand 
Peipelralor Sue Kendal sue.kendaB(i!plyr»dKac.'uk-
Accessnghom PSQ_A^4_WS1 
has Iramlened the tie Fie ID: 4 
S: \T echrtology\E xpenses. mdb 
Located an machine 
PS0_A3CW_FS1 
- Using appEcatbn - - Email 
Through commiaTicaroin server PSQ_A304_MS1 
To: Me$<aip^>mouthacuk Jiies 
Rislrieving dala fiom PSQ_A304_WS4 
« Previous Atert II View Fie Details NextAleft» 
Outcome of File Transfer Test Scenario 3 
Test: Recipient is an Insider, and has Authority to Access, but the Machine Utilised for 
Accessing the File is not authorised. 
File ID 2 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
File Custodian Steven Fumell 
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File Description Entire Thesis 
Application For Access MS Word 
Partial Replication True 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable False 
Entr>' of File Details in File Inventor>' within Knowledgebase 
Event ID 15 
Sender Name Paul Dowland 
Sender Machine Name PSQ_A304_WSI 
Application Name Email 
Communication Server 192.168.0.6 
File Server PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\Aung\Thesis\Thesis.doc 
Sender Address paul@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Receiver Address shukor@jack.see.plymouth.ac.uk 
Entry of Data Transfer Log 
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Event ID Command ID Event Type 
15 4 File Transfer 
16 5 Data Retrieval 
Entr>' of Event log in the Events data table of Events database 
Event ID Reference Event ID Application Name Receiver Machine 
16 15 Email 192.168.0.7 
Entry of Data Retrieval log table of Events database 
File ID Full Name 
2 Shukor Razak 
Table: List of Users Authorised to Receive each File 




Table: List of Machine Authorised to Host Files from Each Ser\'er 
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imFileTidnsfeiAleit 
Aletl to: Steven Fuinell 
PaulOowland 
Perpetrator Paul Dowland paul@iack,se8 p^-moUKacuk 
Acce«ing from PSQ_A304_WS1 
hasiransJenedthefte FtelD: 2 
S:\Aung\Thesi3UhKi$.doc 
Located on machine 
PS0_A304_FS1 
" • - Using appScation Emai 
Through communicatoin teiver PSQ_A304_M51 
Tot shi*uM@iack.5ee.p^mfiouth.ac.uk "ShiA;or Flazak 
Retrieving data from PSO_A304_WS4 
« Previous AJeit ViewFteDetais Next Alert » 
Outcome of File Transfer Test Scenario 4 
Modirication of Database Records 
The logic o f the analysis procedure for all database access scenarios is described in 
chapter?, section 7.8. 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user adding a record to a data table, and the condition states that 
a corresponding reference record must exist. For this particular example, the perpetrator 
assigns the person who does not exist in employee registry as a f i le custodian. 
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File ID 7 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path S:\MScStudents\StudentList.doc 
File Custodian Jackie C 
File Description Student list 
Application For Access Open Office 
Partial Replication False 
Whole Replication False 
Save to Removable False 
Entry made to the File Inventory table of the knowledgebase 
Event ID 11 
User Name Aung Htike Phyo 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
Application Name Database Application 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path 
E:\Aung's Thesis\Demo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
Generator\Contextual Infomiation\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name FileLocation 
Record ID 7 
Entr>' of Database Access Log 
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Query Name AssignFileCustodian 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
Generator\Contextual lnformation\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name FileLocation 
Table Custodian Paul Dowland 
Primary Key Attribute FilelD 
Common Attribute FileCustodian 
Attribute To Verify FileCustodian 
Entr>' of Data Verification Table 
Query Name AssignFileCustodian 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Padi 
E:\Aung's Thesis\Demo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring Engine\Event 
GeneratorXContextual Information\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name Employees 
Common Attribute FullName 
Attribute To Verify FullName 
Condition Exist 
Entr>' of Data Verification Reference Table 
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Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because the assigned custodian 
o f the file does not exit in the employee registry. 
Automated verification of database access (view, and edit) 
Alert To: PadOoMMand 
PeipeUfltoi At*igHl#;ePhj>o 
hasaccenedthe FWD 7 
h the data taUa FteLocation 
of the database EiVAing't ThesisVOemo 2007VUeits\Montotfig EngneVEveni Genetato(\Conte}<iual InfotrnationVConce^dudrito rndb 
kicked on the machirte PS0_A3(U_FS1 
And the ccncficn (hat the attibUe viAuc of FileCustodLan 
(Tiust Emt h the attrtUe vdiue d Fi^ame 
iithe data table Emptoyees 
of the databa» EiVAi#<s Thesb\Demo 2007\Aterts\Mor*3mg EngiieNEvent GeneiatoiVCorteMtual trionnatnnVrontextuJnlarndb 
loMted on macHne PSQ_A304_FS 1 
19 not satisTied 
[I <<Previoicn| Mexl>> | 
Outcome of the Database Access Test Scenario 1 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user adding a record do a data table, and the condition states that 
a certain value from the new record must equate to a certain value from the corresponding 
reference record. For this example, the perpetrator updates the account o f a customer, the 
balance o f which must equal to the total deposits made. 
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Query Name BalanceCheck 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Test 
Databases\CustomerRecords.mdb 
Table Name Accounts 
Table Custodian Accounts Manager 
Primary Key Attribute CustomerlD 
Common Attribute CustomerlD 
Attribute To Verify AccountBalance 
Entr>' of Data Verincation Table 
Query Name BalanceCheck 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path 
E:\Aung's Thesis\Demo 2007\Test 
Databases\CustomerRecords.mdb 
Table Name Deposits 
Common Attribute AccountID 
Attribute To Verify TotalDeposits 
Condition Be Equal 
Entr>' of Data Verification Reference Table 
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Customer ID Customer Name Account Balance 
1 Account 1 100 
Entry of Account data table 
Account ID Total Deposits 
I 1000 
Entry of Deposits data table 
Event ID Command ID Event Type 
29 8 Database Access 
Entr>' of Event log 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because the updated account 
balance does not equal to the total deposits. 
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QueiyVerificationAlert 
Automated verification of database access (view, and edit) 
Alert To: Accounts Managei 
Perpetiatof Aung HtJie Phyo 
has accessed the GuslomefID 1 
in the data taWe Accounts 
of the database E;VAung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Test DalabasesVCustomerRecortkmdb. 
boated on the machine- PSQ^A304_FS1 
And the condition that the attribute value of AccounlBalance . ^ 
must Be'Eiqual in the attribute value of TotalDeposiis 
in the data table Deposits 
of the database E:V\ung's ThesisVDemo 2007VTest DatabasesVCustomefRecofds.mdb 
located on machine - PSQ_A304_FS1 
is not satisfied 
« Previousl N e x t » 
Outcome of Database Access Test Scenario 2 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user adding a record to a data table, and the condition states that 
a certain value from the corresponding reference record must be tme. 
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Query Name VerifyRecord Access 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path 
E:\Aung's Thesis\Demo 2007\Test 
Databases\AccessValidation.mdb 
Table Name VerifiedRecord Access 
Table Custodian Database Manager 
Primary Key Attribute LogID 
Common Attribute CustomerlD 
Attribute To Verify CustomerlD 
Entr>' of Data Verification Table 
Query Name Veri fyRecord Access 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Test 
Databases\AccessVahdation.mdb 
Table Name AccessRequests 
Common Attribute CustomerlD 
Attribute To Verify Verified 
Condition Be Tme 
Entr>' of Data Verification Reference Table 
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Log ID Employee ID Customer ID Access Request ID Access ID 
I Aung Htike Phyo 1 I 1 
Entry of VerifledRecordAccess Table 
Log ID Customer ID Verified 
I 1 False 
Entry of AccessRequests Table 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because the "Verified" attribute 
of the reference record in AccessRequests table is false. 
336 
Appendix A - Evaluation of Prototype 
& QueiyVerificAtionAleit- ^ [ • | | | ^ 
Automated verification of database access (vieWi and edit) 
Alert To;" Database Managei 
Perpetrator Aung Htike Phyo 
has accessed the LogI D 1 
in the data taUe VerifiedRecoxdikccess 
of the database E:\Aung's ThesisNDemo 2007\Test Databases\Accessyaridation.mdb 
located m the machine PSQ_A3041FS1 
And tte condition thai the attritiute value of - - Custorr^eilD-
musi; BeTiue inlhe.atbibuteyalue of ^Verified 
In the data table AccessRequesls 
ol the database E;VAung's Thesis\Defno~2B07\Tesl DatabasesNAccessValidatipamdb 
located on machine PS 0_A304_FS 1 
is rtol satisfied 
« Previous N e x t » 
Outcome of Database Access Test Scenario 3 
Addition of Users or New Records to Organisation's Registry Databases 
The logic of the analysis procedure for the test scenarios is described in chapter 7, section 
7.81. 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user adding a new record to the employee registry. 
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Event ID 9 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS2 
User Name Steven Fumell 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
Generator\Contextual lnformation\Contextuallnfo.mdb 
Table Name Employees 
Recond ID 8 
Log Entry or the User Management Table 
Employee ID 8 
Full Name Jules 
Department Technology 
Immediate Superior Sue Kendall 
Job Title Receptionist 
Email Jules@plymouth.ac.uk 
Entry of the Employees data table 
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List Name Employees 
Sender Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path 
E:\Aung*s Thesis\Demo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
Generator\Contextual lnformation\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name Employees 
Primary Key Attribute EmployeelD 
Record Name Attribute FuIlName 
Attribute Name ImmediateSuperior 
List Description The list of employees 
Entry of the Lists data table (indicates monitored registries) 
List Name Employees 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
GeneratorVConlexmal Information\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name Employees 
Attribute Name Full Name 
Custodian Attribute Full Name 
Entry of the ListCustodians data table 
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Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, so that the record can be verified 
by the list custodian of the category to which the new employee has been added. The alert 
generator utilised the information to identify the person responsible for verification of the 
record. 
AtejlTcr Sue KendAS 
Recotd Name juies 
has been added to ist SueKendal 
l>etcriptian 
The bt ol employees 
Located on PS0_A304_FS1 
Datdbeso Fte Path E:SAung'( ThewVOemo 2007\AJeit&\Moritorvig Engne\Eyenr Generaiof\Contextud tnforTutmVCtntodualrtfb m(ft> 
DalaTaUe; Empteyce* 
by Steven Fumdl 
From. PSOjfii304.WS2 
!«PtevitusAlett! N»aAlert» | 
Outcome of the User Management Test Scenario I 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents the addition of a new user to a role. 
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Event ID 10 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS3 
User Name Nathan Clarke 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FS1 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisVDemo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineXEvent 
GeneratorVContextual Information\ContexaialInfo.mdb 
Table Name UserRoIes 
Record ID 4 
Log Entr>' of the User Management Table 
Record ID User Name Role Name 
4 Luke Skywalker NRG Researchers 
Entr>' of the UserRoIes data table 
Role ID I 
Role Name NRG Researchers 
Department NRG 
Role Manager Steven Fumell 
Role Description PhD students and network researchers 
Entr>' of the Roles data table 
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List Name UserRoles 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path 
E:\Aung*s ThesisVDemo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
Generator\Contextual Information\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name UserRoles 
Primary Key Attribute Record ID 
Record Name Attribute UserName 
Attribute Name RoleName 
List Description List of users for each role 
Entry of the Lists data table (indicates monitored registries) 
List Name User Roles 
Server Name PSQ_A304_FSI 
File Path 
E:\Aung's ThesisNDemo 2007\Alerts\Monitoring EngineVEvent 
GeneratorXContextual Information\ContextualInfo.mdb 
Table Name Roles 
Attribute Name Role Name 
Custodian Attribute Role Manager 
Entry of the ListCustodians data table 
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Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, so that the record can be verified 
by the custodian of the category to which the new user has been added. The alert 
generator utilised the information to identify the person responsible for verification of the 
record. 
Q finiR&febtiyAcceisAleu- . . _ . . . . . ^ - _ EjtUB 
Alert To: Steven Furel 
RecotdNatne Ld^eSKyw^ei 
has been added to Id fJRG Reseactos 
Dcscnpbon 
The falotusmfw each tote, 
V 
LoMledon PS0>3W.FSl 
Database Fie Path E:^ >&ung't Thetb\Denio2007Wertx\MoritonngEngffw\Evert Gew 
Data Table: UjerRtto 
by Nathan Otfhe 
Fiom PS0_A304_WS3 
«PrevoisAteni Ne3(iAfert» 
Outcome of the User Management Test Scenario 2 
Modification of System/Application Settings 
The logic of the analysis procedure for test scenarios is described in chapter 7, section 
7.6. 
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Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user entering the settings with some of the required flags 
missing. 
Entry o 
Event ID 31 
Machine Name PSQ_A304_WS1 
User Name Sevi 
Application Name Windows Firewall 
the Settings data table within Events database 
Event \D Flag Description 
31 Tum on firewall 
Entry of the Flags data table 
Machine Name Application Name Flag Description 
PSQ_A304_WS1 Windows Firewall Tum on firewall 
PSQ_A304_WS1 Windows Firewall Don't allow exceptions 
Entr>' of the Settings data table within the knowledgebase 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because "Don't allow 
exceptions" flag required by the policy is missing. 
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fimSettingsAlerl mm 
Arbitrary Settings Alert 
Aleil To: 
Perpetrator: Sevi 
'has changed the security,settings of Windows FirewaD 
on PS0'A3b4 WSi 
User Attempted Settings Required Setlir»gs 
Tumon firewall. Turn on firewall 
Don't aDow exceptions 
« Previous Alert [ Next Alert» | 
Outcome of the Arbitrary Settings Test Scenario 1 
Test Scenario: 
This scenario presents a user entering the settings with more flags dian required by the 
policy. 
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Event ID 7 
Machine Name PSCLA304_FS1 
User Name Shukor Razak 
Application Name Windows Firewall 
Entry of the Settings data table within Events database 
Event ID Flag Description 
7 Turn on firewall 
7 FTP 
7 Apache Web Server 
Entr>' of the Flags data table 
Machine Name Application Name Flag Description 
PSCLA304_FSI Windows Firewall Turn on firewall 
PSCLA304_FS1 Windows Firewall FTP 
Entr>' of the Settings data table within the knowledgebase 
Outcome: 
The analysis engine logs the event to the Alert database, because one o f the flags 
"Apache Web Server" is not required by the defined policy. 
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f i mSettingsA le 11 
Arbitrary Settings Alert 
AlefiTo: PauIDowland 
. Perpetrator, ' Shukof Razak 
has changed the securiiy settings of Windows Fiiewafl 
on ;PSQ_A304_FS1 
User Ailempted Settings .Requiied Settirigs 
Tyrn on firewall 
Apache Webserver 
Turn on firewall 
FTP 
<< Previous Aleit Next Alert» 
Outcome of the Arbitrary Settings Test Scenario 2 
Various test carried out has validated the functionality of the prototype and its ability to 
detect various forms of misfeasance identified at the start of Chapter 8. 
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Those marked with a * are included for reference. Some of the publications were edited 
and republished. Therefore, only the most relevant edition is includedfor reference. 
Fumell, S.M. and Phyo, A.H. (2002), "Watching your own: The problem of insider IT 
misuse", Proceedings of AiCE 2002 Third Australian Institute of Computer Ethics 
Conference, Sydney, Australia, 30 September 2002, pp 17-24, 2002 
Fumell, S.M. and Phyo, A.H. (2003), "Considering the Problem of Insider IT Misuse" 
Australian Journal of Information Systems, vol. 10, no. 2, pp 134-138, 2003 * 
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Abstract 
In recent years the Internet connection has become a fi-equent point of attack for most 
organisations. However, the loss due to insider misuse is far greater than the loss due to 
external abuse. This paper focuses on the problem of insider misuse, the scale o f it, and how it 
has effected the organisations. The paper also discusses why access controls alone cannot be 
used to address the problem, and proceeds to consider how techniques currently associated 
with Intrusion Detection Systems can potentially be applied for insider misuse detection. 
General guidelines for countermeasures against insider misuse are also provided to protect 
data and systems. 
Keywords: Insider misuse; misuse detection; misuse countermeasures. 
Introduction 
I f one was to play a game of word association and use the terms 'security breach' or 
'cybercrime' as the starting point, it is very likely that words like 'hacker' or 'virus' would be 
amongst the first responses. It is somewhat less likely that terms like 'employees' or 
'insiders' would emerge as many peoples' first choices. In reality, however, insiders are very 
often the cause of the most significant and costly security incidents, and a significant 
proportion of what is commonly classed as cybercrime can be attributed to them. Indeed, the 
fact that insiders are already within the organisation often puts them in an ideal position to 
misuse a system i f they are inclined to do so. 
Although the great majority o f the people are familiar with the generic meaning of the word 
'misuse', when we try to map it to an IT context, there is a need to clarify certain issues. 
Insider IT misuse can be a very subjective term, and one o f the most challenging tasks is to 
draw a clear line that separates an IT misuser fi-om a person who is using a system in an 
acceptable way and for an approved purpose. The word 'misuse' implies the presence of rules 
that specify the conditions of allowable usage for the resources concerned. These rules are 
often embodied within an IT usage policy. However, such a policy, and hence the defmition 
of misuse, can differ from one organisation to the other. For example, where some would give 
priority to detecting data-theft and unsanctioned modification of data, others might want to 
detect denial of services and Internet access abuse. Thus no single definition of misuse is 
appropriate for all organisations. 
The aims of this paper are to present evidence of the insider misuse problem, and suggest 
possible means by which it could be addressed. The discussion begins by examining the scale 
of the problem, based upon evidence from computer abuse surveys from recent years. This is 
followed by a more specific consideration of what can actually be considered to constitute IT 
misuse in an organisational context, which then leads into a discussion of methods that could 
potentially be employed to combat the problem. 
The scale of the insider misuse problem 
I f one takes a look back to computer crime literature and surveys dating up to the mid-90s, the 
evidence presented would certainly suggest that the main threat was to be found from one's 
own staff (with as much of 80% of computer crime believed to be the result of insider 
activity). In more recent years, however, many sources have indicated a significant rise in 
externally sourced incidents (principally in terms of Internet-based attacks such as website 
defacement and denial of service), with the consequence that although insider misuse is still 
significant, it now accounts for a far lesser proportion of raw incidents. For example, in the 
UK, results from the Department of Trade & Industry's Information Security Breaches 
Survey 2002 revealed that only 34% of businesses considered their worst security incident to 
have been caused by an insider (DTI 2002). This possibly accounts for why 60% o f 
respondents in the same survey were either not very concerned or not at all concerned about 
threats originating from their own employees. However, when considering the large 
businesses (with over 250 employees) only, it should be noted that the split between those 
experiencing their worst incident as a result of internal staff versus external parties was almost 
equal. 
Another source that has monitored the changing trend regarding internal and external attack is 
the annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Looking back to 1995, a key 
observation from the CSI was that 'the greatest threat comes from inside your own 
organisation" (Power 1995). In more recent years, however, the survey results have painted a 
rather different picture, and by 2002 it was reported that, for the f i f th year running, more 
respondents had cited their Internet connection as a frequent point of attack (74%), than had 
cited internal systems (33%) (Power 2002.). This may well be the case, but presenting the 
information in this manner tends to create something of a false impression, because the raw 
number of incidents is not necessarily the factor that we should be most concerned about. Of 
more interest to most CEOs, for example, wil l be the effect that the incidents had on their 
bottom line. 
Many of the categories used in the CSiypBI results encompass incidents that could potentially 
have been both internally and externally sourced (e.g. theft of proprietary information, 
sabotage of data networks, and virus). However, three of the categories very clearly indicate 
the source, and it is interesting to see the level of the annual losses that were associated in 
each case. The relevant information is presented in Table I (Power 2002). 
System penetration 
by outsider 




1998 $1,637,000 $3,720,000 $50,565,000 
1999 $2,885,000 $7,576,000 $3,567,000 
2000 $7,104,000 $27,984,740 $22,554,500 
2001 $19,066,600 $35,001,650 $6,064,000 
2002 $13,055,000 550,099,000 $4,503,000 
Total $43,747,600 $124,381,390 $87,253,500 
Table 1 : Annual losses for selected incidents from CSI /FBI sur\'eys 
It is quite evident from the results that, although they relate to a five-year period over which 
the proportion of externally sourced incidents had exceeded internal ones, the quantifiable 
losses in the latter case dwarf those attributable to outside hackers. It is therefore clear that, in 
real terms, the level of the insider threat is still much greater than that exhibited by external 
hackers. 
The CSI figures relating to insider abuse of network access clearly suggest that, as well as 
bringing considerable advantages in terms of web and email communication, Internet access 
has also ushered in a whole range of new problems. This can be further evidenced by a 
survey of 544 human resources managers, conducted in 2002 and targeting large UK 
companies (with Marge' in this case being defined as those employing an average of 2,500 
people). The results revealed that almost a quarter of them (23%) had felt obliged to dismiss 
employees in relation to Internet misconduct (with the vast majority of these cases - 69% -
being linked to the downloading of pornographic materials) (Leyden, 2002). Many other 
cases resulted in less severe courses of action, such as verbal warnings or a discreet word in 
the ear of the person concerned, and in total the results indicated that 72% of respondents had 
encountered Internet misuse in some form. 
The nature of insider IT misuse 
One of the CSI/FBI categories from Table 1 was that of 'unauthorised insider access'. 
However, one of the complicating aspects with insiders, and the aspect that differentiates this 
from the other insider category listed in the table, is that incidents will not always relate to 
something that is unauthorised. Indeed, the basic problem with insider misuse is that the 
person concerned has legitimate access to IT resources of the target organisation. This means 
that he/she does not need to bypass the authentication mechanisms o f the IT infrastructure (no 
stealing or illegal reproduction of passwords and other forms of authentication tokens). Thus, 
in an IT context, insider misuse is the act of abusing granted privileges to cause harm. In this 
context, it can also be observed that users that know more about a system are more likely to 
abuse their privileges than users who are less knowledgeable. 
Although this is not difficult to grasp, vagueness is introduced by the term misuse and what it 
means to different people or organisations. What is considered illegitimate use in one 
particular organisation can be perfectly acceptable for another. For example, browsing the 
web for personal use is outlawed entirely in some companies, whereas others are somewhat 
more relaxed about it and impose varying limits upon what is acceptable (e.g. some may 
permit up to 20 minutes per day, whereas others may allow twice this). In addition, there are 
myriad other activities that would hkely be regarded as misuse in any organization, for 
example: 
- Personal entertainment (e.g. playing games, writing personal email etc.) 
- Downloading MP3s, pirated software, pornographic images, or other unsuitable 
material 
- Fraud and theft (e.g. modifying payroll database to increase one's wages) 
- Sending out inappropriate material using company computers 
- Installing and using pirated software. 
- Reading or modifying another user's files. 
Although the computer security research community has created a plethora of taxonomies that 
describe computer intrusions in general (see Furnell et al. 2001 for an overview), little effort 
has been placed on the construction of a taxonomy that specialises in insider incidents. The 
earliest attempt to classify internal misuse o f computer systems is presented by Anderson 
(1980) and discusses borders of distinction between masqueraders, clandestine users, and 
misfeasors. Masqueraders are insiders that exploit weaknesses of the authentication system, 
thus gaining the identity of other legitimate users. A clandestine user is related to authorised 
users and their capabilities to bypass audit, control and access resource mechanisms in a 
particular computer system. Finally, misfeasors are insiders who do not need to masquerade, 
but abuse the power of their privileges to misuse the system. However, as the small selection 
of examples above shows, the single category o f 'misfeasor' can encompass a whole range o f 
different incidents. As a result, other works have focused more specifically upon the issue of 
insider misuse, and indicative examples are given below: 
- Tuglular (2000). This is the first comprehensive taxonomy of misfeasor incidents. 
The taxonomy classifies computer misuse incident in three dimensions: incidents, 
response and consequences. The entire taxonomy is orientated towards data collection 
for insider incident response. 
- Magklaras and Furnell (2002). This taxonomy is human centric. Mgklaras and 
Fumell perceived that all actions that constitute IT misuse lead back to human factors. 
The fiindamental aspect for their taxonomy is classifying people in three basic 
dimensions: system role, reason o f misuse and system consequences. This scheme is 
the most appropriate for threat prediction, but not suitable for detection. 
Intentional misfeasor cases are performed for a variety o f reasons. The best way to sub-divide 
them is to consider the motives in a way that could detect the ultimate goal o f the abuser. It 
might be inferred, for example, that a legitimate user is trying to access sensitive data (data 
theft), take revenge against a particular person or an entire organisation (personal differences), 
cover indications of unprofessional behaviour, or deliberately ignore a particular regulation of 
the information security policy. 
Unfortunately, despite evidence of the insider threat, there is no substantial effort devoted to 
addressing the problem o f internal IT misuse. In fact, the great majority o f misuse 
countermeasures address forms of abuse originating from external factors (i.e. the perceived 
threat from hackers). A significant reason for this is the difficulty in actually monitoring and 
detecting the problem in order to enable a response to be mounted. In the cases above, for 
example, it is clear that the misuse would have been very difficult to control or prevent, as the 
perpetrators concerned were not violating any system-side access rules. 
Combating insider misuse 
The problem with insider abuse is that, once a user is authenticated to use a system, what he 
does with the system or the objects he has access rights to is neither monitored nor logged 
most of the time. Considering the list of potential misuses in the previous section, it is 
possible that appropriate access controls could be used to prevent some of them, but even 
these will not be sufficient for all contexts (consider, for instance, the case in which the 
misfeasor has legitimately been granted administrator level privileges). This epitomizes the 
difficulty in implementing access controls that resembles organisational hierarchy onto the IT 
systems. It must also be remembered that one user/process/account having all the privileges 
can lead to serious misuse by exploiting the situation. Neumann's suggestion of multilevel 
systems and compartmentalization (Neumann 1999) should be given a serious consideration 
before we proceed with the insider misuse detection. 
Today's commercial operating systems are based on the old systems developed years ago. At 
the time when the core components of these systems were developed, the users were expected 
to behave themselves. The problem of insider misuse was not an issue. However the research 
in the IT security over the years has proved that people do misbehave and that insider misuse 
is a serious problem. Since these systems were not developed with insider misuse in mind, 
the preventive mechanism and the logging present in today's commercial systems are not 
optimized for misuse detection. Existing access controls are not good enough to prevent 
insider misuse, making it more difficult to enforce insider misuse policies. For example, a 
user with administrator level privileges may not have the moral right to access confidential 
data on the system, but access controls present in today's systems cannot prevent such 
actions. As such, it is considered that some form of supervision system is required to monitor 
for misuse activity. 
Such technologies are already available to some extent in the form of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) (Amoroso 1999), but as with many other mainstream security technologies, 
these are geared towards detecting attacks on the system rather than misuse of it by legitimate 
users. Nonetheless, some of the principles are transferable. For example, current IDS employ 
two main strategies to identify attacks namely misuse-based detection and anomaly-based 
detection, and it is possible to see how each of these could be applied to the insider problem. 
- Misuse-based detection 
In a traditional IDS, this approach relies upon knowing or predicting the intrusion 
scenario that the system is to detect, intrusions are specified as attack signatures, 
which can then be matched to current activity using a rule-based approach. A similar 
approach could potentially be incorporated for misfeasor incidents, based upon those 
methods that employees have been known to exploit in the past, or those that they can 
be anticipated to attempt based upon the privileges and resources available to them. 
For example, at a conceptual level, one such misuse signature might relate to a user 
who is identified as attempting to modify a record about him/herself in a database (e.g. 
the payroll example indicated earlier). The principle here would be that, although 
their database privileges may allow them to do so, users should probably not be 
modifying details relating to themselves without someone else's authority. Another 
example could be to watch for any sequence of events where a user accesses 
confidential information and then attaches it in an email destined for a recipient 
outside the organization. Neither of these rules would necessarily cause the user in 
question to be locked out of the system (because in some contexts the actions could 
still be quite legitimate), but they could be used to flag the activity for closer scrutiny. 
- A nomaly-based detection 
Rather than being based upon known or predicted panems of misuse, this approach 
relies upon watching out for things that do not look normal when compared to typical 
user activity within the system. In a standard IDS, the principle is that any event that 
appears abnormal might be indicative of a security breach having occurred or being in 
progress. The assessment of abnormality is based upon a comparison of current 
activity against a historical profile of user (or system) behaviour that has been 
established over time. For example, past behaviour might suggest that a particular 
user typically downloads an average of 5MB of material from the web per week, and 
the nature of the attachments they assign to emails are normally documents. Therefore, 
i f activity supervision detects a surge of download activity to 10MB in a single day, or 
a large number of email messages suddenly being sent with image attachments, then 
there would be reasonable grounds to investigate whether unsuitable activities might 
be in progress. 
Although the above descriptions make the concepts sound relatively straightforward, it must 
be appreciated that neither technique can be considered 100% reliable, even in the context of 
traditional IDS. The consequence is that they can lead to false positives (where legitimate 
activity is believed to be intrusive) and false negatives (where genuine intrusive activities are 
misjudged as acceptable). The concept of applying the techniques for the detection of 
misfeasor activity / insider misuse makes the task more difficult, because we are dealing with 
legitimate users who are not violating access controls. From a misuse-based detection 
perspective, it is more difficult to identify the ways in which an insider might misuse the 
resources to which they have legitimate access, while from an anomaly detection perspective 
the level of behaviour profiling would need to be much more detailed and precise. When 
basing the assessment upon a comparison against their behaviour profile, a legitimate user 
misbehaving wil l almost certainly be more difficult to identify than a total impostor who is 
masquerading under the legitimate user's identity. In addition, in an adaptive system, the 
process of profile refinement might be exploited by wily misfeasors who gradually train the 
system to accept misuse behavior as normal. As such, this aspect is still an area of active 
research, as the technical approaches are not mature. 
When considering how to protect systems now, it is worth noting that preventative measures 
need not be technical. Insider misuse is a management problem as much as it is a technical 
issue. As such, formal internal controls are as important as technical controls. Security 
guidelines, such as the recommendations provided by the ISO 17799 standard (BSI 2001), 
typically suggest a number of personnel-related measures, which i f employed correctly could 
dramatically reduce the likelihood of insider misuse being successftil: 
- Check references of prospective new employees before hiring them; 
- Ensure that employment contracts include a clause relating to the acceptable use o f IT 
resources; 
- Ensure that adequate reminders about the 'acceptable use' policy are encountered by 
staff during their day to day use of systems; 
- Ensure adequate supervision of staff by line management; 
- Provide a means by which staff can confidentially report misuse o f IT systems, 
without fear of recrimination from colleagues. 
- Ensure proper division of duties (i.e. such that collusion between staff members would 
be necessary before significant opportunities for frauds could be identified). 
- Concerning the access of data, make sure that access control policies resemble 
organisation's management hierarchy or rules. 
- Security and access control policies need to be maintained to keep up with the change 
in organisation's management hierarchy. 
In the absence of an automated supervision approach, it would still fall to line managers and 
the like to enforce and monitor these aspects. 
Conclusion 
Insider misuse poses a great threat to organizations. Even though the Internet connection is 
the most frequent point of attack, the loss due to insider misuse is far greater than the loss due 
to external attacks. 
At the present time, the system level countermeasures that can be implemented are limited. 
Current access control systems, although well-suited to guarding against unauthorized 
activities, cannot prevent insider misuse effectively i f the subject is doing something within 
their legitimately assigned privileges. More advanced mechanisms, in terms of activity 
monitoring and supervision systems may offer a potential solution in the ftjture. The authors' 
ongoing research will design and evaluate approaches for realizing the latter approaches, and 
results will be detailed in future publications. 
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Abstract 
The impact of insider IT abuse can be devastating compared to most outsider attacks. In principle some of the techniques 
used in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are transferable to Insider Misuse detection. The difference bet\veen a traditional 
IDS and an Insider Misuse Monitoring system is the type of data collected and analysed. This paper discusses the types of 
data needed to monitor Insider Misuse and the different methods by which it may be collected, and then explains why 
application level detection has more potential over the others. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years society has become increasingly dependant on IT infrastructures, as many 
organisations (including telecommunication, healthcare, banking, transport, emergency 
ser\'ices and the military) use IT for the smooth functioning of their operations. Therefore IT 
systems are critical to our everyday lives. In response, the IT industry has launched a variety 
of security tools to help the users and system administrators prevent, detect and sometimes 
respond to the abuse of the systems. Security tools frequently employed in today's computer 
systems include anti-virus toolkits, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). In recent 
years, attacks from outside the organisations have increased, due to an increasing number of 
organisations getting connected to the Internet and being exposed to attacks. However the 
results of the surveys by CSl/FBI in recent years have constantly suggested that the dollar 
amount lost due to insider abuse is greater than the loss due to abuse from outsiders (Power 
2002). Insider abuse can have a major impact upon an organisation since the perpetrators 
have a good idea of what is sensitive and valuable within the company. Knowing where these 
resources are stored, and what security mechanisms are used to protect them, also helps 
insiders in circumventing controls and evading detection. As such, it is essential for 
organisations to be cognisant of the threat, and for mechanisms to be available to facilitate 
detection of these incidents, as well as those that come from the outside. This paper 
considers the feasibility of such mechanisms, based upon principles of data collection and 
analysis that are already applied in the context of intrusion detection systems. 
2. Background 
Before discussing further on the issue of Insider Misuse, there is a need to define the terms 
'Insider' and 'Misuse'. From the organisation's point of view, insiders can be employees, 
part-time employees, consultants, contractors and employees of partner firms. From the 
system's perspective, insiders are users with a valid login account to access the resources it 
manages. Users may be physically located inside or outside the organisation, but have the 
same logical presence. By contrast, some individuals may be physically inside the 
organisation, but lack a valid account to access the systems. In this context, they are regarded 
as logical outsiders, and for the purpose of this paper the term 'insider' refers to users with 
valid login accounts (i.e. the logical insiders). In general misusers are the users who have 
legitimate access to the IT systems and the data stored on it, but abuse their privileges by 
using the resources in an inappropriate manner or for an unapproved purpose. According to 
Anderson (1980), such users can be termed 'misfeasors'. The word 'misuse' implies the 
presence of rules that specify the conditions of allowable usage for the resources concemed. 
These rules are often embodied within an IT usage policy. The nature of misuse is 
widespread, with a wide-range of possible misuse scenarios. Some of these misuse activities 
require a closer scrutiny due to the financial impact they can have on the organisation, such 
as: 
• Net abuse 
• Data theft 
• Sabotage 
• Fraud 
• Use of unauthorised software 
Aside from Net abuse and the use of unauthorised sofhvare, the activities listed are 
essentially old problems in a new environment. In the IT network, large amounts of data can 
be stolen unrecognisably in a short period of time. Electronic data can be destroyed at the 
click of a button i f the perpetrator has the appropriate privileges, and such a process will not 
be immediately noticed unless monitoring facilities are carefully implemented. Fraud 
committed in the IT medium is difficult to prevent due to difficulties in implementing 
controls that resemble organisational hierarchy and the enormous amount of data involved. 
This in turn makes it even more difficult for automatic detection of the fraud due to the 
system's lack of knowledge in business processes and management hierarchy. 
Common security mechanisms found in Microsoft and Unix-based operating systems (OS) 
are Identification and Authentication, Access Control, and Auditing. The purpose of 
Identification and Authentication is to make sure the user is who he claims to be, and it 
therefore represents a frontline defence against unauthorised users. Such controls are clearly 
ineffective against insider misusers, who have legitimate access into systems. Once a user is 
logged in, the role of Access Control is to prevent them from accessing systems and data to 
which they are not entitled. However, traditional access controls can only allow or deny 
access to a resource, and the problem is that insiders have leginmate access to the resources 
that they may subsequently misuse. As such, the main countermeasure at the moment is to 
retrospectively monitor what they are doing, and determine whether misuse has occurred. In 
this context, audit mechanisms produce audit trails of events and logs of data concerning the 
system usage. Most operating systems provide an audit mechanism that is at least capable of 
logging every file accessed by a user. From a security perspective, the main purpose of 
logging is to be able to hold users accountable for their actions. However, although the 
majority of the computers in sensitive environments log audit data, most of the audit data is 
generally utilised for performance measurement or accounting purposes, and not very useful 
for intrusion detection (Lunt 1993). Most systems allow the administrator to identify what 
data is sensitive and who needs access to it. However the ability to detect the manner in 
which the data is accessed and the actions after gaining access is somewhat limited. 
Therefore comprehensive auditing is required in order to monitor such operations. In an 
organisation with hundreds of users, large amounts of audit data is logged and it becomes 
very difficult for the system administrators to manually detect attacks by examining the log 
files. In dealing with externally sourced incidents, Intrusion Detection Systems can ease this 
task by automating the process of looking for attack patterns in log files. With this in mind, 
consideration can be given to applying a similar technique as a means of identifying insider 
misuse activity. 
Intrusion detection is based on auditing by helping the administrator look for known attack 
scenarios, anomalous user/system behaviour, combination of suspicious activities, and 
patterns of events that associate with malicious behaviour. Depending on the source of data 
used for analysis, IDS can be classified in to: 
• Nenvork-based: The IDS performs detection at the network level, and the ne^vork 
traffic is monitored to look for attacks patterns. 
• Host-based: The IDS performs detection at the OS level. The main sources of data.are 
the audit trails and event logs. 
Host-based IDS can then be further sub-classed depending on the level of monitoring that 
they employ: 
• System-level monitoring: Monitors system events such as system calls, CPU usage, 
file access and I/O. 
• Application-level monitoring: Monitors user interactions with the application such as 
request-response, access patterns, user input, application output, and user utilisation of 
application functions. 
Having collected such data, IDS can employ two main strategies to identify attacks, namely 
misuse-based detection and anomaly-based detection (Amoroso 1999). 
• Misuse-Based detection: This approach relies upon knowing or predicting the 
intrusion scenario that the system is to detect. Intrusions are specified as attack 
signatures, which can then be matched to current activity using a rule-based approach. 
A similar approach could potentially be incorporated for misfeasor incidents, based 
upon those methods that employees have been known to exploit in the past, or those 
that can be anticipated they would attempt based upon the privileges and resources 
available to them. 
• Anomaly-based detection: Rather than being based upon known or predicted patterns 
of misuse, this approach relies upon watching out for things that do not look normal 
when compared to typical user activity within the system. In standard IDS, the 
principle is that any event that appears abnormal might be indicative of a security 
breach having occurred or being in progress. The assessment of abnormality is based 
upon a comparison of current activity against a historical profile of user (or system) 
behaviour that has been established over time. 
As with many of the IT security technologies, IDSs are geared towards detecting intrusion 
from outside the network or system security violations by legitimate users. However, some of 
the data collection and analysis techniques employed by traditional IDSs can theoretically be 
used to develop a misfeasor-monitoring system. As a first step towards achieving this, we 
need to review current data gathering techniques, the data that can be collected by such 
techniques, and their collective suitability for use in misfeasor monitoring. 
3. Review of Data Collection Techniques 
As already established in the context of traditional IDS, different types o f data can be 
gathered at varying levels in a computer system. As different types of misuse can manifest 
themselves on different levels of a system, it is important that the relevant data is collected at 
the appropriate level. The different options, and their applicability to insider misuse 
detection, will now be considered in more detail. 
3.1 Net>vork-level Monitoring 
This technique is used by network-level IDSs where network packets are the main source of 
data for monitoring. Network packets are captured by placing the network interface cards in 
promiscuous mode. Network data collection modules need to be strategically placed in the 
network in order to capture all the network traffic, usual places include the first node after the 
router in a subnet, on a gateway between two subnets, or just after a firewall in an 
organisation. Network environments are often divided into multiple subnets for security and 
performance reasons. In order to monitor network traffic for all subnets, each subnet would 
need a separate data collection station, and to monitor the traffic entering and leaving the sub-
net, the monitors would need to pickup all the packets. 
Packets are considered suspicious i f they match some predefined signatures. Three main 
types of signatures are string signatures, port signatures and header condition signatures. By 
checking header fields in the packets, the IDS would be able to monitor attacks on the 
network protocols. By monitoring packet content, remote exploitation of apphcation and/or 
system vulnerabilities can be monitored. Packet content can also be used to monitor web and 
email usage. This type of collector would pickup packets going in and out of a subnet, but do 
not monitor traffic in the subnet, since they are primarily designed for perimeter security. I f 
encryption were implemented by network services, the monitor would not be able to analyse 
the data collected in this manner. For example, i f IP tunnelling is established between two 
computers, the sniffer needs to be in the OS network stack of the concerned machines in 
order to see the packet in clear text. Again, this approach would not work i f the encryption 
took place at application level, such as an SSL encryption. This approach wil l not allow 
detection of system level attacks, attacks from directly attached terminals or attacks via dial-
in modems directly connected to the target computer. 
From a misfeasor monitoring perspective, network-level data collection can help in detecting 
insiders who employ the same methods used by outsiders to attack the internal systems. In 
addition it can also help in monitoring: 
• Web access 
• Email content 
• Excessive usage of network resources 
• Anomalous access of isolated sub-nets 
• Utilizing services from unauthorised terminals 
Although many users may accept monitoring web access and excessive usage of network 
resources, monitoring or filtering of email is subject to debate of privacy in the workplace 
and legal issues. It is also important that anomalous access of isolated sub-nets is monitored. 
For example, questions need to be asked when a software developer establishes direct 
network connection to the systems in the payroll department, as the user in question may be 
in process of modifying the payroll database in order to raise his earnings. Utilizing ne^vork 
services from unauthorised terminals should also be monitored, since access-terminal security 
is very important in trust-based distributed computing environments. The perpetrator here 
might be using a rogue client program to access the services. Again controls are sometimes 
placed within the application environment and the use of arbitrary programs to access the 
services may allow the user to by pass the controls either accidentally or intentionally by the 
user. Having stated the possible monitoring opportunities for insider misuse at the network 
level, we should consider the statement by Schultz (2002), "Insiders do not generally 
demonstrate the same attack signatures as external attackers". Insiders may already have user 
accounts to access the systems concerned and in most cases that also means physical access. 
Therefore, there might not be a need to remotely exploit the services or protocols in order to 
gain access. Insiders are also wary of setting of f alarms in the process of misuse, and they are 
more likely to abuse their existing privileges than to exploit remote vulnerabilities. This leads 
us to the need for monitoring at the system level. 
3.2 System-level Monitoring 
Continuing from the previous discussion on collecting network data, it is possible to monitor 
network packets entering and leaving the system by running the data collection module as 
part of the OS, in the neUvork slack at the system level (Kerschbaum et al. 2000). The 
disadvantages of this approach are the need to correlate the attack logs from each machine to 
get a network-wide view of the attacks, and performance degradation of the concerned 
system. At the system level, the main source of data collected is from audit trails, application 
logs, and system events. In addition system calls, kernel messages, system statistics and 
access violations can be monitored to characterize system/application behaviour. Audit logs 
usually provide information on access violations, change of system and configuration files. 
As stated previously, IDS automates the process of looking for known attack scenarios, 
anomalous user/system behaviour, such as a combination of suspicious activities, and 
patterns of events that associate with malicious behaviour. The following are types of 
suspicious activities that may be monitored at the system-level: 
• Covering tracks: Example, a user attempts to modify audit configurations, deleting 
entries in the log files, and making changes to accounting configuration. 
Unauthorised programs: Monitor execution of unauthorised programs for they may 
be Trojan horses or rouge programs. There is also a chance of the user utilising such 
programs for a malicious purpose. For example access of database files with the use 
of an arbitrary program. 
Monitor system consequences: Example, presence of an unauthorised device driver, or 
the machine listening on an unauthorised port. The presence of a modem might 
indicate, the user directly connecting to the Internet, bypassing the ne^vork 
monitoring system. This also gives the opportunity to send information out of the 
organisation without being monitored. 
Monitoring Access: Monitor successful access in order to monitor frequency of access 
to certain files; this will later enable the system to characterize file access by 
users/processes. Monitor access to files tagged as confidential (this requires a 
database of confidential file names). 
• Monitor file deletes: Monitor deletion of files, especially batch deletion of files. 
Deletion of files on the backup servers need even more care. Both of the mentioned 
activities may be intended to sabotage the system and resources it manages. 
In addition to the above, there are a number of activities that can be monitored at system level 
for insider misuse monitoring. Some of those activities are: 
• Check for events where the User ID of the owner of the process is not equal to the 
User ID of the owner of the object accessed (objects here can include File, Directory, 
or an executable program). Even though the user might have gained privilege to 
access the objects, such events might indicate breach of privacy by the privileged 
user. 
• Atypical usage of I/O resources by systems may also indicate information leakage. 
For example, unusual access of the Internet by the backup server. 
It is also possible to monitor user behaviour at the system level, such as the 
applications/commands the user often utilizes, system access times, and the type of network 
services used. Utilization of some of the applications/commands may indicate preparatory 
behaviour, for example the use of a port/vulnerability scanner by a user, who does not have 
system administration duties. It may also be appropriate to monitor the input source and 
output destination of data to and from an application. For example, when the tagged secret-
file is used as an input to the encryption/steganographic program, the user might be in the 
process of disguising the information before sending it out of the organisation. The suspicion 
level should naturally increase when the output of the previously mentioned activity is 
attached in an email to be sent out of the organisation. However some types o f abuse wil l be 
distinguishable from normal activity only with the knowledge of application-level semantics 
and subsequently may not exhibit malicious behaviour at the system level. Therefore some 
detection strategies will be necessary at the application and database level. 
3.3 Application-level Monitoring 
Although a few researchers have worked on misuse detection (Chung et al. 1999) and data 
collection (Almgren and Lindqvist 2001) at the application level, this is a relatively less 
explored area compared to the first two techniques. At this level, the main source of data can 
be input from user/processes, output produced by the application, user actions within the 
application environment and the applicafion data itself Monitoring criteria here include: 
• Range of input/output data. By constantly monitoring maximum and minimum 
values for certain items in a record, some types of fraud may be detected. One real-
life example would be the case of Joseph Jett (Dhillon et al. 2001), where Jett 
indefinitely postponed the time the actual losses could be recognised in a Profit and 
Losses statement. 
• Destination of output. By monitoring the destination of output, information leakage 
could be monitored. For example, i f the data is written to a world readable file, it 
could compromise the confidentiality of the data. 
• Type of input/output data. By monitoring the type of input, such as numbers, strings 
and control characters, attempts to compromise the integrity of the running process 
and its data can be detected. 
• Format of input/output data. By monitoring the format of the data entered such as 
time/date formats, some of the accidents that could otherwise compromise the 
integrity of the data can be detected. 
• Access patterns. By monitoring user access patterns such as read/write, to certain 
items in a record, user access behaviour can be characterised over time to determine 
their normal activity. 
Using the above data, it is possible to create profiles of the normal behaviour associated with 
a user or a user-class (with the latter being based upon the user's role within the 
organisation). The question of which is more effective requires more research and 
investigation. However, at the moment the authors conjecture that the class-based profiling 
has potential in misfeasor detection, as it is assumed that the users with the same 
responsibilities would exhibit similar i f not identical activities within the system. Their 
similarities should be clear in terms of the applications frequently used and the actions 
performed within the application environment. Therefore, the individual profile of a 
misfeasor should be obvious when compared to the role-based profile the perpetrator belongs 
to. Another advantage of role-based profile comparison is that when the users of a particular 
role are assigned special assignments, the sudden change of user profile may not be 
considered anomalous, i f the changes are similar for all users within the same role. Again this 
approach may also help monitor users who gradually train the system to accept anomalous 
behaviour as normal. 
For the purpose of misfeasor monitoring, the authors feel that application level monitoring 
can provide most relevant data; because this is where the users directly interact with the 
application environment and the concerned data. Therefore the data collected here should 
reveal more about the user behaviour within the environment, and it gives a better 
understanding of the user's intentions. Again, the user actions and input to the application is 
more meaningftil when monitored at this level. However, these hypotheses need to be proven, 
and our future research will focus on this. The advantages of collecting data at this level are 
that the data is unencrypted and it gives an insight into how the application interprets the 
transaction. It also gives the opportunity to reconstruct the session by logging request-
response transactions. The ability to reconstruct the session is very important as it allows the 
security personnel to investigate what actually happened to find out i f the actions were 
accidental or intentional. Session reconstmction also allows the characterisation of the 
particular misuse scenario, to automate future detection. The disadvantage of this approach is 
the potential effect on the performance of the application. I f implemented without care the 
collected data may also reveal confidential information and system vulnerabilities that can be 
used by misfeasors. It is also vital how the collection module is implemented. With some of 
the applications it may be sufficient just to monitor the data logged, however, with some 
applications it might be necessary to modify the code in order to get the desired data. For the 
latter approach, it needs to be identified where in the application the data collection function 
should be placed. Again this might vary from one application to another. Therefore more 
research needs to be carried out to identify the best manner in which the data can be collected 
at this level and how it can be transferred or stored safely for analysis. 
To understand how application level monitoring works, we can consider previous work in the 
domain. A good example is provided by DEMIDS (Detection of Misuse in Database 
Systems), which attempts to profile working scopes based on user access patterns in 
relational databases (Chung et al. 1999). DEMIDS assumes that a user typically will not 
access all attributes and data in a database schema; therefore access patterns of users wi l l 
form some working scopes, which are sets of attributes usually referenced together with some 
values. Based on that assumption, Chung at al defined the notion of a distance measure 
between sets of attributes that consider both the structure of the data and user behaviour. This 
notion is then used to guide the search for regular patterns that describe user behaviour in a 
relational database. 
4. Predicting the insider threat 
It is important to note that insider misuse is both a managerial and a technical problem. One 
of the complicating aspects with insiders, and the aspect that differentiates this fi-om the 
outsiders, is that incidents wil l not always relate to something that is unauthorised. Indeed, 
the basic problem with insider misuse is that the person concerned has legitimate access to IT 
resources of the target organisation. Again it may not be system vulnerabilities that are 
exploited, but exploitation of the business processes and management loopholes in the IT 
environment. Therefore, knowledge of the business hierarchy, the segregation of duties and 
responsibilities of the users are important in monitoring insiders, as this type information can 
give an idea of who needs to be monitored closely. However, one advantage insider misuse 
monitoring has over outsider attack detection is that the insiders can be profiled not only 
based on their IT usage behaviour, but also their personality traits, job positions, 
responsibilities, knowledge of the system and understanding of the business processes. Based 
on this information, analysis may be made to calculate the possibility of misuse by certain 
users. Knowledge of job positions and segregation of duties are important as the opportunity 
for misuse arises when the individual is in a position of trust and the controls are weak. There 
are also prediction theories on this issue, such as privileged users who know more about the 
system are more likely to misuse (Magklaras and Fumell 2002). Privileged users are in better 
position to misuse and evade detection for a longer period, though it cannot be concluded that 
the majority of the privileged users would misuse the systems, actions by privileged users 
should be closely monitored as even the innocent errors may have serious consequences. 
Indeed, the opportunity for fraud often begins when a user realises that an innocent error has 
passed unnoticed, thus exposing a weakness in the internal controls (Coderre 1999). The 
same principle applies to insider misuse in general, and it occurs "when a ready mind meets 
an opportunity'* (Tuglular 2000). However, having privileges and being in a position of trust 
is not enough to speculate misuse, a generic insider threat model referred to as "CMO" 
postulates that in order to misuse a computer system, the perpetrator must have: the 
Capability to misuse. Motive to do so and the Opportunity to launch the attack. Therefore, the 
user must have the technical ability, understanding of business processes, be in the position of 
trust to launch the attack and finally the motivation to do so. This requirements specification 
can be helpftil in predicting the potential for insider misuse. Users can then be classified on 
their technical ability, length of time in the position, and their duties. Finally, i f reasonable 
explanation can be provided on why the user would be motivated to misuse the system, then 
it would give a reason for closer monitoring of the concemed user. 
5. Conclusions 
Existing data collection and analysis technologies used by traditional IDSs can be used to 
monitor certain types of insider misuse. However, many insider misuses do not exhibit the 
same attack patterns as external attacks. Various types of insider misuse can manifest 
themselves on different levels of a system and it is important that the data is collected at the 
relevant level. While network-level data collection can help monitor insider abuse of net-
usage, system-level data collection can help monitor data-theft, sabotage and use of 
unauthorised software. However, fraud may only be detected at the application level with the 
help of domain knowledge. Data collection at the three levels of the system is only the first 
part of the data gathering process. Additional knowledge of the users, organisation's 
management hierarchy, business processes and job responsibilities are equally important in 
monitoring insider misuse. The authors' future research will focus on the development of a 
misfeasor monitoring system that utilizes the data collection techniques and user profiling 
strategies discussed in this paper. 
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Abstract 
Although the problem of insider misuse of IT systems is frequently recognised in the 
results of computer security surveys, it is less widely accounted for in organisational 
security practices and available countermeasures. Indeed, the opportunities for insider 
misuse, by perpetrators with legitimately assigned privileges, are often overlooked 
until an incident occurs. A possible reason for this is that the problem receives 
relatively little attention in the commonly recognised classifications o f IT-related 
attackers and intrusions, with most focusing upon attacks and methods involving 
some form of system penetration and/or unauthorised access. This paper examines 
the potential forms of insider misuse in more detail, classifying them according to the 
level within in a target system at which the incidents could be detected. It is 
considered that such an approach could provide a relevant foundation in terms of 
subsequent approaches to automate insider misuse detection methods. 
Introduction 
Frequent headlines reporting hacker break-ins to computer networks and fast 
spreading computer viruses have steadily increased public awareness o f the threats 
posed to information security. However, extemal hackers and malicious software are 
far from being the only threats to the security of an organisation. Survey results 
consistently show that insiders are very often the cause o f the most significant and 
costly security incidents, and a significant proportion of what is commonly classed as 
cybercrime can be attributed to them. From the organisation's point of view, insiders 
can be employees, part-time employees, consultants, contractors and employees of 
partner firms. From the system's perspective, insiders are users with a valid login 
account to access the resources it manages. In 2002 Information Security magazine 
survey, 23% of respondents rated authorized users as their most important problem, 
while 11% reported unauthorized users as their most important problem [Briney and 
Prince 2002]. Similarly, results from the Department of Trade & Industry's 
Information Security Breaches Survey 2002 revealed that 34% of businesses 
considered their worst security incident to have been caused by an insider [DTI 2002]. 
Indeed, the fact that insiders are already within the organisation often puts them in an 
ideal position to misuse a system i f they are inclined to do so. The insider abuse can 
be more damaging than many outsider attacks, since the perpetrators have a good idea 
o f what is sensitive and valuable within the company. Knowing where these resources 
are stored, and what security mechanisms are used to protect them, also helps insiders 
in circumventing controls and evading detection [Einwechter 2002]. As such, it is 
essential for organisations to be cognisant of the threat, and for mechanisms to be 
available to facilitate detection of these incidents, as well as those that come from the 
outside. 
This paper considers how insider misuse incidents may be classified, giving particular 
attention to the points in the system at which different forms of misuse would be 
discemable. The discussion begins with a brief overview of existing approaches to 
classifying incidents and abusers, some of which already pay specific attention to the 
role of insiders. From this, the paper proceeds to propose a detection-oriented 
approach to classification, and discusses examples of the different forms o f insider-
sourced incident that would be detectable at network, operating system, application 
and data levels within the system. 
A review of current intrusion taxonomies 
In order to be able to focus on the misuses that may be committed by insiders of an 
organisation, it is important to understand the type and nature of all kinds o f misuses. 
A number of previous investigations have therefore attempted to classify system 
attacks and abusers, in order to aid subsequent analysis. Some of these relevant works 
are summarised in the sections that follow, along with brief commentary in relation to 
their suitability for classifying incidents relating to insider misuse. 
• Cheswick-Bellovin Classification. Cheswick and Bellovin have classified 
attacks into seven categories listed in the Table I , which is drawn upon their 
work on firewalls [Cheswick and Bellovin 1994]. 
1. Stealing passwords - methods used to obtain other users' passwords 
2. Social engineering - talking one's way into gaining information that one 
should not have 
3. Bugs and Backdoors - taking advantage of systems that do not meet 
security specification, or replacing software with compromised versions 
4. Authentication failures — defeating authentication mechanisms 
5. Protocol failures - exploiting protocols that are improperly designed or 
implemented 
6. Information leakage - utilising systems such as finger or the DNS to 
obtain information that is necessary for system administration and proper 
operation of the network, and abusing it 
7. Denial-of-service - attempts to deny other users from being able to 
utilise systems and services 
Table 1: Cheswick & Bellovin's seven categories of attacks 
Although, this approach gives an overview of the attacks and classifies the 
main categories of attacks, it is too general and does not give an insight to the 
characteristics of attacks. 
SRI Neumann-Parker Taxonomy. The Neumann-Parker taxonomy is based 
on incidents reported over 20 years [Neumann and Parker 1989]. It classifies 
intrusions into nine categories, which describe the nature of the attacks. Table 
2 summarises the overall scheme of the taxonomy. 
NPI External Misuse Non-technical, physically separate 
intrusions 
NP2 Hardware Misuse Passive or active hardware security 
problems 
NP3 Masquerading Spoofs and identity changes 
NP4 Subsequent Misuse Setting up intrusions via plants, bugs 
NP5 Control Bypass Going around authorised 
protection/controls 
NP6 Active Resource Misuse Unauthorised modification of resources 
NP7 Passive Resource Misuse Unauthorised reading of resources 
NP8 Misuse Via Inaction Neglect or failure to protect a resource 
NP9 Indirect Aid Planning tools for misuse 
Table 2: SRI Neumann-Parker Taxonomy 
• Lindqvist-Jonsson Taxonomy. The results gathered from laboratory 
experiments have indicated the need for further subdivision o f Neumann-
Parker taxonomy. This scheme is an extension of Neumann-Parker taxonomy. 
In this taxonomy the security incidents are viewed from the perspective of the 
system owner, and categories NP5, NP6, and NP7 of Neumann-Parker 
taxonomy are ftirther classified [Lindqvist and Jonsson 1997]. 
Extended NP5 Control 
Bypass 
Password attacks, spoofing privileged 
programs, utilising weak authentication 
Extended NP6 Active 
Resource Misuse 
Exploitation of write permissions, resource 
exhaustion 
Extended NP7 Passive 
Resource Misuse 
Manual browsing, automated browsing 
Table 3: Lindqvist-Jonsson extension of SRI Neumann-Parker Taxonomy 
Although (extended) NP6 and NP7 above do at least recognise the misuse issue, the 
rest represent the attack methods employed by outsiders, or insiders who utilises the 
same methods. In addition, the classification of attacks is based on the misuse 
techniques employed and the consequences o f it, and it is not intended for monitoring 
purposes. However, some other works can also be identified that contain elements 
more specifically related to insider misuse. 
Anderson's Taxonomy. Anderson's early work in this domain classifies 
system abusers into External Penetrators, Internal Peneirators, and Misfeasors, 
as shown in Table 4 [Anderson 1980]. 
Abuser Type Description 
External 
Penetrators 




Authorised users of the system who access data, 
resources or programs to which they are not entitled. 
Sub-categorised into : 
• Masqueraders Users who operate under the 
identity of another user. 
• Clandestine users Users who evade access controls 
and auditing. 
Misfeasors Users who are authorised to use the system and resources 
accessed, but misuse their privileges. 
Table 4 : Categories of system abuser 
Although very useful at a broad conceptual level, the classification does not 
provide any significant assistance in terms o f incident detection, with all 
insider misuse related incidents being grouped under the single 'misfeasor' 
heading. 
• Tuglular's Taxonomy. This is the first comprehensive taxonomy o f 
misfeasor incidents [Tuglular 2000]. The taxonomy classifies computer 
misuse incident in three dimensions: incidents, response and consequences. 
The Incidents dimension is further classified into target, subject, method, 
place, and time sub-dimensions. The Response dimension is divided into 
recognition, trace, indication, and suspect. The Consequences dimension 
includes disruption, loss, effect, violation, misuse type, misuse act, and result. 
The sub-dimensions branches into new branches of sub-dimensions and so on 
until it cannot be further classified. These dimension and sub-dimensions of 
the scheme are used to characterise each misuse incident. However, the entire 
taxonomy is orientated towards systematic data collection of insider incidents 
to provide evidence and incident response. 
• Magklaras-Furnell's Insider Threat Prediction Model 
This model is human centric, and the authors argue that all actions that 
constitute IT misuse lead back to human factors. The fundamental aspect for 
the taxonomy is classifying people in three basic dimensions: system role, 
reason of misuse and system consequences [Magklaras and Fumell 2002]. 
However, while this scheme is intended to assist threat prediction, it is not 
suitable for the detection of insider misuse. 
None of the previously mentioned taxonomies are oriented towards detection of 
insider IT misuse, in terms of considering how we would approach the task of 
monitoring activities to determine where problems may be apparent. A potential 
approach to this issue is considered in the remainder of the paper. 
A detection-oriented approach to classification 
In determining a means to link classification to the method of detection, it is 
considered appropriate to classify insider misuses based on the level of the system at 
which they might be detected. The basis for this is that different types o f misuses 
manifest themselves at varying levels of the system (e.g. some may be apparent at the 
network level, whereas others are most visible at higher levels, such as the operating 
system or application levels). 
With this form of classification in mind, the concept can be illustrated using a variety 
o f recognised insider misuse activities, and then considering the different levels at 
which they may be detected. An overall classification is presented in Table 5, and 
then examples o f the incidents concerned are considered in the sub-sections that 
follow. These consider what could be monitored, and how this could be used to 
detect, control and restrict misuse-related behaviour. 
Misuse Monitoring Level Attrlbute(s) to monitor 
Illegal content Network Packet Content 
Excessive/anomalous usage Network Bandwidth Usage 
Resource exhaustion Network Bandwidth Usage 
Playing Network Games Network Bandwidth Usage 
Illegal software distribution Network Bandwidth Usage 
Access to isolated subnets 
and machines Network IP Address 
Access from unauthorised 
machines Network IP Address 
Access to prohibited content Network URL 
Use of web-based email Network URL 
Recreational surfing Network URL 
Instant Messenger Network Service Usage 
Unauthorised network 
services Network Service Usage 
File Sharing Network. O S Service/Bandwidth Usage, File Attributes 
Web Hosting Network Service/Bandwidth Usage 
Resource exhaustion O S C P U , Memory, Disk Usage 
Storage of Image and 
Multimedia files O S File Extensions 
Anomalous Command 
usage O S Command Usage 
Anomalous Application 
usage O S Application Usage 
Information Disclosure O S File (read) 
Breach of Privacy O S File (read) 
Data theft O S File (read, copy) 
Alteration of Data Files O S File (write) 
Alteration of System Files O S File (write) 
Hardware Installation O S File (create, write) configuration files 
Software Installation O S File (execute) unauthorised program 
Illegal program execution O S File (execute) unauthorised program 
Sabotage O S File (write, delete) 
System Calls, (File, Memory) Access, I/O 
Privileged Program Exploits O S Usage 
Data Hiding O S Input Files to Programs 
Encryption O S Input Files to Programs 
Program Exploitation Application User (Input, Interaction) 
Alteration of Input Application Function Usage 
Function Usage Application Quereis, API Calls. Windows Messages 
Anomalous Database 
Access Application User Queries 
Batch Numbers, Date, Time, Strings, 
Inconsistent Data (Fraud) Data Numbers 
Batch Number, Uniquely Identifiable 
Duplicate Entries (Fraud) Data Entities, etc. 
Number of Employees, Bonuses, Extratime 
Maximum Value Data work, etc. 
Minimum Value Data Hourly pay rate, Work hours, etc. 
Table 5: Insider-Oriented Misuse Classification 
Network-level misuses 
Given that a great deal of misfeasor activity may relate to the use of network services, 
several type of misuse would be detectable by monitoring by monitoring activity at 
the network traffic level. From a practical perspective, this has the advantage that 
there is no specific necessity to install monitoring / data collection agents on 
individual end-user systems. Examples of the misuses that could be identified are 
discussed below. 
• Access of prohibited content: User access of prohibited content on the web 
may be monitored through logging and examination of web addresses 
accessed. Accessed web addresses may be checked against a database o f 
websites containing inappropriate content, such as pornographic material. 
Another approach would be to create a database of websites that the 
employees may access to perform their day-to-day tasks, then user accessed 
websites can be compared against the entries. It is not necessary to block the 
access to the websites that are not in the database; therefore access is not 
restricted, but monitored. The latter approach is more desirable i f the 
organisations want to discourage recreational surfing. 
• Downloading inappropriate material: File extensions of the users' network 
download can be monitored. For example, a user downloading files with 
image extensions may be downloading pornographic material. Other file 
extensions that should be monitored include ".mpeg'\ ".avi'\ ".mp3", and 
".zip" files. Ideally, download rights should be limited to a few users as any 
type of downloaded material may introduce viruses into the organisation's 
networked systems. Downloading o f large files can also consume valuable 
bandwidth and delay legitimate work. 
• Use of web-based email: Many organisations disapprove the use o f web-based 
email, because of the difficukies in monitoring usage. Employees may be 
wasting work hours by sending personal emails through the use o f web-based 
email, especially when the users' email accounts in the organisation are being 
monitored for usage. User accessed web addresses may be checked against a 
database of known web-based email sites. 
• Online shopping: Users may be wasting valuable work hours by shopping 
online. User accessed websites may be checked against a database of online 
shopping websites. 
• Spamming: Users sending more than normal amount of emails may be 
spamming using company computers. On the other hand, the user's email 
client might be infected with a worm that mails itself to everyone in the user's 
contact list. Whatever the case, a closer examination is required, when 
exceeding number of emails are sent from users. 
• Using chat programs: Employee utilisation of chat programs such as IRC, 
ICQ, and instant messengers can affect the productivity of the users. Chat 
programs can also affect the security of the network as they introduce new 
services and those services may be exploited. Network services utilised by 
users can be monitored to look out for users using chat programs. 
• yideo Conferencing: Users may be video conferencing with friends or 
relatives using organisation's computing resources. Network service utilisation 
and bandwidth usage may be monitored to detect such abuse. 
• Playing network games: Employees may be playing games on the 
organisation's local area network. Such activity may consume precious 
bandwidth. This kind of activity may be monitored through looking out for 
users with exceedingly high bandwidth consumption. 
• Running servers: Users may be running personal web-servers from the 
company network. The motivation of such activity may be for financial gain 
or for mischievous purposes such as distribution o f illegal software. 
• Peer-peer file sharing: Users utilising file sharing programs may be 
downloading and sharing inappropriate materials with other internet users. 
Network service utilisation can be monitored to detect such abuses. 
• Access of isolated sub-networks: Users accessing sub-networks that are not 
related to their domain may be suspicious. For example, a software developer 
establishing a direct connection to the payroll sub-net may have undesirable 
intentions such as modifying the payroll database to raise one's own wages. 
Cross network connections may be monitored to detect the access o f isolated 
networks. 
Having stated the possible monitoring opportunities for insider misuse at the network 
level, we should consider the following statement by Schultz [2002], "Insiders do not 
generally demonstrate the same attack signatures as external attackers". Indeed, 
insiders may already have user accounts to access the systems concerned and in most 
cases that also means physical access. Therefore, there might not be a need to exploit 
the network-level services or protocols in order to gain access. Insiders are also wary 
of setting o f f alarms in the process o f misuse, and they are more likely to abuse their 
existing privileges than to exploit remote vulnerabilities. This leads us to the need for 
monitoring at the system level. 
System-Level misuses 
In contrast to detecting network-level incidents, monitoring at the system level 
necessitates that monitoring activity be conducted upon individual host systems (i.e. 
some form of data collection agent would need to be present on the user system). I f 
such monitoring is available, then the following list constitutes some examples of the 
types of incident that could be identified. 
• Storing inappropriate materials: Users may be storing inappropriate materials 
on organisation's computers. For example, users may be storing MP3s, 
movies, illegal software, and pornographic materials. Users' home directories 
may be scanned to detect files with certain extensions, such as "jpeg" to 
detect the content stored. For example a user having a large number o f 
image/media files may be storing inappropriate materials on the computer. 
User disk usage may also be monitored for excessive usage. Monitoring 
excessive disk usage may sometimes lead to the detection o f illegal software 
being stored on company computers. 
• Use of data-hiding programs: Users may be utilising data-hiding programs, 
such as steganographic software to hide inappropriate material. Such programs 
may also be used to disguise proprietary and confidential information before 
they can be sent out of the organisation. Programs that take file(s) as inputs 
and produce file(s) outputs should be examined to make sure they are not data-
hiding programs, such as encryption and steganographic software. 
• Use of arbitrary programs: Users may run arbitrary programs to access data. 
Sometimes when data is accessed through the use of arbitrary programs, 
application level access controls and auditing may be bypassed. Program 
executions may be checked against a database of authorised programs. This 
would require a database of authorised programs along with file check sums to 
guarantee integrity of the program being executed. 
• Modifying system configuration: Users may be modifying system 
configuration files, which may affect the way the system and programs 
behave; such modifications are undesirable as the system may become 
insecure as a consequence. Monitoring access to vital system and application 
configuration files can lead to the detection of such abuse. This would require 
a database of critical configuration files and their check sums. 
• Adding unauthorised hardware: Adding additional hardware, such as modems 
can affect the systems' security. For example, the user's communications 
through the modem wil l not be picked up by network intrusion detection 
systems, and the user may be sending confidential information out of the 
organisation. Addition of unauthorised hardware can be detected by 
monitoring system settings and configurations. 
• Output redirection: Output from applications may be redirected to undesired 
destinations (files, networks, or machines). The output from certain 
applications may contain confidential information, which should only be sent 
to appropriate destinations. For example, backup process sending the backup 
data to a different machine than usual. In this example, the backup operator 
may be attempting to get proprietary information out o f the company. Output 
destinations of applications processing important information can be profiled 
to detect anomalous output destinations. 
Alteration of audit data: Users may be altering audit and system accounting 
file to cover up traces of system abuse. Log files and audit trails should not be 
modified even by the system administrator, because they contain evidential 
information regarding system abuses. Modification of log files can be 
monitored to detect users destroying evidential information. 
Breach of Privacy. Users may be accessing other users' files. The perpetrator 
may be someone with high system privileges or configuration errors may have 
made the file world readable. This type of incidents can be detected by 
monitoring users browsing files/directories own by others. 
Batch Deletion: Users or processes deleting a large number o f files may 
sometimes represent sabotage of system or data. Therefore, users or processes 
deleting a batch of files can be monitored to detect possible sabotage of 
system and data. Managerial controls such as separation of duties should also 
be applied to deletion of files in work folders. For example, a user can be 
assigned the job of actually deleting the files, while users can mark files that 
should be deleted. 
Installation of unauthorised software: Every software program installed is a 
link in the security chain of the organisation. The newly installed program 
may introduce a new vulnerability through which the system may be 
exploited. The installed program may be a Trojan or viral infected software. In 
general software installation rights should be limited to a couple o f users and 
programs should be authorised before installed on organisation's systems. In 
order to accommodate this, a list of executable directories needs to be 
established, and only the authorised programs stored in these directories may 
be executed. A database of authorised programs with associated check sums is 
also required. With this approach, users executing unauthorised programs or 
executing programs from arbitrary directories, such as home or temporary 
directories can be detected. 
Copying software programs: Users may copy customised software programs 
used in organisation's computers. For example, users can copy executable 
files, shared library files, and registry entries of a proprietary program for 
malicious purposes. Users accessing executable files in "Read" mode can be 
monitored to detect copying of executable programs. 
Excessive Printing: Users may be abusing organisation's printer facilities, for 
personal use and private work. Excessive usage of print services may be 
monitored to detect this type of abuse. 
Input to progratns: Files containing confidential data may be passed to 
encryption/steganographic programs as input. Monitoring input to 
encryption/steganographic programs can detect users attempting to disguise 
information before sneaking it out of the organisation. This would require a 
list of encryption/steganographic programs installed on the system. Then the 
file inputs to such programs can be checked i f they are important confidential 
files. 
It is clear from the above that system-level monitoring gives the potential for a far 
wider range o f misuse activities to be identified. However, some types o f abuse wil l 
be distinguishable from normal activity only with the knowledge of application-level 
semantics, and consequently may not exhibit malicious behaviour at the system level. 
Therefore, to be fiilly comprehensive, some detection strategies will be necessary at 
the application and database levels. 
Application and data-level misuses 
Monitoring at this level must again be focused upon individual host systems, but now 
at a deeper level, collecting data from within individual applications that might attract 
misfeasor interest. The list below presents some examples of the general forms that 
misuse at this level might take. 
• Inappropriate inputs: Users may type in inappropriate inputs into the 
applications. Inappropriate inputs can cause the application to crash, behave in 
an unexpected manner, or result in compromised integrity of the data. Entering 
a different type/format of data to the type/format expected by the application 
can result in the application misbehaving and disintegration o f processed data. 
Entering a different range o f data can result in fraud. User input could be 
monitored at the interface level where the users interact with the application. 
In a client server environment, user inputs/request (server messages) may also 
be monitored at the server side. 
• Anomalous access of databases: Anomalous access of databases can result in 
disclosure of confidential information and fraud. Insiders may misuse 
databases containing medical records, criminal records, customer data, 
personal records, and statistical information relating to businesses. Query 
requests by users may be monitored to detect anomalous access of databases. 
• Function usage: Commercial off-the-shelf applications include many features 
some of which are not easily disabled, and usage of certain functions may 
result in disclosure of information or compromised data integrity. Monitoring 
of access to subroutines, ftinction calls, and API calls can detect user access o f 
features and application functions. 
Using the above data, it is possible to create profiles of the normal behaviour 
associated with a user or a user-class (with the latter being based upon the user's role 
within the organisation). The question of which is more effective requires more 
research and investigation. However, at the moment the authors conjecture that the 
class-based profiling has potential in misfeasor detection, as it is assumed that the 
users with the same responsibilities would exhibit similar, i f not identical, activities 
within the system. Their similarities should be clear in terms o f the applications 
frequently used and the actions performed within the application environment. 
Therefore, the individual profile of a misfeasor should be obvious when compared to 
the class-based profile the perpetrator belongs to. Another advantage o f class-based 
profile comparison is that when the users of a particular role are assigned special 
assignments, the sudden change of user profile may not be considered anomalous, i f 
the changes are similar for all users within the same role. Again this approach may 
also help monitor users who gradually train the system to accept anomalous behaviour 
as normal. 
For the purpose of monitoring misuse in database and transaction systems, it is 
conjectured that application level monitoring can provide most relevant data; because 
this is where the users directly interact with the application environment and the 
concerned data. Therefore the data collected here should reveal more about the user 
behaviour within the environment, and it gives a better understanding o f the user's 
intentions. Again, the user actions and input to the application is more meaningful 
when monitored at this level. However, these hypotheses need to be proven, and our 
future research will focus on this. The advantages of collecting data at this level are 
that the data is unencrypted and it gives an insight into how the application interprets 
the transaction. It also gives the opportunity to reconstruct the session by logging 
request-response transactions. The ability to reconstruct the session is very important 
as it allows the security personnel to investigate what actually happened to find out i f 
the actions were accidental or intentional. Session reconstruction also allows the 
characterisation of the particular misuse scenario, to automate future detection. The 
disadvantage of this approach is the potential effect on the performance of the 
application. I f implemented without care the collected data may also reveal 
confidential information and system vulnerabilities that can be used by misfeasors. It 
is also vital how the collection module is implemented. With some of the applications 
it may be sufficient just to monitor the data logged; however, with some applications 
it might be necessary to modify the code in order to get the desired data. For the latter 
approach, it needs to be identified where in the application the data collection function 
should be placed. Again this might vary from one application to another. Therefore 
more research needs to be carried out to identify the best manner in which the data 
can be collected at this level and how it can be transferred or stored safely for 
analysis. Although, potential occurrence of fraud may be detected by monitoring for 
violation of separation of duties, the actual occurrence o f fraud can only be detected 
by analysing the application data itself 
Conclusions 
Existing intrusion taxonomies mainly describe characteristics of various attacks, and 
not developed specifically for monitoring insider misuse. Anderson was the first 
person to classify different types of insiders who misuse the IT systems into, 
masqueraders, clandestine users, and misfeasors. However, these classifications only 
characterise the type of users and not the actual misuse or how they may be detected. 
Tuglular produced the first comprehensive taxonomy o f insider misuses. However, 
Tuglular's taxonomy is primarily aimed for systematic data collection of insider 
incidents to provide evidence and incident response. The authors have presented a 
classification o f insider IT misuses based upon the level(s) of the system each type of 
incident may be detected or monitored. Intemet abuse may be detected at the 
Network level, while data thefl, sabotage, resource exhaustion, process behaviour, and 
system modification may be detected at the OS level. Anomalous user interaction 
with the application, anomalous access of databases, and breach of separation of 
duties may be monitored at the application level. Although, potential occurrence of 
fraud may be detected at the application level by monitoring violation of separation of 
duties, the actual occurrence of fraud may only be detected by analysis of the data. 
The authors are using this work to contribute towards the realisation o f an active 
insider misuse monitoring system. An accompanying conceptual architecture has 
already been specified (Phyo and Furnell, 2004), and work is proceeding towards 
practical implementation and validation. 
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ABSTRACT 
Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems arc inefTective in 
detecting users who abuse their legitimate privileges at 
the application level, because they do not have the 
knowledge of application level semantics, required 
separation of duties, and normal working scope. This 
paper outlines a novel framework for solving the problem 
of insider misuse monitoring. The approach argues ihat 
users with similar roles and responsibilities will exhibit 
similar behaviour within the system, enabling any activity 
that deviates from the normal profile to be flagged for 
further examination. The system utilises established role 
management principles for defining user roles, and the 
relationships between them, and proposes a misuse 
monitoring agent that will police application-level 
activities for signs of unauthorised behaviour. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many security incidents involve legitimate users who 
misuse their existing privileges, such that they have the 
system rights to perform an action, but not the moral right 
to do so. Current FDSs focus upon detecting problems 
such as network penetrations, access violations and 
privilege escalations. These tools are currently geared 
towards detecting attacks by outsiders, as well as insiders 
who employ the same methods to mount an attack. 
However, insiders may not need to exploit the systems 
because they already have legitimate access to it, and 
many incidents involve insiders only abusing their 
existing privileges (Audit Commission 1990), due to lack 
of separation of duties and application level control. 
Additionally current IDSs do not have knowledge of the 
normal working scope of a user for a relevant position and 
the separation of duties that should be enforced. 
Therefore, there is a need to provide the detection system 
with knowledge of organisation hierarchy and role-
relationships in order to enable more effective monitoring. 
Role Based Access Controls ( R B A C ) (Ferraiolo and Kuhn 
1992, Sandhu et al. 1996) utilises knowledge of role-
hierarchy and role-relationship to make access decisions. 
This paper presents a novel framework that uses 
established role management principles used in R B A C to 
provide knowledge of organisation hierarchy and business 
process to the detection system. The next section briefly 
examines the nature of the insider misuse problem, 
leading into a discussion of the degree to which the 
detection strategies employed by traditional IDSs may be 
applicable. This section also introduces the potential for 
incorporating role based access controls, and the 
importance of role-relationship management. These ideas 
are then combined with the proposal for a novel 
framework for insider misuse detection. 
T H E P R O B L E M O F INSIDER I T MISUSE 
Insider misuse refers to users who have legitimate access 
to the IT systems and the data stored upon it, but abuse 
their privileges by using the resources in an inappropriate 
manner or for an unapproved purpose. Anderson (1980) 
classifies such users as 'misfcasors'. Computer crime 
surveys certainly suggest thai one's own staff arc a 
significant threat, with the results of recent surveys 
(Power 2002, Richardson 2003) by the Computer Security 
Institute ( C S I ) consistently suggesting that the dollar 
amount lost due to insider abuse is far greater than that of 
outsider attacks (e.g. the total losses over the last 6 years 
that were clearly attributable to outsiders were S46.5m, 
whereas the costs of insider misuse exceeded S220m). 
Opportunities for insider misuse are many and varied 
(Phyo and Fumell, 2004), it is possible that appropriate 
use of traditional access controls could be used to prevent 
some of them. However, these will not be sufficient for alt 
contexts (consider, for instance, the case in which the 
misfeasor has legitimate access to the payroll database, 
but modifies records to raise his own salary). One of the 
problems with insider abuse is that what users do with the 
system, or objects to which they are granted access rights, 
is neither monitored nor comprehensively logged most of 
the time. Different types of misuses can manifest 
themselves at varying levels of a system. Network access 
violations will show up at the network level, file access 
violations and application usage will be evident at the 
operating system (OS) level, whilst the user behaviour 
within the application environment will be most evident at 
the application level. Therefore it is important to collect 
the data for misfeasor analysis at the appropriate level in 
order to increase the relevance of the collected data. The 
previous payroll example epitomises the case where data 
collected at the application level would provide more 
information about the user's intentions, when compared 
with the data collected at either the network level or the 
OS level. 
Current IDSs are ineffective in delecting misuse of 
existing privileges. Access here might be just a simple 
read operation or modifying a database entry. Again, the 
users may access the resource in an unacceptable manner 
or for an unapproved purpose. Insider misuse is not only a 
technical problem, but also a managerial problem, 
because in some cases it is the improper segregation of 
duties that presented the opportunity to misuse (Audit 
Commission 1990). Therefore, in order to effectively 
monitor misfeasor activity, the monitoring system needs 
to have the knowledge of application level semantics, 
organization structure, separation of duties and user 
responsibilities. Coupled with this knowledge and 
monitoring at relevant levels of the system, a more 
effective system for delecting abuse of existing privileges 
may be designed. 
APPLYING ros T E C H N I Q U E S T O INSIDER 
MISUSE 
Traditional IDS employ two main strategies to identify 
attacks, namely misuse-based and anomaly-based 
detection (Amoroso 1999), and it is possible to sec how 
each of these could be applied lo the insider problem. 
• Misuse-based detection: This approach relies 
upon knowing or predicting the intrusion that the 
system is to detect. Intrusions are specified as 
attack signatures, which can then be matched to 
current activity using a rule-based approach. A 
similar approach could potentially be 
incorporated for misfeasor incidents, based upon 
those methods that employees have been known 
to exploit in the past, or those that can be 
anticipated ihey would attempt based upon the 
privileges and resources available to ihem. For 
example, at a conceptual level, one such misuse 
signature might relate to a user who is identified 
as attempting to modify a record about him/her 
in a database (e.g. the payroll example indicated 
earlier). The rule here is that no one should 
modify their own records without someone else's 
authorisation. The problem with applying 
misuse-based detection to insider misuse is that 
the possible misuse scenarios for insiders are 
wide ranging and could be extremely 
organisation-specific. 
• Anomaly-based detection: This approach relies 
upon watching out for things that do not look 
normal when compared lo typical user activities 
within the system. In standard IDS, the principle 
is that any event that appears abnormal might be 
indicative of a security breach having occurred 
or being in progress. The assessment of 
abnormality is based upon a comparison of 
current activity against a historical profile of 
behaviour that has been established over time. 
One advantage insider misuse detection system 
has over outsider attacks is that it is possible to 
characterise normal activities of insiders 
according to their job position, as users with the 
same responsibilities should exhibit similar 
activities within the system and application 
environment lo complete their daily tasks. The 
similarities may be profiled to represent normal 
behaviour for users with the same 
responsibilities, and dirfereni profiles for 
different job positions. I f the user's behaviour 
deviates from the normal profile that represents 
his position, the activity should be flagged as 
suspicious. For example, a user who accesses a 
critical information system far more frequently 
than the other users within the same role may be 
browsing the database for personal gain. 
Another problem associated in insider misuse detection is 
that current IDSs lack the necessary knowledge of 
business processes, organisation hierarchy, separation of 
duties, and the role of the users within the organisation 
structure. This knowledge needs lo be expressed in the 
form that is understandable to the IDS, if effective 
misfcasor monitoring is to take place. Role management 
principles specified by Gavrila (Gavrila, and Barkley 
1998) are utilised in Role-Based Access Control ( R B A C ) 
to support user role assignment, role relationships, 
constraints and assignable privileges. A role can be 
thought as a collection of operations required to complete 
the daily tasks of a user. In R B A C operations are 
associated with roles and the users are assigned to 
appropriate roles. This approach simplifies the task of 
assigning permissions to the user, as the roles for 
appropriate job functions arc created with the least 
privileges required to complete the relevant tasks and the 
users are assigned to the role that refiects their 
responsibilities. Users can be assigned from one role to 
another, or assigned multiple roles, and permissions can 
be assigned at role-!evel to affect all users associated with 
the role. The type of operations and objects that can be 
controlled by R B A C is dependant upon the environmeni 
and the level at which it has been implemented. For 
example, at the O S level, R B A C may be able to conu-ol 
read, write, and execute; within database management 
systems controlled operations may include insert, delete, 
append, and update; within transaction management 
systems, operations would take ihe form that exhibit all 
properties of a u^insaction. The term transaction here 
means a combination of operation and the data item 
affected by the operation. Therefore, a iransaciion can be 
thought of as an operation performed on a set of 
associated data items. The ability to control specific 
transactions, rather than restricting simple read and write 
operations arc very important in database environments. 
For example, a clerk may be able to initiate a transaction 
and the super\'isor may be able to correct the completed 
transactions, for which both users need read and write 
access to the same fields in the transaction file. However, 
the actual procedures for the operations and the values 
entered may be differeni Meanwhile, the clerk may not be 
allowed to correct the completed transactions and the 
supervisor may not be allowed to initiate the transactions. 
The problem is that determining whether the data has 
been modified in the authorised manner, for it can be as 
complex as the actual transaction that modified the data. 
Therefore, transactions need to be certified and classified 
before associating them with the roles. To characterise the 
required transactions for a role, duties and responsibilities 
of the users need to be specified first. 
In R B A C separation of duties can be applied by 
specifying mutually exclusive roles. In the R B A C 
framework administrators can regulate who can perform 
what actions, when, from where, in what order and 
sometimes under what circumstances. Access controls 
only allow or deny access to certain resources, however 
there is a need to monitor and analyse the user actions 
after the access has been gained and the operations had 
been carried out. In theory the idea of roles and role-
management principles can be applied to misfeasor 
monitoring. Instead of allowing or denying operations to 
be performed, common user operations can be associated 
with roles, and the users can be assigned to appropriate 
roles. If the user's operations deviate from the common 
profile, a thorough investigation can be carried out to 
clarify if the user has misused the system in an 
inappropriate manner or for unapproved purpose. 
environments by Chung et al (Chung et al. 1999). 
However, many of the insider misuse cases in Audit 
Commission (1990) surveys are a result of lack of 
separation of duties and application level consols. In 
order to be able to detect violation of separation of duties, 
the detection system needs to be provided with the 
knowledge of organisation hierarchy and relationships 
between roles. R B A C utilises role-relationship 
management principles to define role-hierarchy and 
separation of duties. The authors' proposed system aims 
to combine the ability of R B A C to provide knowledge of 
role-relationships with intrusion detection techniques to 
effectively delect users who abuse their existing 
privileges. Figure I presents ihe framework of the 
conceptual insider misuse detection system. Functional 
modules are explained in subsequent paragraphs. 
Management Functions 
All management functions, such as defining roles, 
characterisation of operations, association of operations to 
roles and user assignment to roles, are carried out from 
the Management Console. The working scope of a user is 
defined by the operations associated with the role(s) the 
user assumes. Once the separation of duties between roles 
has been defined, it is expressed in the Role-Relations 
Matrix, such as inheritance, staiic separation of duties, 
and dynamic separation of duties. Static separation of 
duties occurs at the role level by specifying mutually 
exclusive roles. When the two roles are in static 
separation of duties, a user may not be assigned both 
roles. Dynamic separation of duties occurs at the 
operations level and the conditions can be that operations 
within dynamically separated roles are; 
• Mutually excluded 
• Disallowed to execute concurrently 
• Disallowed to perform both operations on the 
same set of data 
iMISFEASOR MONITORING S Y S T E M : 
A R C H I T E C T U R A L CONSIDERATION 
It has been mentioned previously that anomaly deteclion 
is more suitable for insider misuse detection, because 
employees' normal behaviour can be profiled. For 
example, previous work in the D I D A F I T system (Low et 
al. 2002) has profiled database transactions by generating 
fingerprints for authorised S Q L queries, along with 
variables that the users should not change, ensuring that 
the queries are executed in the expected order and only on 
the restricted range of records. It is assumed that the users 
with the same responsibilities within the organisation will 
exhibit similar activities within the system, and their 
working-scopes may be established. The idea of 
establishing working-scopes for users with same 
responsibilities has been tested in relational database 
When the two roles are in dynamic separation of duties, 
the user may not execute the operations that are mutually 
exclusive or on the same set of data. The relationships 
expressed in the Role-Relations Matrix are checked 
against the rules specified by (Gavrila, and Barkley 1998) 
for consistency. 
Host 
This is where the actual profiling of user(s) and the 
detection process takes place. Characteristics of each 
operation are stored in the Operations DB along with an 
appropriate name for each operation. The characteristics 
are dependent upon which level of the system they are 
being profiled at. Characteristics of the operations may be 
in the form of file access, sequence of system calls, S Q L 
queries, API calls, User interactions, and Network access. 
Recording the characteristics of each operation is 
controlled from the Management Console. The profiling 
should be done at all three levels of the system namely: 
network, system, and application level. At the network 
level, roles should be profiled based on the essential 
access to subnets in order for the users of the role to 
complete their daily tasks. At the system level, roles 
should be profiled on the use of applications required to 
complete the tasks. It should also be established which 
machines the users of the role can/cannot perform the task 
from. Again, at the system level, roles should be profiled 
based on what files need to be accessed in order to 
complete the task, along with the access mode and the 
application/process from which the files are accessed. 
Once the user has gained access to the file, and if the file 
is accessed from an application in which the file can be 
modified or manipulated (e.g. Databases), the application 
level monitoring should commence. At the database 
level, user queries and the associated values should be 
monitored. The problem is that determining whether the 
data has been modified in the authorised manner, for it 
can be as complex as the actual transaction that modified 
the data. Therefore, transactions need to be cenified and 
classified before associating them with the roles. The 
Detection Engine then checks the roles available to the 
active user, and next checks the RoIeOperations table for 
the names of the operations available to the user. After 
which the characteristics of the available operations from 
the Operations DB are compared to the current user 
actions. I f current user actions do not match the 
characteristics of operations available to the user, the 
administrator is alerted. This alert may indicate the user 
performing a totally new operation, or performing a valid 
operation in the Operation DB but is violating separation 
of duties because the operation is not listed under any 
roles the user may assume. 
The envisaged detection How is as follows: 
1. Detection Engine gets the name of the user from the 
Client. Looks for the roles the user's name is 
associated with, in the Role-Uscr table. 
2. After acquiring the list of roles for the user, the 
Detection Engine looks for the names of the 
operations associated with each role in the Operations 
DB. (Note: only names of the operations are 
associated with the Roles.) 
3. After acquiring the names of operations available to 
the user, the Detection Engine reads the characteristics 
of available operations from the Operations DB and 
they are compared against current user actions. 
4. If the current user action matches with the 
characteristics of operations available to the user, then 
the user is not in breach of static separation of duties. 
5. If OpA belongs to RoleA, OpB belongs to RoleB, and 
RoleA and RoleB are in dynamic separation of duties. 
Condition of the separation is checked to clarify 
whether the operations are: 
• mutually excluded 
• disallowed to execute concurrently 
• disallowed to perform both operations on the 
same set of data 
If the user violated the specified condition, the system 
security officer is alerted. In addition, the misuse rules 
employed in expert systems within traditional IDSs can 
also be included. These rules may then be associated with 
an operation, such as modifying the payroll database to 
increase one's own wages. In this case, the process is as 
follows: I f modification is performed on the payroll 
database, check that the employee ID of the user is not the 
same as that of the record being modified. 
Client 
This is where the actual data is collected and transferred 
to the Host for analysis. The Clients can be network 
server systems or end-user workstations. The nature of the 
data collected may vary depending on the type of the 
Client. For example mail logs can be collected from the 
mail server, user queries from the database server, and 
application logs from user workstations. The data to be 
collected is specified by the system administrator from the 
Management Console. The collected data can then be 
refined to a standard format by the Communicator module 
before sending the data to the Host, so that data from 
heterogeneous Client systems is in a standard format. The 
Client may also have a Responder module to respond to 
detected incidents, and the appropriate response for each 
incident can be specified from the Management Console. 
For example, when a misuse is detected, the Responder 
may be configured to terminate the user session, revoke 
privileges, deny further access, alcn the security officer, 
or terminate the anomalous process (Papadaki et al. 
2003). 
Implementation Issues 
In order to be able to implement the system successfully, 
separation of duties would first need to be defined at the 
organisation level. Before doing this, the responsibilities 
of the users need to be defined. Then it needs to be 
checked that the operations a user is allowed to perform 
would not lead to a successful misuse. All of these are 
more of a managerial (rather than technical) issue. 
However, these are not trivial and could require 
considerable amount of time and labour. Again, at a 
technical level, monitoring of user behaviour at 
application level may require modification of the software 
package if appropriate APIs are not included. 
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Fig. I . Conceptual Framework ofMisfeasor Monitoring System 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
Insiders pose a considerable threat and organisations need 
to give equal priority in delecting insider abuse as well as 
outsider attacks. Access controls only allow or deny 
access; however there is a need to monitor what the user 
does after gaining access to the system and objects. In 
order to efTectively monitor privilege abuse, IDS require 
the knowledge of organisation hierarchy, managerial 
controls, responsibilities and working scopes of each user. 
The methods employed in R B A C to express knowledge of 
roles, organisation hierarchy, and separation of duties can 
be coupled with intrusion detection techniques to detect 
users who abuse their existing privileges. This paper 
presented a framework for monitoring users who abuse 
iheir existing privileges. The authors' future research will 
focus on developing the proposed system and testing it 
against a variety of simulated insider misuses, such as 
data theft, fraud, net abuse, sabotage, and breach of 
privacy. 
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Abstract 
Although the problem of insider misuse of IT systems is frequently recognised in the results o f computer security 
surveys, it is less widely accounted for in organisational security practices and available countermeasures. The 
countermeasures available today are oriented towards prevention and detection of outsider attacks on the 
organisation's IT systems and services. This paper discusses the possibility of applying similar mechanisms and 
strategies towards monitoring of insider I T misuse. It also discusses the requirements that need to be satisfied 
before insider misuse monitoring can be put in to practice, and on the basis of the discussion, it is recommended 
that a misfeasor monitoring system should include features for monitoring file access through arbiu-ary 
applications, file replication, partial data replication, file transfer, file deletion, user management, 
settings/configuration management, database access, and Internet access. 
Keywords 
Intrusion, Detection, Misuse, Misfeasor 
1. Introduction 
Frequent headlines reporting hacker break-ins to computer networks and fast spreading 
computer viruses have steadily increased public awareness of the threats posed to information 
security. However, external hackers and malicious software are far from being the only threats 
to the security of an organisation's IT systems and valuable data. CSl/FBI survey results have 
consistently shown that a significant amount of financial loss can be attributed to insider IT 
misuse. 
Year System penetration 
by outsider 




1998 $1,637,000 $3,720,000 $50,565,000 
1999 $2,885,000 $7,576,000 $3,567,000 
2000 $7,104,000 $27,984,740 $22,554,500 
2001 $19,066,600 $35,001,650 $6,064,000 
2002 $13,055,000 $50,099,000 $4,503,000 
2003 $2,754,400 $11,767,200 $406,300 
2004 $901,500 $10,601,055 $4,278,205 
2005 $841,400 $6,856,450 $31,322,100 
2006 $758,000 $1,849,810 $10,617,000 
Total $49,002,900 $155,455,905 5133,877,105 
Table 1: Annual losses for selected incidents from C S l / F B I surveys 
The survey results of ICT Fraud and Abuse 2004 (Audit Commission, 2005) has also revealed 
that the majority of the perpetrators (over 80%) originated from inside the organisation, with 
operational staff 37%, administrative/clerical staff 31%, and managers 15%. 
From the organisation's point of view, insiders can be employees, part-time employees, 
consultants, contractors and employees of partner firms. From the IT system's perspective, 
insiders are users with a valid login account and have legitimate rights and privileges to 
access the resources it manages. Within the scope of this paper, the discussion concerns 
individuals who have legitimate access to the organisation's IT system and resources, but 
abuse their access rights. Anderson (Anderson, 1980) termed such users as misfeasors. The 
insider abuse can be more damaging than many outsider attacks, since the perpetrators have a 
good idea of what is valuable within the company. Kjiowing where these resources are stored, 
and what security mechanisms are used to protect them, also helps insiders in circumventing 
controls and evading detection (Einwechter, 2002). A survey commissioned by Microsoft has 
revealed that amongst the 2,226 UK. employees who responded, i f there was an opportunity 
54% would be willing to gain illegal access to sensitive information stored on their 
employer's IT systems, while 22% admitted to have already done so (Microsoft, 2006). 
This paper evaluates the applicability of existing security mechanisms towards prevention and 
detection of misfeasor activities. The discussion begins with the motivations involved in 
misfeasor activities, and associating the motivation with the type and nature o f the activities. 
It then proceeds to analysis of currently available Intrusion Detection Systems, how these 
tools function and their applicability within the context of misfeasor monitoring. The paper 
then discusses the requirements that need to be satisfied in order to enable effective 
monitoring of misfeasor activities in practice. 
2. Background 
2.1 The definition and the scope of the terms (Insider and Misuse) 
It has been stated that within the scope of this paper an insider is an individual with valid 
login account and have legitimate access to the system and its resources. Then, what is 
misuse, when the user accesses the system and the resources that he/she has legitimate system 
level access rights to? Within the scope of this paper, misuse can be defined as any activity 
that the user has legitimate system level rights to perform, however the activity may not be 
acceptable within the context of the application, organisation, moral conduct, or ethical 
conduct. The type of activities may vary, however, motivation behind misfeasor activities can 
be classified into three distinct categories: 
Vengeance: Former/disgruntled employees may be motivated to carry out 
damaging/disruptive or generally unethical activities upon organisation's IT systems 
and data. The activities motivated by vengeance may include denial of service attacks 
on company servers, or sabotage of organisation's IT systems and/or resources, and 
exposure of confidential information (Gaudin, 2000). For example, deletion of critical 
business databases, or configuring critical servers in such a way that it becomes 
vulnerable to attacks, becomes easily accessible to unauthorised users, or becomes 
inaccessible to authorised users. Another example is intentionally exposing 
confidential information so that it may damage the reputation of the organisation, or 
cause embarrassment to an employee/customer. Sometimes the activity may not be 
directed towards the organisation, but rather a colleague, or an acquaintance that 
happens to be one of the organisation's customers. However, the organisation may still 
be held liable for failing to protect the data. 
Financial gain: Activities motivated by financial gain may include providing 
proprietary or confidential information to unauthorised parties, and/or configuring the 
systems in such a way that unauthorised parties may gain access to proprietary and 
confidential information, in return for financial benefits. In addition, the misfeasors 
may also defraud the organisation and/or its customers for financial gain (Dhillon and 
Moores, 2001). 
Recreation & Curiosity: Activities include recreational web-surfing, downloading 
illegal software, perusing and writing personal emails, chatting through instant-
messengers. While performing these activities, users may be unable to carryout 
productive work. In addition, media downloaded from the Internet may be copyright 
protected, or contain inappropriate content such as pornography, which may damage 
the organisation's reputation and the organisation may also be held liable. Misfeasors 
may also access organisation's business databases for personal reasons, which may 
result in breach of privacy to an employee or a customer. 
In addition, accidental misuse may also occur as a result of negligence or users' lack o f IT 
security awareness (Furnell, 2006). 
Deriving from the analysis made previously, the activities that are legitimate in the system 
and network context, yet may be deemed unacceptable/inappropriate in the 
organisation/business and application context include: 
1. Internet access 
2. File access through arbitrary applications 
3. File replication (copy, paste, save as) 
4. Partial data replication (print screen, copy, paste) 
5. File/data transfer through communication applications 
6. Settings/configuration changes 
7. User management 
8. Database access 
Now, an evaluation needs to be made in order to determine whether current Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) can be employed to detect misfeasor activities. 
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
Intrusion detection systems are generally categorised based upon the data analysed in order to 
recognise an attack. 
Network IDS: analyse network packets, network protocols and network statistics in 
order to detect attempts to exploit network protocols and network applications. A 
successftil attack may result in legitimate users being unable to access organisation's 
network services, or the attacker may gain access to the machine on which the server 
application is run. 
Host IDS: analyse resource utilisation (CPU/memory/disk usage, number of files 
opened, number of system calls made), and behaviour of applications (system calls, 
file access) to detect attempts to exploit system/application \ailnerabilities. A 
successfiil attack may result in the attacker gaining access to the machine, or the 
attacker gaining higher privileges. 
Today, hybrid systems that analyse both network, and host data for detecting attacks are 
available. 
IDS can also be categorised based upon the detection strategy employed (Amoroso 1999). 
Misuse Detection: This approach relies upon knowing or predicting the intrusion 
scenario that the system is to detect. Intrusions are specified as attack signatures, 
which can then be matched to current activity using a rule-based approach. With this 
approach the detection system is only as good as the database of attack signatures, and 
may not be able to detect variations of an attack. The problem is that, misfeasor 
activities do not demonstrate the same characteristics as external penetration attacks 
(Schultz 2002). 
Anomaly Detection: This approach relies upon watching out for things that do not 
look normal when compared to typical user activity within the system. The assessment 
of abnormality is based upon a comparison of current activity against a historical 
profile of user (or system) behaviour that has been established over time. With this 
approach, variations of an attack or novel attacks may be detected. However, 
characterising normal behaviour is difficult and, deciding the variables to be involved 
for characterisation still requires insight knowledge of the system and the application 
environment. 
IDS may employ a variety of techniques, including expert systems, neural networks, and 
statistical analysis for detecting attacks. It is conjectured that existing techniques, and 
monitoring strategies may also be applied to detecting misfeasor activity. However, majority 
of currently available IDS are designed to detect network penetrations, and privilege 
escalation attacks. Misfeasors do not need to perform network penetration attacks, since 
misfeasors already have legitimate access to the network and systems. By definition, 
misfeasors do not perform privilege escalation attacks, and do not violate system level 
controls. However, misfeasor activities may be deemed unacceptable within the application, 
business, or organisation context. Therefore, any inherent ability to detect misfeasor activity 
by current IDS would be a coincidence rather than by design. The fact, that misfeasors do not 
violate system level and application level controls, makes it extremely difficult to identify 
misfeasor activity due to lack of reference data/information in order to conclude whether 
violation of (security or acceptable usage) policy has occurred. In addition some misuses may 
not be evident at network or host level alone, and misuse may only be recognised when 
analysed in the context of the application, business rules surrounding the operation, and 
within the context of the organisation. The correlation of network, host, application, 
contextual information and rules is needed for analysing the possible occurrence of misuse. 
Therefore, the data required for successftil detection of misfeasor activities need to be 
identified first. 
3. Relevant Data for Misfeasor Analysis 
Within the IT environment, users access and manipulate the data stored and managed by the 
computer system through the use of application programs. The entities involved in the data 
access are, the machines involved (server-client, peer-peer), the data, the users, and the 
application utilised. Therefore, information regarding these entities wil l certainly be relevant 
for misfeasor analysis. 
Machine Details: Files and databases are stored, processed, manipulated, managed, 
and transferred to and from computer systems. Although a user has legitimate access 
rights to the data, the machine utilised to access the data may not satisfy security 
requirements of the data. For example, a user who has access to the data transfers the 
file to an external machine. Although, the user at the receiving end might be also 
authorised to access the data, the machine utilised at the receiving end may not be 
regulated by organisation's security mechanisms. Therefore, security requirements of 
the system such as which users have access to the machine, which computers can 
access the file/database server, and other details such as location and physical security 
of each machine wil l be relevant for detecting misfeasor activities. 
File and Database Security Requirements: Data is stored within files and databases 
on computer systems. Since the aim is to ensure the security of the data, it is essential 
that the security requirements of the file/databases are provided to the monitoring 
system for reference. Access control mechanism determines only whether the user can 
read the data, and edit or delete the data (Escamilla 1998). In order to detect data 
theft/leakage, information regarding whether partial/whole replication of data is 
acceptable, and whether the data can be saved to a removable media need to be 
defined. It is more difficult to manage the security o f multiple copies of confidential 
data on various machines. Therefore, it is also important to keep track of how many o f 
copies o f a critical file exist, and where they are located. Keeping track of critical files 
will also become useful when recovering data i f it is deleted on certain machines, or 
verifying whether it is the only copy prior to deletion. Since the business managers 
have better knowledge of the sensitivity, and the users who needs access to the data 
and the validity of access, the business managers should be given the responsibility of 
defining the security requirements of the data, instead of the system administrator who 
may not have equal knowledge of the contents and security requirements of the 
file/data in the business context. In addition, i f an event does not satisfy the security 
requirements of the data, the business manager should be alerted. Therefore, the 
information regarding who the file custodian is wi l l also be useful for alerting the right 
personnel in the event of suspicious activity. It may not be practical to monitor all data 
files as a computer system may also contain system files and user's personal files, and 
thus files regarded as intellectual property o f the organisation and files that require 
misfeasor monitoring should be listed and tagged with security policy. 
User Details: A misfeasor that has access to the file may transfer the file to someone 
who is not authorised access. The file may be transferred through email, messengers, 
or some other programs with communication capability. Therefore, contact addresses 
of organisation's employees, customers, or contractors should be provided to the 
monitoring system to determine misfeasor activity. Information regarding, the user's 
responsibilities and role within the organisation wil l also be useful when alerting the 
system administrator or file custodian, so that the file custodian wi l l be able to make 
better decision regarding the validity of the activity within the business context. 
Application function and capabilities: The application utilised determine what the 
user can do with the system or data accessed. Therefore, data regarding user activity 
within the application environment will be relevant for detecting misuse. However, it 
may not be practical to monitor all applications and application functions. 
Applications that require monitoring can be divided into two categories based on the 
data access capabilities. 
Applications with access to file or databases: Applications with direct access 
to file and databases include file managers, word processors, document 
readers, image editors, media players and database programs. File managers do 
not have direct access to the contents of the file, but provide capability to 
replicate, move, and delete the file. User activities regarding file replication, 
relocation, and deletion needs to be monitored to detect misuse. Document 
readers and processors have direct access to the entire contents of the file, and 
also provide capability to edit, and replicate partial or entire contents of the 
file. It may not be possible to automate the integrity checking of the contents 
of documents, i f various users may be allowed to update the document, 
because the structure of the data within the documents may vary with each 
update. Database programs access small part of the file; however a single 
record may contain critical information regarding the organisation, a business 
transaction, an employee, or a customer. User access to each record, for both 
viewing and updating needs to be verified. I f possible, access to each record 
should be validated, and integrity of the record should be verified after each 
update. To be able to automate this validation and verification process, 
information for reference needs to be provided to the monitoring system. 
Application with no access to file or databases: The applications that do not 
have direct access to the contents of the file yet may affect the security of the 
system and data include security applications, configuration managers, user 
management applications, and applications with communication capability. 
Security applications can be used to harden or weaken the security of a system 
or an application, which may result in unauthorised users gaining access or 
authorised users being unable to access. Therefore, changes to security settings 
need to be verified against security requirements of the system or application 
as defined in the policy. Proper fiinctionality of a system or an application 
depends on the correct configuration, and thus changes to configuration need 
to be verified against an appropriate reference. Adding users to a system or a 
role, in effect allows the user to gain access to the system or the files accessible 
for the assigned role, therefore system administrators and role managers should 
be asked to authorise the addition of a user. Applications with communication 
capabilities, such as email and messenger may be used to transfer files, or 
partial data. In order to detect misuse, the monitoring system needs to 
determine whether the server mediating the communication is managed by the 
organisation, whether the recipient is authorised to access the file, and whether 
the machine utilised by the recipient satisfy security requirements for accessing 
the file transferred. Therefore, the details o f the file, the sender, the server, the 
recipient, and the machines utilised for communication is required for analysis 
of possible misfeasor activity. 
Before misfeasor monitoring can be put in to practice, the applications need to provide 
the monitoring system with the information described previously in order to enable 
misfeasor activity detection. 
Contextual rules related to operations: Sometimes, certain conditions may need to 
be satisfied for an operation to be legitimate within the application environment and 
business context. Required conditions may vary from one business to another, and one 
operation to the next. When an operation does not conform to the required conditions, 
the activity may result in fraud/misuse. There may be pre-requisite conditions to be 
satisfied. For example, when a user account is created, the contextual may require that 
the user of the account exists in the human resource database as an employee o f the 
organisation. There may be post-requisite conditions to be satisfied. For example, 
when a user is added to a role, the policy may state that the role manager must verify 
the addition of the user to the role, and the time period for verification to be made may 
also be defined. Within certain applications, other contextual rules may exist. For 
example, in some businesses i f the payment is made within fifteen days of a purchase, 
then the customer is entitled to a prompt payment discount. Depending upon whether 
the organisation is the customer or the supplier, there may be opportunities for 
employees to commit fraud in such cases, and the organisation and the 
supplier/customer may be defrauded. For the monitoring system to be able to detect, 
misfeasor activity, the system needs to be provided with the knowledge of contextual 
rules relating to the operation. For certain operations, the value entered by the user 
may determine whether/when the verification of the operation takes place. For 
example, the loss/profit calculation date may determine when the loss/profit 
calculation for a business takes place and phoney profits may be generated or 
verification of losses may be delayed. 
Questions have been raised as to why the aforementioned contextual rules are not used 
as access control for operations, rather than monitoring. The reasons for this is that in 
some cases the application developers could not have foreseen the contextual 
requirements, and it is not practical to hard-code contextual rules within the 
application because the rules may not apply to all business transactions, and the rules 
may change within a short period as the business practice evolves in order to be 
competitive. 
4. A Generic Misfeasor Monitoring Tool 
Based upon the requirements noted previously, a generic misfeasor-monitoring tool may be 
designed. Deriving from the analysis made previously, the user activities that should be 
monitored are database access, data replication, data transfer through communication 
programs, user management, and settings/configuration management of system and 
applications. The information required to determine possible misuse, concerning the described 
activities will be discussed in detail. 
File Access: The application utilised by the user to access the file determine what the 
user can do with the file accessed. In addition, i f an arbitrary application is utilised, the 
user may by pass application level controls embedded within the normal application. 
Therefore, the monitoring system should be able to determine whether the application 
utilised is the normal application for accessing the file concerned. For the monitoring 
system to be able to determine the access o f file through arbitrary application, the 
system needs to be provided with the information regarding the application normally 
used for accessing the file, and the application utilised by each user for accessing the 
file. Thus each file listed for misfeasor monitoring needs to be tagged with the 
identifier of the application normally used for access, so that the monitoring system 
can compare it against the application utilised by the user for accessing the file, in 
order to determine possible occurrence of misfeasor activity. 
File replication: When a user copies and pastes a file, the monitoring system needs to 
determine whether the source file is listed for misfeasor monitoring. I f the source file 
is listed then, the system needs to determine whether replicating the entire file is 
acceptable, or saving the file to a removable disk is acceptable. I f replicating the entire 
file, and/or saving the file to a removable disk are acceptable then no further analysis 
needs to be made and no one needs to be alerted of the activity. However, i f 
replicating the entire file is not acceptable, then the monitoring system needs to alert 
file custodian of the activity with the details. The details of the event that should be 
provided are the source file ID, the machine on which the copy is saved, the exact file 
path of the copy, and the user who performed the activity. Thus each file listed for 
misfeasor monitoring needs to be tagged with the policy regarding whether replicating 
to removable disk is acceptable, whether replicating the file is acceptable, and who 
should be alerted in the event of policy violation. 
Partial data replication: When a user performs Print Screen, Cut, or Copy activity 
when a file is accessed, the monitoring system needs to determine whether the source 
file ft-om which the data is copied has been listed for misfeasor monitoring. I f the 
source file is listed, then the clipboard data needs to be associated with the source file 
ID. When the user Paste/Inserts the clipboard data, then the file custodian should be 
alerted the details of the event. The details of the event include source file ID, the user 
responsible for the activity, file path of the document into which the copied data is 
pasted, the machine on which the file is saved. The files listed for misfeasor 
monitoring needs to be tagged with the policy whether partial replication of the 
contents is acceptable. 
File transfer: When a user transfers a file, the monitoring system first needs to 
determine whether the file is listed for monitoring, and whether saving the file to a 
removable disk is acceptable. I f the file is listed and saving the file to a removable disk 
is not acceptable then the monitoring system needs to determine whether the server 
mediating the transfer is managed by the organisation, i.e. i f it is an intemal server. I f 
it is not an internal server then, the file custodian and the file server administrator 
should be alerted of the activity. I f the server is intemal then, the monitoring system 
needs to determine whether the recipient is also an insider. I f the file is transferred 
through the email application, the recipient's email should be checked against 
employee email address list to determine whether the recipient is an insider. I f the 
recipient is not an insider then the file custodian should be alerted. I f the recipient is an 
insider then, the monitoring system needs to determine whether the recipient is 
authorised to access the file. I f the recipient is not authorised to access the source file 
then, the file custodian should be alerted with the details. I f the recipient is authorised 
to access the source file then, the monitoring system needs to determine whether the 
machine utilised by the recipient to retrieve the file satisfy security requirements, i.e. 
whether the machine is authorised to access the File server where the source file is 
located on. I f the machine utilised by the recipient to retrieve the file is not authorised 
to access the file server of the source file then the system administrator of the file 
ser\'er and file custodian should be alerted of the activity along with the details. 
The information needed for monitoring this activity is, whether replication of the file 
and saving the file to removable disk is acceptable. The monitoring system also needs 
to be provided with the list o f internal machines for it to determine whether the 
communication server involved is managed by the organisation. The monitoring 
system then needs the username/addresses of insiders, so that it can determine whether 
the recipient's username/address is that of an insider's. The monitoring system then 
needs to be provided with the role(s) and users allowed to access the file, so that it can 
determine whether the recipient is authorised to access the file transferred. The 
monitoring system then needs to determine whether the machine utilised by the 
recipient for retrieving the file is an internal or external machine. The monitoring 
system also needs the knowledge of which machines are allowed to access the file 
server the file originated from, so that it can determine whether the machine utilised 
by the recipient is authorised to access the file server i.e. acceptable to access the 
contents of the file server. 
File Deletion: When a file is to be deleted, the monitoring system should be able to 
determine whether it is the only copy that exists within the organisation's IT systems. 
The list of files that need to be monitored is required, and information regarding how 
many copies of each file exist and where each file is stored, and who is responsible for 
the security and availability o f the file is needed in order to determine possible 
sabotage, and to inform the right personnel. 
User management: When an account is created or a user is added, the added user wil l 
gain access to the system, application, file, or records depending upon the list the user 
has bee added to. I f the user is added to the user-list of a server then the user will gain 
access to the server, i f the user is added to a role then the user wil l gain access to the 
resources given access to the role members. Therefore, the List Custodian should be 
informed of the addition of users to the list. Thus, the monitoring system first needs to 
identify to which list the user have been added. Once it has been identified then the 
custodian of the list should be alerted for verification. 
Settings/configuration management: Changing the settings of a system/application 
may also be a stepping-stone towards a misfeasor activity. When a system is first set 
up, the required settings for both security and functionality should be defined. When a 
user activity affects settings/configurations, then the monitoring system needs to 
determine whether current/attempted settings of the system/application satisfy the 
required settings defined when it was first set up. I f the current/attempted settings vary 
from required settings defined by the policy, then the administrator of the 
system/application should be alerted with the details. The details should include, the 
affected machine, the affected application, the user responsible, current settings, and 
required settings stated by the policy. The monitoring system needs to be provided 
with the required settings for each application installed on each machine, so that 
analysis can be made to determine whether the changes made by the user conforms to 
requirements. 
Database access: Each user's database access statistics can be monitored on the basis 
of the number of records accessed per defined period, the number o f records accessed 
per related event/quantity, and comparing the number of records accessed by each user 
to that of the average accessed by other users belonging to the same role within the 
organisation. However, the validity o f each record accessed by each user should also 
be verified. When a record is viewed, the monitoring system should be able to 
determine whether the user had a valid reason to access the record. I f a record is added 
or updated, the monitoring system should be able to determine the integrity of the data 
within the record. The monitoring system needs to be provided with the list of data 
tables that require monitoring, and the corresponding data table where the data for 
reference may be found. The monitoring system also needs to know the attributes that 
share a common value in both data tables, so that the corresponding reference record 
may be identified. The monitoring system also needs the information regarding the 
attributes that need to be verified from the two tables, and the condition of the 
verification, i.e. check for existence, both values must equal, or a value must be True. 
Internet access: Employees may abuse the ability to access the Internet through 
organisation's IT systems by downloading illegal software, online shopping, and 
accessing inappropriate content. In order to be able to detect abuse, the monitoring 
system must be provided with acceptable usage policy. The acceptable usage policy 
may indicate the acceptable number of bytes downloaded per defmed period or per 
user, the URLs deemed acceptable for access, the acceptable amount of time spent 
utilising the web browser, and the types of media acceptable for download. 
5. Conclusions 
Without having relevant data for analysis, the monitoring system wil l not be able to carryout 
accurate detection of possible misfeasor activity. The data analysed by current IDS related to 
network and system level events, and these data may be analysed for detecting network 
penetrations and privilege escalation attacks. However, the misfeasors do not need to perform 
network penetrations or privilege escalation attacks in order to gain access to the network and 
systems. Misfeasors already have legitimate access to network and systems in order to carry 
out their day-to-day tasks. However, while some of the activities may be perfectly acceptable 
at network and system level, the activity may be unacceptable within the context of the 
application and acceptable usage policy defined by the organisation. Therefore, in order to be 
able to detect violation o f contextual rules regarding the application, organisation, or a 
business process, the monitoring system needs to be provided with the contextual information 
related to application, organisation, business operations, and acceptable usage policy. 
Currently, a demo misfeasor monitoring tool is being designed based on the specifications 
derived from the discussion made in this paper, and developed in order to test the relevance of 
log data mentioned for the analysis of misfeasor scenarios. 
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